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Abstract
The historical goal of cryptography is to securely transmit or store a message in an insecure
medium. In that era, before public key cryptography, we had two kinds of people: those
who had the correct key, and those who did not. Nowadays however, we live in a complex
world with equally complex goals and requirements: securely passing a note from Alice to
Bob is not enough. We want Alice to use her smartphone to vote for Carol, without Bob the
tallier, or anyone else learning her vote; we also want guarantees that Alice’s ballot contains
a single, valid vote and we want guarantees that Bob will tally the ballots properly. This is
in fact made possible because of zero knowledge protocols.
This thesis presents research performed in the area of zero knowledge protocols across
the following threads: we relax the assumptions necessary for the Damga˚rd, Fazio and
Nicolosi (DFN) transformation, a technique which enables one to collapse a number of
three round protocols into a single message. This approach is motivated by showing how
it could be used as part of a voting scheme. Then we move onto a protocol that lets us
prove that a given computation (modeled as an arithmetic circuit) was performed correctly.
It improves upon the state of the art in the area by significantly reducing the communication
cost.
A second strand of research concerns multi-user signatures, which enable a signer to
sign with respect to a set of users. We give new definitions for important primitives in the
area as well as efficient instantiations using zero knowledge protocols.
Finally, we present two possible answers to the question posed by voting receipts. One
is to maximise privacy by building a voting system that provides receipt-freeness automati-
cally. The other is to use them to enable conventual and privacy preserving vote copying.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The historical goal of cryptography is to securely transmit or store a message via an insecure
medium. In that era, before public key cryptography, we had two kinds of people: those
who had the correct key, and those who did not. Nowadays however, we live in a complex
world with equally complex goals and requirements: securely passing a note from Alice
to Bob is not enough. We want Alice to be able to use her smartphone to vote for Carol,
without Bob the tallier, or anyone else learning her vote, we want guarantees that Alice’s
ballot contains a single, valid vote and we want guarantees that Bob will tally the ballots
properly. This is in fact made possible because of zero knowledge protocols.
Generalizing from the voting example, in a zero knowledge protocol a prover wishes
to convince a verifier that a particular statement is true. Alice, in our example, would want
to convince Bob that her (encrypted) ballot only contains a single vote (as opposed to 5, or
simply random data). Alice, acting as the prover has some private information (a witness)
which would convince anyone, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the statement is true.
However, the prover does not wish to reveal this witness. Alice could easily convince Bob
by showing him the contents of her ballot i.e. her vote, as well as any randomness used to
encrypt it, but this would completely defeat the secrecy of her ballot. Zero knowledge pro-
tocols allow us to satisfy both parties: without revealing the witness to anyone, they make
it infeasible (or even impossible) for the prover to convince the verifier of false statements.
Balancing security and privacy is hard enough on its own, but to fully capture our
voting example we need a third pillar: efficiency. After all, Alice wants to vote on her
smartphone, and Bob might need to process and tally thousands if not millions of ballots.
Efficiency can manifest itself in different ways: processing time, storage space or interac-
tivity, the need for back and forth communication between the two parties.
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In this thesis we will study four different areas, each time improving upon the state
of the art in one of the three pillars. We will consider: (a) Non-interactive zero knowledge
designated verifier arguments, where we remove a computational assumption and replace it
with one that can be fully realised in applications, (b) The evaluation of arithmetic circuits
where we improve on existing work in terms of processing time as well as communica-
tion, (c) Accountable Ring Signatures and Group signatures, where we provide a compact
accountable ring signature, give a new, more precise definition of group signatures and
demonstrate how one can obtain a group signature scheme from accountable ring signa-
tures. Finally, (d) we will examine the topic of receipt-freeness in voting from two opposite
directions: first by building a voting system that achieves a strong version of the property,
and second by studying a secure vote-copying protocol built on top of a voting system lack-
ing in receipt-freeness.
In many cases the improvements listed in the above contributions are not free: often
there is a price to be paid in terms of efficiency or stronger assumptions (or equivalently,
potentially weaker security). We will discuss these issues and make comparisons with works
tackling similar problems with different methods in the following chapters. In the rest of
this chapter we will give a succinct introduction to each problem area in order to establish
some context for our contributions.
1.1 Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
The original notion of zero knowledge, due to Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89],
captures interactive protocols between a prover and a verifier. Such protocols enable the
prover to convince the verifier that a given statement is true, whilst satisfying the following
properties:
Completeness If the statement is indeed true, the protocol will convince the verifier.
Soundness If the statement is false, it will be infeasible for the prover to convince the
verifier, even if she attempts to cheat by deviating from the protocol.
Zero Knowledge The protocol gives the verifier only a single bit of information: that the
statement is true.
Such statements can also have witnesses associated with them. For example, Alice
may state that her ballot contains a valid vote. A possible witness would be the vote and
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the randomness used to produce the ballot. Given a statement and a witness, verification
is simple. The object of zero knowledge protocols is to allow verification to be performed
accurately without revealing the witness, or in fact leaking any other information.
The concept of the witness is tightly coupled with the working definition of zero knowl-
edge: that there exists a way to simulate the execution of the protocol regarding a true state-
ment without needing to know the corresponding witness. Intuitively, a simulated execution
cannot give information regarding the witness because the witness was never a part of it.
However, if such simulated executions are indistinguishable from real ones, then real ones
cannot leak information either.
When real and simulated transcripts follow identical distributions, we have perfect
zero-knowledge. We can relax this to statistical zero knowledge, where the two distributions
are statistically close, or even computational zero knowledge, where the distributions are
indistinguishable only by computationally-bound adversaries.
Similarly, perfect soundness means that the prover cannot cheat, statistical soundness
means that any cheating prover will fail to prove a false statement with overwhelming prob-
ability and computational soundness further relaxes this to only cover polynomially-bound
provers. Computationally sound protocols are called arguments, as opposed to proofs.
The motivation behind such relaxations is efficiency: we know that perfect soundness
precludes short (sub-linear) proofs for non-trivial languages [GVW02, GH98]. At the same
time, succinct arguments were presented by Kilian [Kil92] in 4 rounds and later compressed
to a single round by Micali [Mic94] via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Round complexity is a
particularly important parameter, moreso when they only require a single move and are thus
non-interactive. We call such Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge protocols NIZKs [BFM88].
The Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS87] is a widely used tool to transform a Sigma
protocol into a NIZK proof. It is conceptually simple, and efficient to implement: we
simply replace the verifier’s challenge with a hash of the protocol’s transcript thus far. The
transformation is secure in the random oracle model (ROM) [BR93] where the hash function
is idealised into a truly random function. Furthermore, the model also allows for the oracle
to be programmed (even adaptively) if required.
Unfortunately, the random oracle model is too strong. Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi
[CGH04] proved that for any candidate hash function, one can build encryption schemes and
signature schemes which are secure under the ROM, but trivially insecure in practice. This
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was later generalised by Goldwasser and Kalai [GK03] who produced signature schemes
that would fail for any instantiation while being provably secure in the ROM. Nevertheless,
it is still widely used as there is evidence that non-interactive zero knowledge with sub-
linear communication cost requires unfalsifiable assumptions [GW11] i.e. assumptions that
cannot be modeled as a security game whose outcome can be efficiently checked.
One alternative to the Fiat-Shamir transformation is the one by Damga˚rd, Fazio and Ni-
colosi (DFN) [DFN06], which can be used to transform a restricted class of Sigma-protocols
into NIZK arguments for a designated verifier. In their transformation, instead of using a
hash to replace the verifier’s challenge, the verifier registers an encrypted challenge ahead
of time. Because the cryptosystem used for this is additively homomorphic, and the prover’s
last message is linear in the challenge, the prover is able to complete the protocol by produc-
ing a ciphertext containing her answer. However, the security proof for their construction
requires a complexity leveraging assumption: i.e. a class of (possibly super-polynomial)
adversaries strong enough to completely break one computational problem but at the same
time weak enough that a second problem remains hard. In contrast with gap assumptions
(where two problems are separated into “easy” and “hard” ), both problems are considered
hard for polynomial adversaries. The additional tiering into “hard” and “very hard” only
becomes relevant inside certain security reductions.
In chapter 4 we will revisit the DFN transformation with the goal of removing the
complexity leveraging assumption they require. To do that, we use the concept of culpable
soundness [GOS12], which is a relaxation of standard soundness in that a successful adver-
sary needs to not only prove a false statement, but also provide a proof of this falsehood,
called a guilt witness, in a fashion established ahead of time. The nature of guilt witnesses
can be different for every application. In the case of the DFN transformation, they take the
form of decryption keys, allowing us to peek inside ciphertexts that would be brute forced
under the original complexity leveraging assumption. It might seem that we are essentially
formalizing the same concept in a different way, but that is false. The second part of our
contribution is to demonstrate a practical application of NIZKs (namely, a simplified voting
system) where the guilt witness is available in the environment. Thus, whereas the security
of the original construction is conditioned on the complexity leveraging assumption for all
applications, we manage to show that for certain applications the equivalent assumption (i.e.
the infeasibility of a proof for a false statement absent a guilt witness) is always satisfied.
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This is done by building a minimal voting system: the decryption key for the ballots serves
as the guilt witness. Since the key exists in the environment, and soundness does not rely
on it being secret, we are able to make any successful adversary culpable by simply giving
them the key.
1.2 Protocols for Arithmetic Circuits
Arithmetic circuits are a more expressive variant of binary circuits: instead of restricting the
values carried by wires to 1s and 0s, we consider values from a finite field Zp. We mainly
consider addition and multiplication gates (note that AND gates are essentially multiplica-
tion gates and OR gates can be built out of addition and multiplication –with the help of a
constant “-1” wire). Apart from their generality, arithmetic circuits are also practical: there
exists a compiler of restricted C programs to arithmetic circuits.
This practicality of arithmetic circuits is also manifest in their use in the veri-
fiable computation setting. Verifiable computation (VC) setting eschews zero knowl-
edge in favour of efficiency. By using succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge
(SNARKs) [GGPR13] based on bilinear maps, Pinocchio [PHGR13] manages to produce a
verifiable computation system with constant-size proofs where verification times for a com-
putation are faster than running the computation locally. Most of this efficiency is preserved
when adding zero knowledge to our requirements.
When we consider protocols based on the discrete log problem, the most efficient ones
are those of Groth [Gro09b] and Seo [Seo11], both achieving square root communication.
ZKBoo [GOM16] relies only on collision resistant hash functions and achieves excellent
performance but produces large proofs (linear in both the circuit size and the desired sound-
ness parameter).
In chapter 5 we will give a discrete log protocol for the evaluation of arithmetic circuits
that manages to improve upon the state of the art in the following ways:
• We can achieve logarithmic proof size by using a logarithmic number of rounds.
• For constant rounds, we can match the 5 move interaction cost of Seo’s protocol,
while also achieving lower communication and computation cost than Groth’s 7 move
protocol, improving upon what would be the “best of both worlds”.
• We are able to tune the number of rounds to any intermediate point between the loga-
rithmic and the constant version, enabling us to balance communication and compu-
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tation cost as required.
• The protocol comes with a prototype python implementation, which manages to out-
perform Pinocchio’s prover (but not the verifier).
1.3 Multiuser Signatures
Group and Ring signatures allow a team member to sign with respect to that team without
disclosing her identity. A trivial solution would be to create a single signing key for the
team and give it to every member. Obviously, this solution is extremely poor: there is no
accountability, no ability to remove users (other than starting over) and members of multiple
teams need to be given keys for every team. Group signatures [CvH91] offer solutions to
these problems: they provide a tracing algorithm that can be run in case of abuse, so as
to reveal the individual who produced the signature on a malicious message. The group is
overseen by a manager who is also responsible for adding users (dynamic groups) or adding
and removing users (fully dynamic groups) from the group.
Ring signatures [RST01] do away with the manager and effectively let users manage
themselves: any user is able to define a ring (i.e. a set of users that includes herself) and
sign with respect to it. Every signature can be attached to a different ring. However, ring
signatures typically lack a tracing functionality. Accountable ring signatures are a more
recent concept that attempts to combine the best features of groups and rings: users are
still free to define the ring they are signing against, but accountability is still enforced.
Furthermore, ring signature schemes can allow signers to specify who will be the tracing
authority. This can enable interoperability by allowing the same infrastructure and keys to
be reused across different settings by only changing the authority specified. For example,
Alice would use the same credentials to sign as a member of her employer’s information
security team (with the team members as the ring, and their manager as the tracing authority)
as well as a member of her local science fiction book club (with the club members forming
the ring, and Bob, the club president as the authority).
Existing definitions for dynamic group signatures are oftentimes built around a spe-
cific instantiation, and in that way inherit some of its flaws. As we will see, this is in fact
the case with some constructions based around revocation lists. Revocation lists are one
method used to achieve revocation i.e. the removal of a member from a group. They re-
quire that the signer also provides proof that her identity is not featured in a list of revoked
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users that is published by the manager. Intuitively, this might seem to capture our security
requirement: revoking a user prevents them from signing afterwards. However, this proves
to be imprecise: what one would reasonably expect is that users are able to sign with re-
spect to time periods following them joining the group and (if applicable) preceding their
revocation. Schemes such as [NFHF09,LPY12b,LPY12a], which follow the revocation list
paradigm fail to consider a simple back-dating attack: a user who joined the group in June
is not prevented from signing with regards to the group membership as it was in March.
In the absence of a reliable opening oracle, this may implicitly frame past members. In
this thesis we will study both group and ring signatures. We will first address accountable
ring signatures (Chap. 6), starting with definitions before moving on to a construction in
the discrete logarithm setting. Our construction is based on the ring signature of Groth
and Kohlweiss [GK14] but adds accountability as well as some performance enhancements
(namely n-ary trees instead of binary, and substituting Pedersen commitments for ElGamal
ciphertexts when possible).
We will then move to group signatures (Chap. 7) and give a rigorous set of definitions
for their security. We also give a full description of the backdating attack, and show how
affected schemes may be repaired. Finally, we show how existing models for group signa-
tures can be described in our framework. Finally, we link the two concepts, and show how
group signatures and can be built from accountable ring signatures, with our scheme used
as a concrete example.
1.4 Voting and Receipt Freeness
Electronic Voting has been a prominent cryptographic application for the last 30 years, af-
ter Chaum’s early work [Cha81]. However, Internet voting for general elections is only
regularly practiced in a limited number of countries [SFD+14]. A few more use electronic
in-person voting (with cryptography being deployed in varying degrees). By contrast, finan-
cial transactions over the internet are near-ubiquitous. If Alice can buy a new phone from
her computer (or a new computer from her phone) why is internet voting so hard?
First off, the privacy requirements are much stricter. If Alice orders a pizza over the
internet she might reasonably expect her choice of toppings or sides to be private; using
more recent payment systems, the identity of the business she’s paying might be obscured
as well. The amount transacted however needs to be made known to her bank, which Alice
must (at least partly) trust. Part of this trust may also be mitigated via regulation and state
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oversight.
When voting however, Alice expects a higher degree of privacy. Ideally, the only infor-
mation that’s disclosed is whether she voted or not (if that). In practice, some voting systems
might reveal her ballot, but only after anonymizing it, and usually in a restricted setting. To
achieve this via cryptography we use systems based on either blind signatures [Cha83] or
homomorphic encryption such as [Elg85]. Blind signatures enable a voter to anonymously
demonstrate her eligibility, reducing the problem to that of anonymously submitting the
signed vote. Systems where votes encrypted via a homomorphic scheme allow for two so-
lutions: they may be passed through a series of shuffling servers (a Mixnet), or they may be
tallied homomorphically, where an encryption of the tally is produced directly by summing
the encrypted votes. Zero knowledge protocols are used to ensure correct behaviour in all
cases.
Even so, voting introduces an extra hurdle: we might need to protect Alice from her-
self. In particular we should not leave Alice in a position where she is able to prove how
she voted, as that would leave her open to coercion. This property, introduced by Benaloh
and Tuinstra [BT94], is receipt freeness, i.e. the requirement that voters are unable (even if
willing) to construct receipts for their ballots. A receipt in this context allows its holder to
check whether a ballot is in support of a particular candidate (e.g. by providing the random-
ness used in constructing the ballot). Unfortunately, preventing Alice from having a receipt
rules out most of the easy solutions to verifiability [CMFPT06] necessitating additional
assumptions such as trusted hardware, multi-party protocols or untappable channels.
In this thesis we will study two modifications of the Helios voting system. Helios, is
a well-studied and widely deployed internet voting system based on homomorphic tallying.
It is proposed as a system for elections in low coercion environments. Because it runs as a
javascript application, users in control of their web browser are able to produce receipts by
running simple javascript commands (see Sect. 8.2.1).
In chapter 8 we investigate the lack of receipt freeness as an opportunity for controlled
ballot copying. Ballot copying without controls was pointed out in [CS11, CS13] and later
developed into controlled ballot copying by [DC12]. Desmedt and Chaidos gave a vote-
copying protocol utilising the divertibility of the proofs used in Helios. However, in order to
maintain compatibility with Helios their protocol was only zero knowledge against honest
verifiers (or copiers). In addition their privacy definition was informal, which as pointed
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out in [SB13] fails to highlight the privacy implications of the protocol itself versus those
implied by the act of allowing copies. The work in this thesis repairs both issues: first we
give a formal definition of privacy for ballot copying, and second, we extend the original
Ballot copying protocol so as to achieve full zero knowledge.
In a different direction, chapter 9 will address the lack of receipt freeness by intro-
ducing BeleniosRF: a Helios inspired voting system which uses the encryption scheme
of [BFPV11a] to achieve a strong variant of receipt freeness. Signed Randomizable Ci-
phertexts enable an intermediate server to rerandomise ballots before posting but prevents
tampering or wholesale replacement. This ensures that a voter is unable to produce a re-
ceipt even if she were to disclose all of her information. This is similar to the notion of
RCCA [CKN03] encryption, which combines the strong tamper-resistance of CCA-secure
encryption with a rerandomisation functionality. However, since it does not involve signa-
tures, RCCA security cannot guard against wholesale replacement, but only against tamper-
ing.
1.5 Structure
The next chapter 2 covers related work, and highlights the motivations and techniques be-
hind the results in this thesis. Chapter 3 covers background concepts and gives definitions
that will be used throughout the text. In some cases, highly domain-specific concepts will
be deferred until the chapter in which they will be relevant.
The rest of the chapters are based around different projects. They may be read inde-
pendently for the most part with any exceptions being mentioned in the text. Thematically,
they form three loose groups. In the first group, chapter 4 covers the revisiting of the DFN
transformation which, while being applicable to only a small subset of protocol, can still be
used in a wide range of applications. After that, chapter 5 focuses exclusively on calcula-
tions that can be represented as arithmetic circuits. This produces a highly efficient family
of protocols under without relying on any strong assumptions (for the online version).
The next two chapters, 6 and 7 cover multiuser signatures. We start by giving a def-
inition and a generic construction for accountable ring signatures along with a very size-
efficient instantiation. We also demonstrate how accountable ring signatures (ARS) can be
used to derive both ring signatures and group signatures. Next, in chapter 7 we focus on
giving new definitions for fully dynamic group signatures. Our interest is motivated both by
some weaknesses present in existing definitions, as well as the presence of our ARS based
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construction.
Finally the last two chapters consider two divergent approaches to the issue of non
receipt-free voting systems, such as Helios. In chapter 8 we exploit the presence of receipts
to build a secure system allowing for consentual ballot copying. Opposing this, in chapter 9
we present BeleniosRF, a derivative of Helios designed to achieve receipt freeness without
requiring any extra work from the voter.
Chapter 10 concludes this work and offers some potential future directions.
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Cerulli, Essam Ghadafi, Jens Groth and Christophe Petit, and was published in
ESORICS 2015 as [BCC+15].
• The research presented in chapter 7 was joint work with Jonathan Bootle, An-
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as [BCC+16a].
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• The research presented in chapter 9 is joint work with Ve´ronique Cortier, Georg
Fuchsbauer and David Galindo, and was published in CCS 2016 as [CCFG16].
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter covers relevant parts of existing work with the aim of establishing both context
and motivation for the results that follow. First, we cover the area of zero-knowledge proto-
cols, with a focus on non-interactivity as well as circuit-based protocols. Non-interactivity
is a crucial feature for many applications as it is not feasible to assume that all participants
in a system are online at the same time. At the same time, efficient circuit-based approaches
can find wide usage in applications for which a tailor-made protocol is unavailable or in-
feasible. Multi-user signatures follow, where users are able to sign not as individuals but as
member of a large set. Oftentimes, they use zero knowledge techniques to enforce correct
behaviour amongst the (sometimes untrusted participants). Finally, we cover voting appli-
cations, focusing on solutions using homomorphic tallying such as Helios [Adi08]. Again,
non-interactive zero knowledge protocols are a core component as malicious ballots need
to be detected before being tallied into the result.
Parts of this chapter are derived from [CG15, BCC+16b, BCC+15, BCC+16a, DC12,
CCFG16] as well as the author’s upgrade report.
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2.1 Zero Knowledge
Zero-knowledge proofs were invented by Goldwasser et al. [GMR89]. Since then, they have
been used in a number of cryptographic applications, particularly in areas covered in this
text.
2.1.1 Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
Σ-protocols are particular types of 3-move honest verifier zero-knowledge proofs that can
be highly efficient. However, in many applications (e.g. in voting or in multiparty signa-
tures) it is preferable for a protocol to be non-interactive [BFM88] with the prover prepar-
ing a proof with no need for direct input from the verifier. The Fiat-Shamir transforma-
tion [FS87] produces a non-interactive version of a Σ-protocol by substituting the verifier’s
challenge with the output of a hash function on the prover’s statement and messages. The
transformation can be proven secure in the random oracle model [BR93]. However, the ran-
dom oracle model is regarded with some skepticism since there exist pathological protocols
that can be proven secure in the random oracle model but fail in any real-world instantia-
tion [CGH04, GK03].
The introduction of pairing-based techniques [GOS12, Gro06, GS12] has led to prac-
tically efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that can be used in the context
of pairing-based cryptography. Recently pairing-based succinct non-interactive zero-
knowledge arguments [Gro10b, GGPR13, PHGR13] have become very compact even for
large scale statements, however, they rely on knowledge extractor assumptions over bilin-
ear groups.
The above research yields non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that are publicly ver-
ifiable. However, there are many settings where it suffices to have non-interactive zero-
knowledge arguments intended for a designated verifier. Cramer and Shoup used universal
hash proofs to build a highly efficient public-key encryption scheme [CS98, CS02], secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks. Non-interactive proofs for a designated verifier for all
languages in NP can be found in [BCNP04] in the key registration model where parties
register keys.
Damga˚rd, Fazio and Nicolosi (DFN) [DFN06] introduced an alternative to the Fiat-
Shamir transformation. The DFN transformation works in the Registered Key Model
(RKM) [BCNP04] where a verifier registers a public key and transforms a Σ-protocol with
linear answer into a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument that can be verified by this
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specific verifier [JSI96]. The transformation works by having the verifier encrypt his chal-
lenge under an additively homomorphic encryption scheme and relies on the Σ-protocol
having an answer that can be computed using linear algebra and the homomorphic property
of the encryption scheme to enable the prover to complete an encrypted version of the an-
swer in the Σ-protocol. Their construction is secure for a logarithmic number of proofs but
soundness rests on a complexity leveraging assumption. A complexity leveraging assump-
tions states that there is a hardness separation between two hard problems, i.e. that there
exist solvers for the first problem, running in time T , but no T -bound adversary can solve
the second problem with more than negligible probability. This allows security reductions
to raise a contradiction by solving the second, harder, problem using the adversary, and a
solver for the first problem.
Ventre and Visconti [VV09] give an alternative proof of soundness for a construction
based on a two ciphertext variation of the DFN transformation in the style of Naor and
Yung [NY90]. They replace the complexity leveraging assumption by introducing a modi-
fication of culpable soundness1 [GOS12] that they call weak culpable soundness. Culpable
soundness restricts adversaries to being “aware” of the falsehood of the statement they are
proving. Weak culpable soundness furthermore requires that the adversary is also aware of
the fact that she has succeeded in producing a convincing proof of a false statement, by
producing a second auxiliary proof to that effect.
In the DFN setting using weak culpable soundness would require the adversary to
prove statements containing ciphertexts addressed to the designated verifier. It would be
challenging to provide such an adversary with enough power to perform the required proofs
without having knowledge of the verifier’s secret decryption key (if the adversary knows
the verifiers key, the system serves no function). To overcome this, in chapter 5 we will
instead opt to construct the underlying protocol with the property that forged proofs reveal
the challenge. This is enough to contradict the semantic security of the encryption scheme
used for the designated verifier proof if a false proof is ever produced.
2.1.2 Circuit-Based Protocols
Since the introduction of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs by Blum, Feldman and
Micali [BFM88] much effort has been spent on reducing their size [Dam92, KP98, Gro10a,
GGI+14].
1Culpable soundness was also called co-soundness in an earlier version of [GOS12].
32 Chapter 2. Literature Review
Both [Dam92] and [KP98] suggest protocols on circuit satisfiability, since SAT is NP-
Complete and computer operations are naturally represented as circuits. Both protocols
essentially operate in the hidden bits model, where a shared random string is “interpreted”
in a way that hides information from the verifier while still preventing the prover from
cheating. [Dam92] uses a shared sting of cubic size in the circuit size to encode the gates
of the circuit as quadratic residues of large numbers (where squares encode 0 and non-
squares 1). The prover then proves consistency by demonstrating that hidden values which
are claimed to be equal multiply up to a square. However, the size of the proofs is as large
as that of the common string. In [KP98] the dependency on the circuit size is reduced to
n logn by using a different encoding with less redundancy.
This is further reduced to a quasi-linear dependency in the circuit in [Gro10a] by us-
ing probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) i.e. large proofs that may be convincingly
checked by accessing only a small portion thereof. This helps compact the proof as the
probability of a malicious prover failing is high in the base case, eliminating the need to
boost it via repetition.
Gentry et al. [GGI+14] used fully homomorphic encryption to construct zero-
knowledge proofs where the communication complexity corresponds to the size of the
witness. However, proofs cannot in general have communication that is smaller than
the witness size unless surprising results about the complexity of solving SAT instances
hold [GH98, GVW02].
It is useful to distinguish between zero-knowledge proofs, with statistical soundness,
and zero-knowledge arguments with computational soundness. In general proofs can only
have computational zero-knowledge, while arguments may have perfect zero-knowledge.
Goldreich et al. [GMW91] showed that all languages in NP have zero-knowledge proofs
while Brassard et al. [BCC88] showed that all languages in NP have zero-knowledge argu-
ments with perfect zero-knowledge.
Kilian [Kil92] showed that in contrast to zero-knowledge proofs, zero-knowledge ar-
guments can have very low communication complexity. His construction relied on the PCP
theorem though, and did not yield a practical scheme.
Schnorr [Sch91] and Guillou and Quisquater [GQ88] gave early examples of practical
zero-knowledge arguments for concrete number theoretic problems. Extending Schnorr’s
protocols, there have been many constructions of zero-knowledge arguments based on the
2.1. Zero Knowledge 33
discrete logarithm assumption. Cramer and Damga˚rd [CD98] gave a zero-knowledge argu-
ment for arithmetic circuit satisfiability, which has linear communication complexity.
Currently the most efficient discrete logarithm based zero-knowledge arguments for
arithmetic circuits are the ones by Groth [Gro09b] and Seo [Seo11], which are constant
move arguments with a communication proportional to the square root of the circuit size.
A square root barrier. The works of [Gro09b, Seo11] share the common pattern of repre-
senting the circuit state as a matrix, using a commitment to represent each row, doing some
protocol specific work and finishing with de-commiting a function of the committed rows.
This seems to imply a square root lower bound on the size of such a proof: committing
has a cost equal to the number of rows and revealing has a cost equal to the number of
columns. Since both parts seem critical to proving soundness it seems that further improve-
ments would either require a complete rethink of the representation and proof structure, or
an intermediate “compression” step allowing us to reveal less data.
The work of [Gro09a] can be thought of as one such step, moving from a matrix to a
cube to give a zero-knowledge argument with a cubic root communication complexity, but
uses pairing-based cryptography instead of just relying on the discrete logarithm assump-
tion. In the discrete log setting, [BG12] use an iterable reduction to reduce computation
by compressing one problem instance into a smaller one (obviously, this hinges on the cost
difference of the two instances being larger than that of the compression).
There are recent works giving a logarithmic communication complexity for specific
languages. Bayer and Groth [BG13] show that one can prove that a polynomial evalu-
ated at a secret committed value gives a certain output with a logarithmic communication
complexity and Groth and Kohlweiss [GK14] show that one can prove that one out of N
commitments contain 0 with logarithmic communication complexity. These results are for
very specific types of statements (with low circuit depth) and the techniques do not seem to
generalise to arbitrary NP languages.
An exciting line of research [Gro10b, Lip12, BCCT12, GGPR13, BCCT13, PHGR13,
BCG+13, BCTV14, GK14] has developed many proposals for succinct non-interactive ar-
guments (SNARGs) yielding pairing-based constructions where the arguments consist of a
constant number of group elements. However, they all rely on a common reference string
(with a special structure) and non-falsifiable knowledge extractor assumptions. In contrast,
the arguments we develop in Chapter 5 are based solely on the discrete logarithm assump-
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tion, and use a small common reference string which is independent of the circuit.
2.2 Multi-user Signatures
2.2.1 Group Signatures
After their introduction by [CvH91], a long line of research on group signatures has
emerged. In the early years, security of group signatures was not well understood and early
constructions were proven secure via informal arguments using various interpretations of
their requirements.
Bellare et al. [BMW03] formalised the security definitions for static groups. In their
model, the group manager (who also acts as the tracing authority) needs to be fully trusted.
Later on, Bellare et al. [BSZ05] and Kiayias and Yung [KY06] provided formal security def-
initions for the more practical partially dynamic case. Also, [BSZ05] separated the tracing
role from the group management. In both [BSZ05, KY06] models, members cannot leave
the group once they have joined. More recently, Sakai et al. [SSE+12] strengthened the
security definitions for partially dynamic groups by defining opening soundness, ensuring
that a valid signature only traces to one user.
The first practical and provably secure group signature was due to Ateniese et
al. [ACJT00]. It yields signatures of constant size and are based on the DDH and the
strong RSA assumptions, in the random oracle model. Their scheme was later improved
by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya to allow efficient revocation of group member using dy-
namic accumulators [CL02]. Boneh et al. [BBS04] also constructed constant size group
signatures under the strong Diffie-Hellman and the Decision Linear assumption in pair-
ing groups. Other pairing-based schemes include [ACHdM05, NS04, CG05, BW07, Gro07,
CKS09,LPY12a]. Recently, Langlois et al. [LLNW14] gave an efficient lattice-based group
signature scheme supporting revocation, based on the hardness of approximating the short-
est independent vectors problem in lattice of dimension n within a factor O˜(n1.5).
Group Signatures Without Revocation. Constructions of group signatures in the ran-
dom oracle model [BR93] include [CS97, CM98, ACJT00, BBS04, CL04, CG05, NS04,
FI05, FY04, KY05, DP06, BCN+10]. Constructions not relying on random oracles in-
clude [ACHdM05, Gro06, BW06, Gro07, BW07, AHO10].
Group Signatures With Revocation. Since revocation is an essential feature of group
signatures, many researchers investigated the different approaches via which such a feature
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can be realised. One approach is for the group manager to change the group public key
when members are removed and issue new group signing keys to all remaining legitimate
members or allow them to update their old signing keys accordingly. This is the approach
adopted by e.g. [TX03, CL02].
Bresson and Stern [BS01] realise revocation by requiring that the signer proves at
the time of signing that her group membership certificate is not among those contained
in a public revocation list. Another approach, which was adopted by e.g. [CL02, TX03,
DKNS04, Ngu05], uses accumulators, i.e. functions that map a set of values into a fixed-
length string and permit efficient proofs of membership.
Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] showed that their static group signature scheme
supports revocation since it allows members to update their signing keys according to the
changes in the group without the involvement of the manager. Camenisch and Groth [CG05]
also gave a construction that supports revocation. Song [Son01] gave a fully dynamic group
signature with forward security.
A different approach for revocation known as Verifier Local Revocation (VLR), which
needs relaxation of some of the security requirements, considered by Brickell [Bri04], was
subsequently formalised by Boyen and Shacham [BS04] and further used in e.g. [NF05,
LV09, LLNW14]. In VLR, the revocation information (i.e. revocation lists) is only sent to
the verifiers (as opposed to both verifiers and signers) who can check whether a particular
signature was generated by a revoked member. A similar approach is also used in Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocols [BCC04]. Traceable Signatures [KTY04] extend
this idea, as the group manager can release a trapdoor for each member, enabling their
signatures to be traced back to the individual user.
More recently, Libert, Peters and Yung [LPY12b, LPY12a] gave a number of efficient
constructions of group signatures supporting revocation without requiring random oracles
by utilizing the subset cover framework [NNL01] that was originally used in the context
of broadcast encryption. [NFHF09] is another certificate-based scheme and achieves con-
stant size as well as signing and verification time in the random oracle model. However,
the security models of [LPY12b, LPY12a, NFHF09] all fail to account for users producing
“backdated” signatures (i.e. signatures w.r.t to a time before them joining the group). While
one would expect such signatures to be invalid, the models do not cover it and their con-
structions allow them to verify. As such, this may be used to (implicitly) implicate past
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users for the actions of current ones. In Chapter 7 we examine this attack in detail, fix the
affected schemes and provide a strict definition for fully dynamic group signatures.
2.2.2 Ring Signatures
Ring Signatures were first introduced in [RST01], offering a way for users to sign on behalf
of a set without the requirement for managers or registration. Their construction produces
signatures with size linear in the group. A formal security model for ring signatures was
provided by Bender et al. [BKM09].
Constant-size ring signatures can be based on the strong RSA assumption [DKNS04]
and on pairing assumptions [Ngu05]. Very recently, Groth and Kohlweiss provided a ring
signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model,
which is asymptotically more efficient than previous ones.
2.2.3 Accountable Ring Signatures
Accountable ring signatures were informally defined by Xu and Yung [XY04]. Their secu-
rity model mitigates the trust on the opener by using several openers and a threshold decryp-
tion mechanism. However, their construction requires a cumbersome registration protocol
between the user, her smart card and the opener, whereas in our model a user needs only
to be aware of the public key of an opener (the opener does not need to be aware of the
user). This makes it simpler and more efficient to compartmentalize trust by using different
openers for different contexts (e.g posting on a technical message board vs a political one)
as there is no registration process to be duplicated.
The [DKNS04] construction, supports identity escrow in a model similar to that of
accountable ring signatures, but without requiring openers to prove the opening is correct
when they claim a particular user made a signature.
Traceable ring signatures [FS08] and linkable ring signatures [LWW04] also offer
some restricted form of accountability. In traceable ring signatures, any couple of signa-
tures produced by the same user and under the same tag will reveal her identity if they sign
different messages. Two signatures by the same user for the same message and under the
same tag will be distinguishable as duplicates, but without revealing the signer. In linkable
group signatures, it is possible to efficiently decide whether two signatures were produced
by the same user but without revealing his identity. Unique ring signatures [FZ13] encom-
pass elements of both traceable and linkable ring signatures: signatures by the same user
for the same message will be linked, but signatures of different messages have no special
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property.
2.3 Internet Voting
The technical feasibility for internet voting was first pointed out by Chaum [Cha81], and
was followed by a large output of research, broadly split into three “schools” of ensuring
anonymity. Mix-Based approaches, (also introduced in [Cha81], along with their voting ap-
plication) operate by shuffling ballots before decrypting them so that the link between voter
and vote is obscured. Solutions based on blind signatures [Cha83] focus on anonymous
“endorsement” (i.e. signing) of ballots by authorities so that only registered voters can get
their ballots endorsed while the authorities are unable to determine the voter behind a final
ballot. Finally, solutions based on homomorphic tallying require a homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme so that ballots can be added together before they are decrypted, so that only an
encryption of the tally requires decryption.
2.3.1 Homomorphic Tallying
Initial efforts in homomorphic tallying systems are due to Benaloh (previously Cohen)
[CF85,BY86]. In such a system valid encrypted ballots can be added together in a straight-
forward manner to produce an encrypted sum of the votes. Both systems used a form of
cut and choose approach where the validity of an encrypted ballot would be guaranteed by
interactively revealing part of it in a random way they differ in that the later system supports
multiple authorities to better manage trust. The randomness for the ballot proof was facili-
tated by means of a beacon. Later systems such as [CFSY96, CGS97a] use the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic in place of a beacon in order to provide random challenges for the proofs of ballot
validity. Both systems support multiple authorities but [CGS97a] is more efficient by us-
ing threshold encryption [DF90] rather than the more expensive technique of verified secret
sharing [Fel87]. The system of Hirt & Sako [HS00] modify [CGS97a] to provide the newer
security property of receipt freeness [BT94]. This is accomplished by having the authority
prepare a list of encryptions of all possible options in a scrambled order and giving the voter
a designated verifier proof of the correct ordering. Because of the designated verifier prop-
erty (i.e the verifier is in the unique position of being able to forge proofs), the proof is of no
value to an adversary. Shorty after the invention of the Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99] it was
put to use in homomorphic tallying systems [DJN10, BFP+01] as being additively homo-
morphic is preferable to the multiplicative homomorphic property of ElGamal. The system
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by Baudron et al. also supports a regional hierarchy that mirrors paper-based elections and
also mentions the possibility of using randomisers to obtain receipt freeness. A later system
by Damga˚rd et al. [DGS03] improves on [CGS97a] by using a single ciphertext to encrypt
multiple choices thus reducing the number of proofs required.
Helios [Adi08] (since the 2nd version) is an implemented voting platform with a design
very similar to [CGS97a]. Since its introduction it has been attacked [ED10], repaired
[CS13], modified to add functionality [DC12] and improved to provide everlasting privacy
[DVDGA12]. It has been used in several real-world elections such as that of the president of
the University of Louvain-la-Neuve in Belgium, and of the Board of Directors of the IACR
since 2011 [IAC].
Kulyk et al. [KTV15] propose an extension of Helios where voters may later cancel
their vote, still being indistinguishable from null votes submitted by the crowd. In addi-
tion to being difficult to deploy in practice, this scheme strongly relies on revoting. Hirt’s
scheme [Hir10] heavily depends on the existence of untappable channels. Selene [RRI15]
proposes an enhancement for receipt-free schemes, to ease the verification step made by
voters through tracking numbers.
A different approach is that of self-tallying systems such as [KY02, DJ03, Gro04a,
HK11]. In such a system, a (somewhat expensive) pre-processing step ensures that the sub-
mitted encrypted ballots will sum to a decrypted or easily decryptable value. This requires
that participants do not abstain since their vote is needed to facilitate decryption. In settings
with a small number of participants this may be easily rectified by restarting the protocol,
but for large groups it becomes necessary to re-introduce an election authority albeit with
a very limited role. The presence of an authority also prevents the situation where the last
person to vote holds the advantage of being able to know the result before everyone else.
2.3.2 Helios Ballot Copying
Due to the popularity and prominence of Helios, a number of works have examined its
internals resulting in both attacks as well as additional, unplanned functionality.
Cortier & Smyth [CS11] attack a voter’s privacy by means of a replay attack. In the
base version of their attack, a ballot is recast either verbatim or with minor differences in
the representation of the signatures by a number of parties under the control of the attackers.
The checks performed by the then current Hellios ballot casting server were somewhat lax.
In some scenarios the additional votes for the original voter’s chosen party or candidate will
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significantly bias the election result, thus violating privacy. The authors offer the French
legislative elections as an example of such a scenario. A more complex version of their
attack involves a permutation of the voter’s choices making the malicious ballots slightly
harder to detect.
Esteghari & Desmedt [ED10] describe an attack which essentially installs a rootkit in
the user’s web-browser by exploiting a vulnerability in Adobe Reader. The rootkit then
secretly changes the user’s vote to a different one, and also hides any evidence of foul play.
Helios, operating under the assumption that the user’s browser is trustworthy, accepts the
changed vote instead of the intended one.
The work of [DC12] also leverages web-based nature of Helios’ voting booth and the
notion of divertible proofs (explained below) to provide a consensual vote copying mecha-
nism in which Bob asks Alice for permission (and assistance) in copying her vote, so that
the copied vote cannot be detected as such.
Blind signatures [Cha83, CP93], involve signing a document through an intermediary
(in our case, the copier) without the original signer (the voter) being able to trace the end
product. Blind signatures have been suggested by Chaum [Cha83] for use with anonymous
electronic cash, where banks sign “coins” proving their authenticity but are unable to trace
their use, and voting where authorities can supply signed blank ballots to authenticated
voters but are then unable to track them once filled.
Divertible proofs [OO90, DGB88] are a similar notion to blind signatures, but in an
online setting. An intermediate party is introduced between the prover and verifier, playing
the role of the verifier against the prover and that of the prover against the verifier. The
intermediate is called a warden in some cases (for example, if he is introduced to enforce to
ensure honest behaviour) or a man in the middle in others.
In [SB13], Smyth and Bernhard correctly point out that the claim about Alice’s privacy
in [DC12] (i.e. Bob will not learn anything about Alice’s vote that is not also revealed by the
tally, but will know that the ballot produced by the copying system contains the same vote
as Alice’s) is too strong. Bob can learn more about Alice’s vote than what is revealed by the
tally, as he also knows if he cast his duplicate. Furthermore, they claim that vote copying
is incompatible with ballot privacy. This is true if the definitions and security reductions do
not account for ballot copying. We can however, adjust the definitions by adding a ballot
copying oracle, and ensuring that it always copies votes from the board that will be tallied,
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even if the board that is visible to the adversary is the fake one.
2.3.3 Receipt Freeness and Coercion Resistance
The early definitions of receipt-freeness [BT94, Oka97] introduced the idea that an at-
tacker should not be able to distinguish between a real transcript and a fake one, but
their descriptions are rather informal. A weaker definition of receipt-freeness, proposed
in [CG96,KZZ15], lets the attacker only interact with the voter after the election (in partic-
ular, the attacker cannot control the randomness of the voter’s device). A simulation-based
definition for receipt-freeness (UC-RF) was given in [MN06]. It assumes however that the
voters adopt an “anti-coercion strategy” and is therefore closer to coercion-resistance as
defined in [JCJ05], even if it does not cover, for instance, abstention attacks. The coercion-
resistance and receipt-freeness definitions in [KT09] also assume a strategy from the voter.
Similarly, the symbolic definition of receipt-freeness in [DKR06] also requires the
voter to adopt a strategy to fool the adversary. Other definitions in symbolic models aim
at characterizing the notion of a receipt [JdV06, BG11, HS12] but (as usual in symbolic
models) they are much more abstract than standard computational models.
In contrast, in chapter 9 we define strong receipt freeness which allows adversaries
to have greater control over the voter. At the same time, we present BeleniosRF, which
satisfies this definition without needing a specific counter-coercion strategy from the voter.
Previous receipt-free schemes. The scheme by Kiayias et al. [KZZ15] only achieves
receipt-freeness for honest voters, as discussed above. Other well-known and deployed
schemes include Preˆt-a`-voter [RBH+09] and Scantegrity [CEC+08]. These systems how-
ever are designed for elections with physical voting booths. The system used in Esto-
nia [SFD+14] and the one deployed in Norway [AC11, Gjø12] might possibly satisfy some
level of receipt-freeness, as the corresponding ballot boxes are not publicly available. But
because of this, they do not achieve universal verifiability.
Blazy et al. [BFPV11b] sketch a receipt-free e-voting scheme, using their new primi-
tive of signatures on rerandomizable ciphertexts (SRC) which enable votes to be rerandom-
ized without allowing them to be changed, although no definition nor security reduction
for receipt-freeness is given. In their approach, the voting server, which is in charge of
running the ballot box, can be allowed to re-randomise ballots if it is trusted not reveal the
randomness used for that procedure.
In contrast, Helios [MBC01] and [KZZ15] achieve receipt-freeness under the assump-
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tion that the voting client is not going to reveal the randomness it used for sealing the vote.
The latter seems difficult to ensure in practice, unless voters are provided with secure hard-
ware tokens.
In chapter 9 we will present BeleniosRF which is receipt-free only relies on a single
re-randomization server not leaking.
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Chapter 3
Background & Definitions
3.1 Notation
We will use y← S to denote uniform sampling from set S. For an algorithm A, y← A(x;r)
denotes the output of A on input x and randomness r. If the randomness is unimportant, we
may use the notation y← A(x) which denotes that r is (implicitly) randomly sampled and
passed to A. We write y := f (x) when the value of y is derived as a deterministic function f
of x.
We will assume that all algorithms get a security parameter λ , expressed in unary as
an additional input. This is not only to make sure that the parameter is available, but to also
enable us to make claims about the algorithms complexity with respect to the size of the
security parameter. In general, we will consider algorithms to be efficient if their running
time is polynomial in the security parameter.
We will call a function f : N→ R negligible, if for any polynomial p(t) there exists
n0 such that for n > n0 we have f (n)< p(n). We say that a probability a is overwhelming,
if 1− a is negligible. Given two functions g,h : N→ [0,1] we write g(n) ≈ h(n) when
|g(n)−h(n)|= O(n−c) for every constant c > 0.
In many security definitions we ofter refer to probabilities of the form:
Pr
[
Exp(λ )
]
,
where Exp(λ ) describes an experiment involving the security parameter λ and a num-
ber of bound variables and algorithms. We will always consider the probability to be taken
over the random sampling of such variables, and any implicit random sampling in the exe-
cution of algorithms during the experiment. As such, evaluating the probability produces a
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function in λ with range [0,1]. In the same context, we will sometimes consider constant
values as (constant) functions of λ in order to facilitate comparison via the ≈ operator.
For algorithms A and B, 〈A,B〉 denotes algorithms A and B being run together, with
messages passed between them during execution. We write (x,y)← ⟪A(a),B(b)⟫ where at
the end A, with input a outputs x, whereas B, with input b outputs y. By AB(b)(a),we denote
the invocation of B (with input b) by A (with input a). Note that A does not get the private
output of B.
3.2 Setting
3.2.1 Cyclic Groups & The Discrete Logarithm Assumption
Let GGen be an algorithm that on input 1λ returns (G, p,g) such that G is the description
of a finite cyclic group of prime order p, where |p|= λ , and g is a generator of G.
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Assumption). The discrete logarithm assumption holds
relative to GGen if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A
Pr
[
(G, p,g)← GGen(1λ );h←G;a←A(G, p,g,h) : ga = h
]
≈ 0
In this definition, the value a is called the discrete logarithm of h in the basis g. Note
that the discrete logarithm assumption is defined with respect to a particular group generator
algorithm GGen. According to current state-of-the-art cryptanalytic techniques, to get a
security level of 2−λ the group generator may for example return well-chosen elliptic curve
groups where group elements can be represented with O(λ ) bits or multiplicative subgroups
of finite fields with a large characteristic where group elements can be represented with
O(λ 3) bits. It is well-known that the discrete logarithm assumption is equivalent to the
following assumption.
Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm Relation Assumption). For all n≥ 1 and all non-uniform
polynomial time adversaries A
Pr
 (G, p,g)← GGen(1λ );g1, . . . ,gn←G;
a0, . . . ,an←A(G, p,g,{gi}i)
: ∃ai 6= 0 and ga0
n
∏
i=1
gaii = 1
≈ 0
We call such a product ga0 ∏ni=1 g
ai
i = 1 a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation.
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Definition 3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption). The DDH assumption holds
relative to G if for all PPT adversaries A
Pr
 gk = (G,q,g)← GGen(1λ );x,y,z← Zp;b←{0,1};
h := gx;u := gy;v := g(1−b)xy+bz :A(gk,h,u,v) = b
≈ 1
2
.
The DDH assumption relative to G implies the DL assumption relative to G. The DDH
assumption is believed to hold whenG is an appropriately chosen subgroup of elliptic curve
groups or multiplicative groups of large characteristic finite fields.
3.2.2 One-way functions
A one-way function f with setup G works as follows.
G(1λ )→ gk: The probabilistic polynomial time setup algorithm generates a setup gk. The
setup gk defines a domain SK and a range VK, which have efficient algorithms for
deciding membership and sampling elements.
f (gk,sk) = vk: A deterministic polynomial time function from the domain to the range,
i.e., given sk ∈ SK we get vk = f (gk,sk) ∈VK. If sk /∈ SK, f returns an error symbol
⊥.
Definition 4 (One-way). We require the one-way function to be hard to invert, i.e., for all
probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A
Pr
[
gk←G(1λ );sk← SK;vk := f (gk,sk);sk′←A(gk,vk) : f (gk,sk′) = vk
]
≈ 0.
We will instantiate f via group exponentiation, i.e. x 7→ gx with domain Zp and range
G. The one-wayness of f is then implied by the DL assumption.
3.3 Encrypting and Commiting
A non-interactive commitment scheme allows a sender to create a commitment to a secret
value. She may later open the commitment and reveal the value in a verifiable manner. A
commitment should be hiding, i.e., not reveal the secret value, and binding in the sense that
a commitment cannot be opened to two different values.
Encryption can be thought of as a perfectly binding commitment scheme, with the
additional property that knowledge of a secret key allows the receiver to obtain the original
value without the need for the sender to reveal it.
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3.3.1 Commitment Schemes
Formally, a non-interactive commitment scheme is a pair of probabilistic polynomial time
algorithms (CGen,Com). The setup algorithm ck← CGen(1λ ) generates a commitment
key ck. The commitment key specifies a message spaceMck, a randomness space Rck and
a commitment space Cck. The commitment algorithm combined with the commitment key
specifies a function Comck :Mck×Rck→Cck. Given a message m ∈Mck the sender picks
uniformly at random r←Rck and computes the commitment c = Comck(m;r).
Definition 5 (Perfectly hiding). We say a non-interactive commitment scheme (CGen,Com)
is perfectly hiding if a commitment does not reveal the committed value. For all non-uniform
polynomial time stateful interactive adversaries A
Pr
 ck← CGen(1λ );(m0,m1)←A(ck);
b←{0,1};c← Comck(mb)
:A(c) = b
= 1
2
where A outputs m0,m1 ∈Mck.
Definition 6 (Binding). A non-interactive commitment scheme (CGen,Com) is computa-
tionally binding if a commitment can only be opened to one value. For all non-uniform
polynomial time adversaries A
Pr
 ck← CGen(1λ );
(m0,r0,m1,r1)←A(ck)
:
Comck(m0;r0) = Comck(m1;r1)
and m0 6= m1
≈ 0
where A outputs m0,m1 ∈Mck and r0,r1 ∈Rck.
We say a commitment scheme is homomorphic if for all valid keys ck the message,
randomness and commitment spaces are abelian groups and for all messages m0,m1 ∈Mck
and randomness r0,r1 ∈Rck we have
Comck(m0;r0) ·Comck(m1;r1) = Comck(m0+m1;r0+ r1).
3.3.2 Pedersen Commitments
The most prominent example of a homomorphic perfectly hiding commitment scheme is
the Pedersen commitment scheme [Ped91]. Pedersen commitments have the form c = grhm
where g,h are group elements specified in the commitment key. The opening of a Pedersen
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commitment is (m,r) ∈ Z2p, from which anybody can recompute the commitment c and
verify it was a valid commitment. Since Pedersen commitments are random group elements,
they are perfectly hiding. On the other hand, breaking the binding property of Pedersen
commitments corresponds to breaking the discrete logarithm assumption.
CGen(gk)
h1, . . . ,hn←G.
Return ck := (h1, . . . ,hn).
Comck(m1, . . . ,mn)
If (m1, . . . ,mn) /∈ Znp return ⊥.
r← Zp; Return c := gr∏ni=1 hmii .
Figure 3.1: Pedersen commitment to multiple elements
We exploit the fact that the Pedersen commitment scheme is homomorphic, i.e., for all
correctly generated gk,ck and all m,m′,r,r′ ∈ Zp
Comck(m;r) ·Comck(m′;r′) = Comck(m+m′;r+ r′).
We will use a variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme to commit to multiple messages
at once as shown in Fig. 3.1.
With the Pedersen commitment scheme in mind, we will assume throughout the text
that the message space is Znp and the randomness space is Zp. The constructions we have in
Sections 5.4 and 5.6.3 require a perfectly hiding, homomorphic commitment scheme so we
are not limited to using the Pedersen commitment scheme. However, in Sections 5.5 and
5.6.4, we will rely on specific properties of the Pedersen scheme and work directly on the
group elements in the key.
3.3.3 Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme (over setup gk) consists of three algorithms (PKEGen,E ,D).
PKEGen(gk) is a probabilistic algorithm that generates a public key and decryption key
pair (pk,dk). Without loss of generality, we assume pk can be efficiently computed given
dk and write pk = PKEGen(gk,dk) for this computation which returns ⊥ if dk is not valid.
E(pk,m) is a probabilistic algorithm which returns a ciphertext c if all its inputs are valid
and ⊥ otherwise. D(dk,c) is a deterministic algorithm that decrypts the ciphertext and
returns either the message m or the failure symbol ⊥.
We assume that gk, which is an implicit input to E and D, defines the public key,
decryption key, message, randomness and ciphertext spaces PKgk, DKgk, Mgk, Rgk and
Cgk.
In most chapters of this work, we will make use of an encryption scheme where the
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message space is Zp for some large integer p, which is explicitly or implicitly defined by
the public key, and with size |p|= `p(λ ) for a publicly known polynomial `p.
For notational convenience, we let c~z be the vector (cz1 , . . . ,czn) given a ciphertext c
and a vector of integers~z = (z1, . . . ,zn). Given a vector ~w we also define~c←Eek(~w) as the
vector of ciphertexts given by (Eek(w1), . . . ,Eek(wn)).
3.3.4 IND-CPA Security
A common security baseline for encryption is indistinguishability under chosen plaintext
attacks (IND-CPA).
Definition 7 (IND-CPA security). We say that (PKEGen,E ,D) is indistinguishable under
chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA secure) if for all probabilistic polynomial time stateful
adversaries A
Pr
 gk←G(1λ );(pk,dk)← PKEGen(gk)
(m0,m1)←A(gk, pk);b←{0,1};c←E(pk,mb)
:A(c) = b
≈ 1
2
,
where A outputs m0,m1 ∈Mgk.
3.3.5 ElGamal Encryption
In many of the following chapters we will use ElGamal encryption, as described in
Fig. 3.2, which is IND-CPA secure if the DDH assumption holds relative to GGen where
gk = (G,q,g)← GGen(1λ ).
We have PKgk := G∗, DKgk := Z∗q, Mgk := G, Rgk := Zp, and Cgk := G2. We also
note that ElGamal ciphertexts are homomorphic, similarly to Pedersen commitments.
PKEGen(gk)
dk← Z∗q; pk := gdk.
Return (pk,dk).
E(pk,m)
If pk /∈G∗ or m /∈G return ⊥.
r← Zp; Return c := (pkr,grm).
D(dk,c = (u,v))
If dk /∈ Z∗q or c /∈G2 return ⊥.
Return m := vu−
1
dk .
Figure 3.2: ElGamal encryption
3.3.6 IND-CCA Security
A common security baseline for encryption is indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext
attacks (IND-CCA).
Definition 8 (IND-CCA security). We say that (PKEGen,E ,D) is indistinguishable under
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA secure) if for all probabilistic polynomial time stateful
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adversaries A
Pr
 gk←G(1λ );(pk,dk)← PKEGen(gk)
(m0,m1)←AD(gk, pk);b←{0,1};c←E(pk,mb)
:AD∗(c) = b
≈ 1
2
,
where A outputs m0,m1 ∈Mgk, and D∗ is defined as D except it answers ⊥ when queried
on c.
The above definition follows the more recent (adaptive) CCA2 [RS91] variant of cho-
sen ciphertext attacks. We can recover the older CCA1 definition by omitting theD∗ oracle,
but will not be using it in this text.
3.4 Zero Knowledge
3.4.1 Relations and NP-Languages
Let R be a polynomial time decidable binary relation, i.e., a relation that defines a language
in NP. We call w a witness for a statement u if (u,w) ∈ R. We define the language
LR = {x | ∃w : (x,w) ∈ R}
as the set of statements x that have a witness w in the relation R.
To incorporate the security parameter into relations, we will without loss of generality
assume all statements are of a form such that λ can be easily derived (all statements in this
text could be reformulated to be of the form u= (1λ ,u′) although for notational convenience
we will not do this) and that all statements and witnesses are of size polynomial in λ .
3.4.2 Interactive Protocols
A zero knowledge protocol for an NP-relation R enables a prover to demonstrate to a verifier
that a statement u satisfies u ∈ LR, i.e. that there exists a witness w such that (u,w) ∈ R
without disclosing anything else, in particular not disclosing the value of w that the prover
has in mind.
More formally, a protocol for a relation R w.r.t. a setup gk ← GGen(1λ ) is a tuple
(CRSGen,P,V). If a common reference string, crs is used, we assume that the generator,
CRSGen(gk) generates it before the execution of the protocol. Both gk and crs are provided
as implicit inputs to all algorithms. We consider that the prover P and the verifier V , are
both probabilistic polynomial time interactive algorithms. The transcript produced byP and
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V when interacting on inputs s and t is denoted by tr←〈P(s),V(t)〉. In this text, the prover
will not produce an output (apart from messages to the verifier), so, for convenience we
only consider the output of the verifier and write b← ⟪P(s),V(t)⟫ depending on whether
the verifier rejects, b= 0, or accepts, b= 1. Without loss, we assume that transcripts include
the outputs and call them accepting or rejecting depending on whether b is 1 or not.
Σ-protocols are a specific kind of 3-move interactive protocols which are public coin,
complete, 2-special-sound and have special honest verifier zero knowledge. A typical run of
a Σ-proocol is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. P generates an initial message a; V(crs,u,a), produces
a random challenge x; P(x) computes a response z to the verifier‘s random challenge x.
Finally, V(crs,u,a,x,z) verifies the proof and outputs 1 for acceptance or 0 for rejection.
a -
Prover(u,w) x Verifier(u)−→ {accept, reject}ﬀ
z -
Figure 3.3: Σ-protocol with statement u and witness w
A Σ-protocol is required to operate correctly when used by honest participants (com-
pleteness), to prevent dishonest provers from convincing verifiers that false statements hold
(soundness), and not to leak information about w (zero-knowledge).
Definition 9 (Public coin). A protocol (P,V) is called public coin if the verifier chooses his
messages uniformly at random and independently of the messages sent by the prover, i.e.,
the challenges correspond to the verifier’s randomness ρ .
Definition 10 (Perfect completeness). (P,V) has perfect completeness if for all non-
uniform polynomial time adversaries A
Pr
[
(u,w)←A(1λ ) : (u,w) 6∈ R or ⟪P(x,w),V(x)⟫= 1]= 1
Definition 11 (n-Special Soundness). We say that (P,V) is n-special sound [GK14] if there
exists an efficient extractor χ such that for any statement u, given n accepting transcripts
{(a,xi,zi)}ni=1 where the challenges xi are distinct, χ(u,a,xi,zi) outputs w s.t. (u,w) ∈R.
A protocol is zero-knowledge if it does not leak information about the witness beyond
what can be inferred from the truth of the statement. We will present protocols that have
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special honest verifier zero-knowledge in the sense that if the verifier’s challenges are known
in advance, then it is possible to simulate the entire argument without knowing the witness.
Definition 12 (Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge (SHVZK)). A public coin argu-
ment (P,V) is called a special honest verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK) argument for R if
there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that for all interactive non-
uniform polynomial time adversaries A
Pr
[
(u,w,ρ)←A(1λ ); tr← 〈P(u,w),V(u;ρ)〉 : (u,w) ∈ R and A(tr) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(u,w,ρ)←A(1λ ); tr←S(u,ρ) : (u,w) ∈ R and A(tr) = 1
]
where ρ is the public coin randomness used by the verifier.
If this holds also for unbounded adversaries A, we say (P,V) is statistically special
honest verifier zero-knowledge. If the two distributions are equal, then we say (P,V) is
perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
3.4.3 Zero Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
In some applications we may need to tackle more complex protocols, where n-special
soundness may not be simple to obtain. Arguments of knowledge give us an appropriate
framework to analyse the security of such protocols.
To define an argument of knowledge we follow Groth and Ishai [GI08] that borrowed
the term witness-extended emulation from Lindell [Lin03]. Informally, their definition says
that given an adversary that produces an acceptable argument with some probability, there
exists an emulator that produces a similar argument with the same probability together with
a witness w. Note that the emulator is allowed to rewind the prover and verifier’s interaction
to any previous move.
Definition 13 (Argument of knowledge). The pair (P,V) is called an argument of knowl-
edge for the relation R if we have perfect completeness and statistical witness-extended
emulation as defined below.
Definition 14 (Statistical witness-extended emulation). (P,V) has statistical witness-
extended emulation if for all deterministic polynomial time P∗ there exists an expected
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polynomial time emulator E such that for all interactive adversaries A
Pr
[
(u,s)←A(1λ ); tr← 〈P∗(u,s),V(u)〉 :A(tr) = 1
]
≈ Pr
 (u,s)←A(1λ );(tr,w)←E 〈P∗(u,s),V(u)〉(u) :
A(tr) = 1 and if tr is accepting then (u,w) ∈ R

where the oracle called by E 〈P∗(u,s),V(u)〉 allows rewinding i.e. the oracle is aware of the
operation of both algorithms and thus the execution of 〈P∗(u,s),V(u)〉 may be paused at
any intermediate state, then resumed from such state as requested. Additionally, when re-
suming, any part of the verifier randomness contained in s that has not yet been read, can
be replaced with fresh randomness.
In the definition, s can be interpreted as the state of P∗, including the randomness. So,
whenever P∗ is able to make a convincing argument when in state s, E can extract a witness.
This is why we call it an argument of knowledge.
The following lemma links witness-extended emulation with n-special soundness and
its generalizations.
3.4.4 A general forking lemma
Suppose that we have a (2µ+1)-move public-coin argument with µ challenges, x1, . . . ,xµ
in sequence. Let ni≥ 1 for 1≤ i≤ µ . Consider∏µi=1 ni accepting transcripts with challenges
in the following tree format. The tree has depth µ and ∏µi=1 ni leaves. The root of the tree is
labelled with the statement. Each node of depth i < µ has exactly ni children, each labelled
with a distinct value for the ith challenge xi.
This can be referred to as an (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree of accepting transcripts. All of our
arguments allow a witness to be extracted efficiently from an appropriate tree of accepting
transcripts. This is a natural generalisation of special-soundness for Sigma-protocols, where
µ = 1 and n = 2. For simplicity in the following lemma, we assume that the challenges are
chosen uniformly from Zp where |p|= λ , but any sufficiently large challenge space would
suffice.
Lemma 1 (Forking Lemma). Let (P,V) be a (2µ + 1)-move, public coin interactive pro-
tocol. Let χ be a witness extraction algorithm that always succeeds in extracting a witness
from an (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree of accepting transcripts in probabilistic polynomial time. Assume
that ∏µi=1 ni is bounded above by a polynomial in the security parameter λ . Then (P,V)
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has witness-extended emulation.
For simplicity in the following proof, we assume that the challenges are chosen uni-
formly from Zp where |p|= λ , but any sufficiently large challenge space would suffice.
Proof. Suppose that for deterministic polynomial time P∗ there is a non-uniform polyno-
mial time interactive adversary A in the sense of witness-extended emulation, such that
Pr
[
(u,s)←A(1λ ); tr← 〈P∗(u,s),V(u)〉 :A(tr) = 1
]
= ε.
Note that if ε is negligible, then we do not need to extract a witness, since the emulator can
simply fail every time and trivially achieve witness-extended emulation. Therefore, from
now on, we assume that ε is not negligible.
We construct an expected polynomial time emulator U , which has access to a rewind-
able transcript oracle 〈P∗,V〉 and produces a witness. This is done via recursive calls to
tree-finders T that deal with the protocol after the first few challenges are already fixed.
The ith tree-finder takes the previous challenges and partial transcript given to it as input,
picks random values for xi+1, runs the prover on these values and hands the result to the
next tree-finder. Each tree-finder may fail on the first value of xi+1, ensuring that the whole
process runs in expected polynomial time. With overwhelming probability, the emulator
obtains an (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree of transcripts and is then able to extract a witness, using the
efficient algorithm χ that exists by assumption.
U 〈P∗,V〉(u)→ (tr,w):
-Run T 〈P∗,V〉(1)→ (tr, tree)
-If tree =⊥ then return (tr,⊥).
-If tree is not a valid (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree of transcripts (i.e. there are collisions
in certain challenges) then return (tr,⊥).
-Else run w← χ(u, tree).
-Return (tr,w)
Figure 3.4: Emulator U for Lemma 1
The emulator U calls T 〈P∗,V〉(i) for 1≤ i≤ µ+1:
Fix 1≤ i≤ µ , and fix x1, . . . ,xi−1. We say that T (i) has failed if it returns (tr,⊥).
Let ε ′ be the probability that the T (i) fails for this choice of challenges, and let ε ′(xi)
be the probability that T (i+ 1) fails for this choice of challenges continued with xi. The
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T 〈P∗,V〉(i)→ (tr, tree):
-If i = µ+1
-Obtain a complete protocol transcript from tr← 〈P∗,V〉
-Run V(tr)→ b
-If b = 0 then return (tr,⊥).
-If b = 1 then set tree = {tr} and return (tr, tree).
-Run 〈P∗,V〉 up to and including move 2i+1.
-Run T 〈P∗,V〉(i+1)→ (tr, tree)
-If tree =⊥ then return (tr,⊥).
-Set counter = 1
-While counter < ni:
-Rewind 〈P∗,V〉 back until just before move 2i.
-Run T 〈P∗,V〉(i+1)→ (tr′, tree′)
-If tree 6=⊥, then append the transcripts in tree′ to tree, and increment
counter.
-Return (tr, tree)
Figure 3.5: Tree finders T for Lemma 1
ith tree-finder can fail only if the (i+ 1)th tree-finder fails the first time it is called. This
implies that for uniformly random xi, the probability that T (i+1) fails is ε ′=∑xi∈Zp Pr[X =
xi]ε ′(xi).
Therefore, the expected number of times that T (i) runs T (i+ 1) is 1+ ε ′ (ni−1)ε ′ = ni.
The final tree-finder T (k+ 1) merely checks whether the transcript is accepting or not.
Hence, the total expected running time for T (1) to be ∏µi=1 ni multiplied by the time taken
to check whether a transcript is accepting. We conclude that the emulator U runs in expected
polynomial time.
The first tree-finder T (1) only outputs (tr,⊥) if the very first set of challenges gen-
erated by all of the emulators fails to produce an accepting transcript. This is exactly the
probability that P∗ successfully produces an accepting transcript in one run.
Given that we receive ∏µi=1 ni accepting transcripts in tree, we now consider the prob-
ability that they do not form an (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree. This occurs only when the ni values of
challenge xi used by 〈P∗,V〉 while in the loop controlled by counter are not distinct, or in
other words, there is a collision between these values, for some i.
By Markov’s inequality, an algorithm whose expected running time is t will only run
for longer than time T > t with probability tT . Let t be the expected running time of U ,
which is bounded above by a polynomial in the security parameter. For easier analysis, we
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limit the actual running time of U to T , whose value will be chosen later.
When U runs in time at most T , then at most T uniformly random public coin chal-
lenges were selected by V in 〈P∗,V〉. If there are no collisions between any of the public
coins chosen, then there are certainly no collisions of the type which would prevent tree
from being a (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree of transcripts. The probability that there is a collision be-
tween T values sampled uniformly from Zp is at most T
2
p .
Now, we choose T = 3
√
p. The probability that tree fails to be an (n1, . . . ,nµ)-tree is
at most tT +
T 2
p which is now equal to
t
3√p +
1
3√p . This is negligible. Therefore, there is
negligible probability of the tree-finding algorithms succeeding, yet U failing to extract a
witness. This proves the argument has statistical witness-extended emulation.
3.4.5 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) Proofs
It is often desirable to operate in a single step, avoiding the interaction needed to execute
a Σ-protocol. The prover still wishes to demonstrate to the verifier the truth of a statement
u ∈ LR for an NP-relation R without disclosing any other information about her witness w.
A NIZK proof system (over a setup gk) for an NP-relation R defining the language
LR := {u | ∃w : (u,w) ∈ R}, where u is a statement and w is a witness, is a tuple of
polynomial-time algorithms (CRSGen,Prove,PVfy). CRSGen(gk) generates a common
reference string crs; Prove(crs,u,w) returns a proof pi that (u,w) ∈R; PVfy(crs,u,pi) veri-
fies that pi is a valid proof for u ∈ LR, outputting a bit accordingly.
Perfect completeness of the proof system requires that for any crs generated by
CRSGen and any pair (u,w) ∈ R we have Pr[PVfy(crs,u,Prove(crs,u,w))] = 1. Addi-
tionally, we require soundness and zero-knowledge, which are as follows:
• Soundness: For all PPT adversaries A, we have
Pr
 gk← GGen(1λ );crs← CRSGen(gk);(u,pi)←A(gk,crs) :
PVfy(crs,u,pi) = 1 ∧ u /∈ LR
≈ 0.
• Zero-Knowledge: There exist PPT algorithms (SimCRSGen,SimProve), where
SimCRSGen(gk) outputs a simulated reference string crs and possibly a simulation
trapdoor τ , and SimProve(crs,s,τ) produces a simulated proof (without knowing a
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witness). We require that
Pr
[
gk← GGen(1λ );crs← CRSGen(gk) :AProve(gk,crs) = 1
]
≈Pr
[
gk← GGen(1λ );(crs,τ)← SimCRSGen(gk) :ASim(gk,crs) = 1
]
,
where on query (u,w) ∈R, Sim returns pi ← SimProve(crs,u,τ).
3.4.6 The Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
The Fiat-Shamir transformation takes an interactive public coin argument and replaces the
challenges with the output of a cryptographic hash function H. The idea is that the hash
function will produce random looking output and therefore be a suitable replacement for
the verifier. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic yields a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument in
the random oracle model [BR93].
Given a Σ-protocol P,V where the verifier’s challenge is sampled from X , and a hash
function h : {0,1}∗ → X . the Fiat-Shamir transformation replaces the second step, x ←
V (crs,u,a) with x := h(crs,u,a). As h is deterministic, pi ← 〈P,h〉 can be produced by P
alone. At the same time, the original verifier V can be used unmodified to check pi .
In general, the transformation allows us to transform any complete, public coin,
special sound, SHVZK interactive protocol (CRSGen,P,V) into a NIZK proof system
(CRSGen,〈P,h〉,V) given an appropriate1 hash function h.
In security proofs under the random oracle model, the hash function used in the proto-
col is assumed to be an oracle under the control of the simulator. As such, the simulator can
choose the value returned by the hash function on any input with the only limitation being
consistency (i.e. after setting H(x) = y, the simulator is not allowed to set H(x) = y′ 6= y.
The random oracle model has been criticised as [GK03, CGH04] have shown that it is pos-
sible to construct protocols that are secure under the random oracle model but provably
insecure in general. At the same time, these results have not led to a vulnerability being
found in a currently used protocol. In Chapter 4 we examine the DFN transformation that
can be used as an alternative to Fiat-Shamir for a restricted class of protocols.
3.4.7 Signature of Knowledge
A Signature of Knowledge (SoK) for an NP-relation R w.r.t. a setup gk is a tu-
ple (SoKSetup,SoKSign,SoKVerify). SoKSetup(gk) outputs public parameters crs;
1For notational convenience we assume that the challenge space is the same for all rounds.
3.4. Zero Knowledge 57
SoKSign(crs,u,w,m) outputs a signature σSoK on m if (u,w)∈R; SoKVerify(crs,u,m,σSoK)
outputs 1 if σSoK is a valid signature on m or 0 otherwise. The (game-based) security
definition for signatures of knowledge (SimExt) [CL06], besides correctness, requires Sim-
ulatability and Extractability. We consider a stronger generalisation of the latter called
f -extractability [BCKL08]:
• Simulatability: There are PPT algorithms (SoKSimSetup,SoKSimSign), where
SoKSimSetup(gk) outputs public parameters crs and some trapdoor τ , whereas
SoKSimSign(crs,τ,u,m) outputs a signature σSoK, such that
Pr
[
gk← GGen(1λ );(crs,τ)← SoKSimSetup(gk) :ASoKSim(gk,crs) = 1
]
≈Pr
[
gk← GGen(1λ );crs← SoKSetup(gk) :ASoKSign(gk,crs) = 1
]
,
for all PPT adversaries A, where SoKSim(u,w,m) returns SoKSimSign(crs,τ,u,m)
if (u,w) ∈R and ⊥ otherwise.
• f -Extractability: For all PPT adversariesA, there exists a polynomial time algorithm
SoKExtract such that:
Pr

gk← GGen(1λ );(crs,τ)← SoKSimSetup(gk);
(u,m,σSoK)←ASoKSim(gk,crs);
y← SoKExtract(crs,τ,u,m,σSoK) :
(u,m,σSoK) ∈ QSoKSim∨ SoKVerify(crs,u,m,σSoK) = 0
∨ (∃w s.t. (u,w) ∈R∧ y = f (w))

≈ 1·
In the above, QSoKSim is a list of queries to the SoKSimSign oracle. Note that our
extractability definition is stronger than that of [CL06], as we allow the adversary
to ask for signatures w.r.t. statements for which it does know the witness. In the
definition, if f is the identity function, we get the standard notion of extractability.
Signatures of knowledge in the random oracle model can be efficiently realised by
applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to Σ-protocols. Applying the transformation to Σ-
protocols having quasi-unique responses (i.e. given an accepting transcript, it is infeasible
to find a different accepting response w.r.t. the same initial message and challenge) provides
weak simulation-extractability [FKMV12], where the extractor needs to rewind the prover.
To get straightline f -extractability, i.e. without rewinding [Fis05], we additionally encrypt
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a function f of the witness with a public key in the reference string and prove that the
encrypted value is consistent with the witness. This way we get both full weak extractability
and straightline f -extractability simultaneously.
3.4.8 Non-Interactive Designated Verifier Zero Knowledge Arguments
Designated Verifier protocols have an additional property: they are tailored to a specific
verifier as opposed to the general public. Conceptually, it is akin to each verifier having a
personal CRS (along with additional related information that enables verification).
In a non-interactive designated verifier zero knowledge argument system, we imagine
the verifier sets up a public key pk for the proof together with a secret verification key vk
that can be used to verify the arguments. The system therefore consists of three probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms (RKGen,P,V).
(pk,vk)←G(1λ ): The key generation algorithm, given the security parameter as input,
generates a public key pk and a secret verification key vk.
pi ←P(pk,u,w): Given a public key pk and (u,w)∈ Rλ , the prover algorithm generates an
argument pi .
{0,1}← V(vk,u,pi): Given a secret verification key vk, a statement u and an argument pi ,
the verification algorithm returns 1 if accepting the argument and 0 for rejection of
the argument.
(RKGen,P,V) is said to be a non-interactive designated verifier zero-knowledge argument
system for R with culpable soundness with respect to Rguilt if it is complete, culpably sound
and zero-knowledge as defined below.
Definition 15 (Completeness). (RKGen,P,V) is perfectly complete if for all λ ∈N and all
(u,w) ∈ Rλ
Pr
[
(pk,vk)←G(1λ );pi ←P(pk,u,w) : V(vk,u,pi) = 1
]
= 1.
In our constructions (see Chapter 4) we will get zero-knowledge even if the adversary
knows the secret verification key, a strong type of zero-knowledge called composable zero-
knowledge in [Gro06] due to it making composition of zero-knowledge proofs easier.
Definition 16 (Composable zero-knowledge). (RKGen,P,V) is computationally compos-
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able zero-knowledge if for all probabilistic polynomial time stateful adversaries A
Pr
[
(pk,vk)← RKGen(1λ );(u,w)←A(pk,vk);pi ←P(pk,u,w) : (u,w) ∈ Rλ and A(pi) = 1
]
≈Pr
[
(pk,vk)← RKGen(1λ );(u,w)←A(pk,vk);pi ←S(vk,u) : (u,w) ∈ Rλ and A(pi) = 1
]
.
If the above holds also for unbounded stateful adversaries A then we say the argument is
statistically composable zero-knowledge.
Culpable soundness [GOS12] is a relaxation of soundness that restricts the prover in
the following way: First, we only consider false statements in a subset Lguilt of L¯R charac-
terised by a relation Rguilt. Second, we require a successful cheating prover to also output a
guilt witness wguilt along with his false statement u such that (u,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt. Intuitively
this definition captures the notion of a malicious prover being aware of the falsehood of the
statement for which she is creating a fake proof.
Definition 17 (Adaptive culpable soundness). We say (G,P,V) is culpably sound with re-
spect to the relation Rguilt if for all probabilistic polynomial time A
Pr
[
(pk,vk)←G(1λ );(u,pi,wguilt)←A(pk) : (u,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt,λ and V(vk,u,pi) = 1
]
≈ 0.
The above definition does not directly cover the adversary, A having access to a veri-
fication oracle V(vk, ·, ·). However it is straightforward to handle cases where the adversary
has access to a logarithmic number of queries (as in [DFN06]), since that can be simulated
by guessing the responses with inverse polynomial probability.
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Chapter 4
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge without
Random Oracles
Damga˚rd, Fazio and Nicolosi [DFN06] gave a transformation of Sigma-protocols, 3-move
honest verifier zero-knowledge proofs, into efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge argu-
ments for a designated verifier. Their transformation uses additively homomorphic encryp-
tion to encrypt the verifier’s challenge, which the prover uses to compute an encrypted an-
swer. The transformation does not rely on the random oracle model but proving soundness
requires a complexity leveraging assumption.
We propose an alternative instantiation of original DFN transformation and show that it
achieves culpable soundness without complexity leveraging. This improves upon an earlier
result by Ventre and Visconti [VV09], who used a different construction which achieved
weak culpable soundness, by achieving standard culpable soundness as well as avoiding the
duplicate proofs required by their approach.
We demonstrate how our construction can be used to prove validity of encrypted votes
in a referendum. This yields a voting system with homomorphic tallying that does not rely
on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
The research presented in this chapter was joint work with Jens Groth and published
in [CG15]. The author contributed to the investigation in defining strongly additively homo-
morphic encryption, the security proofs and the design and security proof of the referendum
scheme. The idea of using culpable soundness and the boolean circuit application were put
forward by Jens Groth.
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4.1 Introduction
Cryptographic applications often require a party to demonstrate that a statement is true
without revealing any additional details. For example, a voter may wish to prove that an
encrypted message contains a vote for a valid candidate without disclosing the actual can-
didate. This can be done using zero-knowledge proofs [GMR89] that enable a prover to
demonstrate to a verifier that a statement u belongs to a language L in NP defined by a rela-
tion R without giving the verifier any information about the witness w such that (u,w) ∈ R.
The Damga˚rd, Fazio and Nicolosi (DFN) [DFN06] transformation works in the Regis-
tered Key Model (RKM) [BCNP04] where a verifier registers a public key and transforms a
Σ-protocol with linear answer into a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument that can be
verified by this specific verifier [JSI96]. The transformation works by having the verifier
encrypt his challenge under an additively homomorphic encryption scheme and relies on
the Σ-protocol having an answer that can be computed using linear algebra and the homo-
morphic property of the encryption scheme to enable the prover to complete an encrypted
version of the answer in the Σ-protocol. We describe their construction in Section 4.3, where
we give an alternate soundness proof for a more restricted class of protocols and encryption
schemes. The original proof holds for a logarithmic number of proofs but soundness rests
on a complexity leveraging assumption. Complexity leveraging assumptions state that there
is a hardness separation between two hard problems, i.e. that there exist solvers for the first
problem, running in time T , but no T -bound adversary can solve the second problem with
more than negligible probability. This allows security reductions to raise a contradiction
by solving the second, harder, problem using the adversary, and a solver for the first prob-
lem. Ventre and Visconti [VV09] give an alternative proof of soundness for a construction
based on a two ciphertext variation of the DFN transformation in the style of Naor and
Yung [NY90]. They replace the complexity leveraging assumption by introducing a modi-
fication of culpable soundness1 [GOS12] that they call weak culpable soundness. Culpable
soundness restricts adversaries to being “aware” of the falsehood of the statement they are
proving. Weak culpable soundness furthermore requires that the adversary is also aware of
the fact that she has succeeded in producing a convincing proof of a false statement, by
producing a second auxiliary proof to that effect.
In the DFN setting using weak culpable soundness would require the adversary to
1Culpable soundness was also called co-soundness in an earlier version of [GOS12].
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prove statements containing ciphertexts addressed to the designated verifier. It would be
challenging to provide such an adversary with enough power to perform the required proofs
without having knowledge of the verifier’s secret decryption key. We instead opt to construct
the underlying protocol with the property that forged proofs reveal the challenge. This is
enough to contradict the semantic security of the encryption scheme used for the designated
verifier proof if a false proof is ever produced.
4.1.1 Contribution
We give an instantiation of the DFN transformation that achieves standard culpable sound-
ness without complexity leveraging. The transformation relies on an IND-CPA secure addi-
tively homomorphic encryption scheme and is quite efficient. The transformation can be ap-
plied to Σ-protocols that have linear answers and unique identifiable challenges (Sect. 4.2.3).
We can use our resulting non-interactive zero-knowledge designated verifier arguments
to efficiently prove statements about encrypted plaintexts. In particular, we can prove that a
ciphertext contains either 0 or 1 without disclosing the plaintext. This can in turn be used
to prove that a set of ciphertexts encrypt a witness for the satisfiability of a circuit. For the
appropriate Σ-protocols to be in place, we require the encryption scheme to be additively
homomorphic modulo a prime and satisfy a few other requirements (Sect. 4.2.1). We use
Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption [OU98] as an example.
We proceed to give an example application of our non-interactive zero-knowledge ar-
guments to provide publicly verifiable arguments in the context of electronic voting. In vot-
ing systems such as Helios [Adi08] voters submit their votes encrypted under a homomor-
phic encryption scheme accompanied with non-interactive arguments (typically using the
Fiat-Shamir transformation) that the encrypted votes are in fact valid. Ciphertexts with con-
vincing arguments are aggregated homomorphically to produce an encrypted tally which is
then decrypted to produce the result. By releasing the designated verifier keys to the public
(similar to [Wik08]), once vote submission has concluded, we can use our non-interactive
designated verifier arguments in place of the usual non-interactive zero-knowledge argu-
ments with minimal changes to the design. It does however differ in that invalid ballots
are detected after being tentatively accepted, whereas other systems are able to reject them
outright.
Additionally, we require that the contents of the message board are initially hidden
and only revealed after ballot submission has concluded. This is a departure from common
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practice, and raised the amount of trust placed on the bulletin board. However, it is not
dissimilar from the way conventional elections are run, and the delay may be omitted by
using a stronger (non-malleable) encryption.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section we expand on some concepts from Chapter 3. This is necessary as the tech-
nical parts of this chapter rely on specific bit sizes of parameters and additional properties
for our encryption scheme.
4.2.1 Strongly Additively Homomorphic Encryption
We say that (PKEGen,E ,D) is additively homomorphic if the randomness and ciphertext
spaces are finite groups as well (written additively and multiplicatively respectively) and for
all possible keys ek and plaintexts m1,m2 ∈Mek and r1,r2 ∈Rek we have
Eek(m1;r1) · Eek(m2;r2) = Eek(m1+m2;r1+ r2).
We say that an additively homomorphic scheme (PKEGen,E ,D) is a strongly addi-
tively homomorphic scheme if it satisfies the four additional properties described below:
Prime order message space: The message space is Zp for some prime p.
Decryption homomorphic2: Membership of the ciphertext space can be efficiently tested
and the decryption algorithm on all elements in Cek returns a plaintext inMek (i.e.,
decryption does not fail). Furthermore, decryptions respect the additively homomor-
phic operation, i.e., for all possible key pairs (ek,dk) and c1,c2 ∈ Cek we have
Ddk(c1)+Ddk(c2) =Ddk(c1 · c2).
Extended randomness: Rek = ZN for some integer N but the encryption function accepts
randomness in Z and for all m ∈Mek and r ∈ Z
E(m;r) = E(m;r mod N).
Verifiable keys: There exists an efficient test VerifyKey(1λ ,ek,dk) that given a public key
ek and decryption key dk (or without loss of generality the randomness used in the
2This property is trivial for cryptosystems where the entire cipherspace consists of valid encryptions but in
the general case it must be stated explicitly.
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key generation) returns 1 if and only if (ek,dk) is a valid key pair using security
parameter λ .
The strengthening of the usual homomorphic properties is mainly aimed to capitalize
on our ability (via culpable soundness) to extract from adversarially generated ciphertexts.
The prime order message space help by ensuring that the values we will extract will give
unique solutions, and the decryption homomorphic property ensures that the adversary will
not be able to present malformed ciphertexts (which might be hard to extract from) that
homomorphically add up to a valid one. Extended randomness is present for generality in
the event that the modulus of the randomness space, N is unknown.
For notational convenience, we let c~z be the vector (cz1 , . . . ,czn) given a ciphertext c
and a vector of integers~z = (z1, . . . ,zn). Given a vector ~w we also define~c←Eek(~w) as the
vector of ciphertexts given by (Eek(w1), . . . ,Eek(wn)).
4.2.2 Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption [OU98]
The Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98] cryptosystem is strongly additively homomorphic with a
message space Zp for a prime p that is implicitly defined by the public key.
PKEGen(1λ ): Pick two different `p(λ )-bit primes p,q and let N = p2 · q. Then choose a
random g in Z∗N such that g mod p2 has order p(p− 1) in Z∗p2 . The public key is
ek = (N,g) and the secret decryption key is dk = (ek, p).
Eek(m): Given m ∈ Zp return Eek(m;r) = gm+rN mod N, where r← ZN .
Ddk(c): Return m = L(c
p−1 mod p2)
L(gp−1 mod p2) mod p, where L(x) =
x−1
p .
For a given public key ek= (N,g) the randomness space is ZN and the ciphertext space
is Z∗N . Even though the message space is defined as Zp, in practice we cannot disclose p
but as long as the encrypting party picks messages m ∈ {0,1}`p(λ )−1 we are guaranteed that
they fall within the message space and will decrypt correctly.
Direct calculation confirms that Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption is decryption homo-
morphic and that it is easy to extend the randomness space to Rek = Z. The keys are verifi-
able in the sense that given the decryption key, i.e., the factorization of N, it is easy to check
that the keys are a valid output of the key generation algorithm and that the encryption
scheme satisfies all the required properties.
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4.2.3 Σ-protocols with Linear Answers and Unique Identifiable Challenges
We will restrict ourselves to Σ-protocols with a linear answer over the integers. By this
we mean without loss of generality that we can consider a prover that generates the initial
message a and two integer vectors ~z1 and ~z2. We consider protocols where x is picked
as a random λ -bit string, where λ is the security parameter. The answer to a challenge
x ∈ {0,1}λ can then be computed as the integer vector~z = x~z1+~z2. We will assume that all
the integers in~z1,~z2,~z are non-negative and that there is a known polynomial upper bound
`z(λ ) on the bit-size of the integers.
We can describe a Σ-protocol for an NP-relation R with linear answer as a pair (PΣ,VΣ),
where PΣ,VΣ are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. The Σ-protocol runs as follows:
(a,~z1,~z2)←PΣ(x,w): The prover given a statement and witness pair (u,w) ∈ Rλ generates
an initial message a and a state~z1,~z2.
x←{0,1}λ : An λ -bit challenge is chosen uniformly at random.
~z← x~z1+~z2: An answer to the challenge x can be computed as~z = x~z1+~z2.
{0,1}← VΣ(u,a,x,~z): The verifier given a statement u and a protocol transcript (a,x,~z)
returns 1 if accepting and 0 if rejecting. The verifier will always reject if any inputs
are malformed, for instance if x /∈ {0,1}λ or~z contains an entry zi /∈ {0,1}`z(λ ).
With respect to soundness, we will for our purposes be interested in a special class of
Σ-protocols that have unique identifiable challenges. Traditionally, Σ-protocols are required
to have 2-special soundness, which says that if the prover, after having created the initial
message a, can answer two different challenges x and x′ then it is possible to compute a
witness w for the statement u being proved such that (u,w) ∈ R.
We do not need the witness to be extractable, and will therefore relax the soundness
definition to just saying that on a false statement there is at most a single unique challenge
the prover can answer after having created the initial message a.
However, we will require that under certain circumstances this unique answerable chal-
lenge should be identifiable, i.e., if the prover “knows” the statement is false in a certain way
then she can actually compute the unique challenge x she will be able to answer if she can
answer any challenge at all. We define this by adapting the notion of culpable soundness
from [GOS12] and strong soundness from [HN06]. We say that the unique challenge is
identifiable using an NP-relation Rguilt, which only contains false statements, if when the
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prover produces a statement x and a witness wguilt of being guilty of cheating such that
(u,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt, then it is possible to efficiently compute a unique challenge where the
verifier may possibly accept (in comparison, strong soundness omits Rguilt). The relation
Rguilt will typically include all false statements that have a special form, depending on the
specifics.
Definition 18 (Soundness with unique identifiable challenge). We say (PΣ,VΣ) has a unique
identifiable challenge using NP-relation Rguilt if there is a polynomial time algorithm E that
takes as input the statement, witness and initial message and returns the unique challenge x
that can be answered. Formally, we require that for all λ ,u,wguilt,a,x,z where (u,wguilt) ∈
Rguilt,λ and VΣ(u,a,x,z) = 1 that x = E(u,wguilt,a).
A frequently asked question is why would the adversary want to provide a witness for
cheating. The answer is that there are many natural scenarios where the real adversary is
only a part of a larger system that contains the guilt witness. It may well be that the system
would never provide a guilt witness in a normal execution but even when that is the case the
notion can still be useful in security proofs: by framing a “standard” adversary within such a
system we are able to explicitly use privileged information held by honest parties in security
reductions. In Sect. 4.4 we give voting as a concrete example of how culpable soundness
can be used to prevent cheating by voters. Voters prove that they have encrypted valid
votes using the election system’s public key. The guilt witness is the decryption key, which
the voting system will never make public since it would reveal all the votes. However,
if a cheating voter exists, it is enough to point out that the guilt witness will exist in the
possession of the electoral authorities. To satisfy the definition we may consider a new
adversary which consists of the cheating voter’s behaviour, with the decryption key added
to the output in a post-processing step. Culpable soundness then guarantees the voter cannot
cheat and submit an invalid vote.
We note that the extractor E only requires the guilt witness and the initial message
from the prover. This will be critical in the next section where the protocol is made non-
interactive via the DFN transformation and the prover’s answer will be encrypted. In gen-
eral, we cannot require that a cheating prover knows the contents of that ciphertext since it
might have been assembled in a way that differs from the protocol.
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4.2.4 Σ-protocol for additively homomorphic encryption of 0 or 1.
Consider a strongly additively homomorphic encryption scheme (G,E ,D) with message
space Zp for a prime p defined by the encryption key. We will now give a Σ-protocol for
proving that a ciphertext encrypts 0 or 1 using randomness r ∈ {0,1}`r(λ ) bounded by a
polynomial `r(λ ).
Prover((ek,c),(m,r)) Verifier(ek,c)
ma←{1}||{0,1}2λ a,b Accept if and only if
ra←{0,1}`r(λ )+2λ ;a←Eek(ma;ra)
-
a,b,c ∈ Cek, f ∈ {0,1}2λ+2
rb←{0,1}`r(λ )+3λ ;b←Eek(−mma;rb) x←{0,1}λ za ∈ {0,1}`r(λ )+2λ+1ﬀ
zb ∈ {0,1}`r(λ )+3λ+1
f := xm+ma,za := xr+ ra f ,za,zb cxa = Eek( f ;za)
zb := ( f − x)r+ rb
-
c f−xb = Eek(0;zb)
Figure 4.1: Σ-protocol for encryption of 0 or 1.
Let
R =
{(
(ek,c),(m,r)
)
: m ∈ {0,1} and r ∈ {0,1}`r(n) and c = Eek(m;r)
}
,
Rguilt =
{(
(ek,c),dk
)
: c ∈ Cek and Ddk(c) /∈ {0,1} and VerifyKey(1λ ,ek,dk) = 1
}
.
Theorem 1. Fig. 4.1 describes a Σ-protocol for R with linear answer and unique identifiable
challenge using Rguilt assuming (G,E ,D) is a strongly additively homomorphic encryption
scheme with message space Zp of sufficiently large size such that `p(λ )> λ .
Proof. The algorithms are probabilistic polynomial time. The protocol has linear answer
with a polynomial upper bound of `z(λ ) = `r(λ )+3λ +1 on the bit-lengths of the integers
in the answer. Direct verification shows that the protocol is perfectly complete.
The protocol is statistical SHVZK. The simulator, given challenge x ∈ {0,1}λ picks
f ← {1}||{0,1}2λ , za ← {0,1}`r(λ )+2λ and zb ← {0,1}`r(λ )+3λ . It then computes a =
c−xEek( f ;za) and b = cx− fEek(0;zb) and returns the simulated proof (a,b, f ,za,zb). Ob-
serve that the simulated f ,za,zb are statistically close to those of a real proof. To see the
simulation is statistically indistinguishable from a real proof with challenge x all that re-
mains to be seen is that given f ,za,zb, the initial message containing a,b is fixed by the
verification equations in both real and simulated proofs.
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Finally, let us show that the protocol has unique identifiable challenges using Rguilt.
A witness in Rguilt gives us the decryption key for the encryption scheme. We can verify
the correctness of the decryption key and decrypt c to get m and also decrypt a,b to get
plaintexts ma and mb. In a succesful argument, the value f must be f = xm+ma mod p
since otherwise the first verification equation would fail. The second verification equation
gives us ( f − x)m+mb = 0 mod p, which means e(m− 1)m+mam+mb = 0 mod p. If
m /∈{0,1}we have that (m−1)m 6= 0 mod p and therefore the equation uniquely determines
x mod p. With p > 2λ this identifies a unique challenge x ∈ {0,1}λ that the prover may be
able to answer or shows that no answerable challenge exists. 
4.3 Transformation
We will now use the DFN transformation [DFN06] on a Σ-protocol with linear answer over
the integers and unique identifiable challenges to get a non-interactive designated verifier
argument. The transformation we use is identical to [DFN06], but the soundness proof
differs: at the cost of requiring soundness with unique identifiable challenge, a strongly
additively homomorphic encryption scheme and proving culpable soundness, we eschew
the use of complexity leveraging assumptions.
The verifier uses an additively homomorphic encryption scheme (RKGen,E ,D) to en-
crypt a random challenge x. Since the Σ-protocol has linear answer, the prover can now
use the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme to compute an encryption of the
answer~z in the Σ-protocol, which is sent together with the initial message a. The verifier
decrypts the ciphertext from the prover to get z and checks whether (a,x,~z) is a valid proof.
The full non-interactive designated verifier argument is described in Fig. 4.2.
RKGen(1λ )
(ek,dk)← PKEGen(1λ )
x←{0,1}λ
c←Eek(x)
pk := (ek,c)
vk := (dk,x)
Return (pk,vk)
P(pk,u,w)
(a,~z1,~z2)←PΣ(u,w)
~cz← c~z1Eek(~z2)
Return pi := (a,~cz)
V(vk,u,pi)
Parse pi = (a,~cz)
~z←Ddk(~cz)
Return VΣ(u,a,x,~z)
Figure 4.2: Non-interactive designated verifier argument
Theorem 2. (RKGen,P,V) specified in Fig. 4.2 is a non-interactive designated verifier
argument for R with culpable soundness for Rguilt if (PΣ,VΣ) is a Σ-protocol for R with linear
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answer over the integers and soundness with unique identifiable challenge using Rguilt and
if (PKEGen,E ,D) is an additively homomorphic, IND-CPA secure public key encryption
scheme where Zp is of sufficiently large size to include the answers, i.e., `p(λ )> `z(λ ).
Proof. Since (PΣ,VΣ) and (PKEGen,E ,D) are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
so are (RKGen,P,V). Perfect completeness follows from the additive homomorphicity of
the encryption scheme and that 0≤ zi < 2`z(λ ) < p for all entries zi in~z combined with the
perfect completeness of (PΣ,VΣ).
Next, we will prove that the construction is zero-knowledge. The simulator knows the
secret verification key vk = (dk,x). It starts by running the SHVZK simulator for the Σ-
protocol to get a simulated proof (a,x,~z) for the statement u. It then generates~cz← Eek(~z)
and returns the simulated argument pi := (a,~cz).
To see a that simulated argument is indistinguishable from a real argument consider
a hybrid simulator that does get the witness as input. This hybrid simulator proceeds by
following the Σ-protocol to get an argument (a,x,~z) and then encrypts ~z to get ~cz. Since
the encryption scheme is also homomorphic with respect to the randomness used for en-
cryption, the hybrid arguments generated this way and real arguments are perfectly indis-
tinguishable. Furthermore, since the Σ-protocol is SHVZK, hybrid arguments and simu-
lated arguments are computationally indistinguishable. Furthermore, if the Σ-protocol has
statistical SHVZK then the hybrid arguments and simulated arguments are statistically in-
distinguishable.
Finally, we will prove that the construction has adaptive culpable soundness with re-
spect to Rguilt. Plugging our construction into the probability defining culpable soundness
with a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A we get
Pr
 (ek,dk)← RKGen(1λ );x←{0,1}λ ;c←Eek(x)
(u,(a,~cz),wguilt)←A(ek,c);~z←Ddk(~cz)
:
(u,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt
VΣ(u,a,x,~z) = 1
 .
By the unique identifiable challenge property of the Σ-protocol this probability is at
most the chance that x is the unique answerable challenge:
Pr
 (ek,dk)← RKGen(1λ );x←{0,1}λ ;c←Eek(x)
(u,(a,~cz),wguilt)←A(ek,c);~z←Ddk(~cz)
:
(u,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt
x = E(u,wguilt,a)
 .
By the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme, this probability is at most negli-
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gibly larger than the same expression with c encrypting a random challenge x′
Pr
 (ek,dk)← RKGen(1λ );x,x′←{0,1}λ ;c←Eek(x′)
(u,(a,~cz),wguilt)←A(ek,c);~z←Ddk(~cz)
:
(u,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt
x = E(u,wguilt,a)
 .
Since x is chosen uniformly random this latter probability is at most 2−λ , which is negligi-
ble. 
4.3.1 Non-interactive Designated Verifier Arguments for Statements about
Ciphertexts
In Sect. 4.2.4 we gave a Σ-protocol for proving a ciphertext having either 0 or 1 as plaintext.
Using the DFN transformation, this leads to a non-interactive designated verifier argument
with culpable soundness for a ciphertext encrypting 0 or 1, i.e., for the relation
R =
{
((ek,c),(m,r)) : m ∈ {0,1} and r ∈ {0,1}`r(n) and c = Eek(m;r)
}
with culpable soundness using
Rguilt =
{
((ek,c),dk) : c ∈ Cek and Ddk(c) /∈ {0,1} and VerifyKey(1λ ,ek,dk) = 1
}
.
This designated verifier argument works for ciphertexts produced by all strongly ad-
ditively homomorphic encryption schemes that have message space Zp for p > 2λ such as
for instance the Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98] encryption scheme from Sect. 4.2.2. A second
instance of the same strongly additively homomorphic encryption scheme but with larger
message space can also be used for the DFN transformation. However, in the interest of
more efficient implementations, it might be desirable to use a different encryption scheme
for the DFN transformation. Specifically, DFN does not require the message space to be of
prime order or the scheme to be strongly additively homomorphic, giving us the option of
using an encryption scheme better suited for encrypting long messages such as Damga˚rd-
Jurik [DJN10].
It is fairly simple to adapt standard Σ-protocols for other languages expressing prop-
erties about ciphertexts. In particular, in addition to the argument for encryption of 0 or
1 it is possible to construct non-interactive designated verifier arguments for the following
relations:
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Plaintext is 0: We can prove that a ciphertext c encrypts 0, i.e., give a non-interactive des-
ignated verifier argument for the relation
R0 =
{
((ek,c),r) : r ∈ {0,1}`r(n) and c = Eek(0;r)
}
.
Equivalence of plaintexts: Given two ciphertexts c and c′, we can give a non-interactive
designated verifier argument for them having the same plaintext by proving that c/c′
is an encryption of 0 using the above designated verifier argument.
Multiplicative relationship: Given a triple of ciphertexts c0,c1 and c2, we can prove that
the plaintexts m0,m1 and m2 satisfy m0 = m1m2 mod p. More precisely, we can con-
struct a designated verifier argument for the relation
RM =
 ((ek,c0,c1,c2),(m1,m2,r0,r1,r2)) : m1,m2 ∈ Zp,r0,r1,r2 ∈ {0,1}`r(n)c0 = Eek(m1m2;r0) and c1 = Eek(m1;r1) and c2 = Eek(m2;r2)
 .
In all cases, the corresponding guilt witness wguilt consists of the decryption key, which can
be used to decrypt the ciphertexts in the statement.
4.3.2 Circuit Satisfiability
We will now show that given a circuit consisting of NAND-gates and encryptions of the
wires it is possible to prove that the plaintexts correspond to a satisfying assignment. A
circuit C with k+ 1 wires and s gates can be described as {( j1, j2, j3)}sj=1, which means
that the wires should satisfy w j3 = ¬(w j1 ∧w j2). We let the output wire be w0 = 1 and the
corresponding ciphertext be c0 = Eek(1;0) encrypted with randomness r0 = 0. We consider
the relations:
RC =
 ((C,ek,c1, . . . ,ck),(w1,r1, . . . ,wk,rk)) | ∀ j = 1, . . . ,s : w j3 = ¬(w j1 ∧w j2)∀i = 1, . . . ,k : wi ∈ {0,1}∧ ri ∈ {0,1}`r(λ )−2∧ ci = Eek(wi;ri)
 ,
RCguilt =
 ((C,ek,c1, . . . ,ck),dk) | VerifyKey(1λ ,ek,dk) = 1 and ∀i = 1, . . .k : ci ∈ Cek∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} : wi =Ddk(ci) /∈ {0,1} or ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . ,s} : w j3 6= ¬(w j1 ∧w j2)
 .
The strategy in the designated verifier argument for RC is to first prove that each ci-
phertext contains a wire value wi ∈ {0,1}. Next, the prover proves for each NAND-gate
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( j1, j2, j3) that w j3 = ¬(w j1 ∧w j2). Following [GOS12] we have for w j1 ,w j2 ,w j3 ∈ {0,1}
w j3 = ¬(w j1 ∧w j2) if and only if w j1 +w j2 +2w j3−2 ∈ {0,1}.
Using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme, we will therefore for each
NAND-gate show c j1c j2c
2
j3Eek(−2;0) contains 0 or 1. The full construction can be found in
Fig. 4.3
PC(pk,(C,ek,c1, . . . ,ck),(w1,r1, . . . ,wk,rk))
w0 = 1,r0 = 0,c0 = Eek(w0;r0)
For i = 1, . . . ,k
pii←P(pk,ci,(wi,ri))
Parse C = {( j1, j2, j3)}sj=1
For j = 1, . . . ,s
c′j = c j1c j2c
2
j3Eek(−2;0)
m′j = w j1 +w j2 +2w j3−2
r′j = r j1 + r j2 +2r j3
pi ′j←P(pk,c′j,(m′j,r′j))
Return pi = (pi1, . . . ,pik,pi ′1, . . . ,pi ′s)
VC(vk,(C,ek,c1, . . . ,ck),pi)
w0 = 1,r0 = 0,c0 = Eek(w0;r0)
Parse C = {( j1, j2, j3)}sj=1
For j = 1, . . . ,s
c′j = c j1c j2c
2
j3Eek(−2;0)
Parse pi = (pi1, . . . ,pik,pi ′1, . . . ,pi ′s)
Accept if and only if
For i = 1, . . . ,k
V(vk,ci,pii) = 1
For j = 1, . . . ,s
V(vk,c′j,pi ′j) = 1
Figure 4.3: Non-interactive designated verifier argument (GC,PC,VC) for encryption of
satisfying assignment of wires in a circuit using GC = G where (G,P,V) is a designated
verifier argument for encryption of 0 or 1.
Theorem 3. (GC,PC,VC) given in Fig. 4.3 is a non-interactive designated verifier argu-
ment for RC with culpable soundness using RCguilt if (G,P,V) is a non-interactive designated
verifier argument for encryption of 0 or 1 using Rguilt from Sect. 4.2.4.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the homomorphic properties of the encryption
scheme and the perfect completeness of (G,P,V).
We will now prove composable zero-knowledge. The simulator SC(vk,(C,ek,c1, . . . ,ck))
runs like the prover except it simulates the proofs pi1, . . . ,pik,pi ′1, . . . ,pi ′s as pii ←
S(vk,(ek,ci)) and pi ′j ← S(vk,c′j). We prove this via a hybrid argument. Let
SPi(vk,(C,ek,c1, . . . ,ck),(w1,r1, . . . ,wk,rk)) for i= 0 . . .(k+s) by a hybrid prover/simulator,
operating as follows: it uses the real prover for the first (k+ s− i) subproofs of pi , and the
simulator for the last i. It is clear that SP0 behaves as the real prover (since it ignores its first
argument), while SP(k+s) behaves as the simulator (since it ignores its last argument). Thus,
if an adversary AC can distinguish between the prover (i.e. SP0) and simulator (SP(k+s)),
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there must also be a value i so that is distinguishes SPi from SP(i+1). We will use AC to
build an adversary A against the composable zero knowledge of (G,P,V). A operates by
running AC to obtain a statement for the circuit protocol, and isolates the ciphertext c and
witness r used in subproof i+ 1. It then returns c,r to the game, obtaining pi∗, finally it
creates a proof pi by running SPi, but inserting pi∗ in place of subproof i+1, and copies the
response ofAC. It is clear that iffAC correctly guesses whether pi was produced identically
to SPi or SP(i+1) thenA correctly guesses if pi∗ was created by the prover or the simulator.
We remark that here the usefulness of composable zero-knowledge comes into play
since it gives the adversary access to the verification key vk, which allows the hybrid argu-
ment to go through.
Finally, we will prove that the argument is culpably sound. By the culpable soundness
of (RKGen,P,V) when we are given dk by the adversary, the proofs pi1, . . . ,pik guarantee
each ciphertext contains 0 or 1. The homomorphic property of the encryption scheme com-
bined with the culpable soundness of the proofs pi ′1, . . . ,pi ′s then shows that the plaintexts
respect the NAND-gates. Since the output is w0 = 1 this means the circuit is satisfied by the
encrypted values. 
4.4 Applications in Voting with Homomorphic Tallying
We will use a basic referendum voting scheme as an illustration of how to use non-
interactive zero-knowledge designated verifier arguments with culpable soundness. We use
a modification of the framework by Bernhard et al. [BCP+11] which generalises the Helios
voting system. Such schemes operate by having eligible voters post their votes on a bulletin
board encrypted with an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. The election result
can then be produced by a single decryption operation on the homomorphic sum of the indi-
vidual votes. Zero-knowledge protocols ensure that the various participating parties remain
honest.
4.4.1 Voting Schemes with Delayed Bulletin Boards
We assume a delayed bulletin board BB holds all messages posted by the various partici-
pants in the election, and that it behaves honestly for the entirety of the election. During the
submission of ballots, it operates in an append-only mode without disclosing its contents.
After voting has concluded, the bulletin board reveals the ballots it contains and checks their
validity. The checks use only public information and as such are reproducible by any party;
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the bulletin board performs them for convenience. Finally, we assume that the history of the
bulletin board is publicly accessible as well as the current state.
Our use of a delayed bulletin board is a departure from usual practice and is aimed
at preventing attacks based on malleability. The additional trust placed on the board by
this requirement may be mitigated by having the bulletin board immediately display com-
mitments to ballots or eliminated by augmenting the ballot encryption to be submission
secure [Wik08]. We also note that Cortier et al. [CGGI13] develop techniques to guard
against misbehaving boards.
In the interest of simplicity, we restrict the options in the referendum to {0,1} without
giving the option of casting an abstention ballot. The election is run by two trustees, TD and
TV , tasked with holding the decryption and verification keys for the election. We will for
simplicity consider them to be trusted parties but they could be implemented using threshold
cryptography.
Definition 19 (Delayed Voting Scheme). A voting scheme Π consists of five probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms: Setup, Vote, SubmitBallot, CheckBoard, Tally, which
operate as follows:
Setup The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ . It produces secret
information SEC, public information PUB and verification information AUG. It also
initialises the bulletin board BB and sets it to be hidden. PUB is assumed to be public
knowledge after Setup has run.
Vote Vote accepts a vote m ∈ {0,1} and outputs a ballot B encoding m.
SubmitBallot SubmitBallot(B,BB) takes as input a ballot B and the current state of the
bulletin board BB and outputs either (0,BB) if it rejects B or (1,BB +←B) if it accepts
it.
CheckBoard CheckBoard(BB,AUG) makes BB visible, and then checks all ballots on BB,
replacing with ⊥ any ballots that do not pass the verification tests. After checking,
the verification information of valid ballots can be removed from the board.
Tally Tally (BB,SEC) takes as input a verified bulletin board BB and the secret informa-
tion SEC and outputs the election result.
For correctness we require that the ballots of honest voters are counted correctly, and
that ballots cast by malicious voters cannot influence the election more than an honest one
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(i.e casting q malicious ballots can only add q votes and subtract none).
ExpCORΠ,A(λ )
(PUB,SEC,AUG)← Setup(1λ )
(vsum,q) := (0,0)
AVoteOracle(·),BallotOracle(·)(PUB)
BB← CheckBoard(BB,AUG)
result← Tally(BB,SEC)
Return (result,vsum,q)
VoteOracle(v)
B← Vote(v)
(r,BB)← SubmitBallot(B,BB)
if r = accept : vsum := (vsum+ v)
Return (r,B)
BallotOracle(B)
(r,BB)← SubmitBallot(B,BB)
q := q+1
Return r
Figure 4.4: The referendum correctness experiment, and the oracles provided to the adver-
sary.
Definition 20 (Correctness). We say that a referendum voting scheme Π is correct if for all
efficient adversaries A:
Pr
[
(result,vsum,q)← ExpCORΠ,A(λ ) : vsum≤ result ≤ q+ vsum
]
≈ 1
Definition 21 (Delayed Ballot Privacy). We say that a delayed voting scheme Π satisfies
ballot privacy if for all efficient stateful interactive adversaries A:
Pr
[
ExpBPΠ,A(λ ) = 1
]
≈ 1
2
ExpBPΠ,A(λ )
(PUB,SEC,AUG)← Setup(1λ )
b←{0,1}
AVoteOracle(·),BallotOracle(·)(PUB)
BB← CheckBoard(BB,AUG)
BB′← CheckBoard(BB′,AUG)
result← Tally(BB′,SEC)
bˆ←A(result,BB,AUG)
Return b = bˆ
VoteOracle(v)
B′← Vote(v)
if b = 1 then B← B′
else B← Vote(0)
(r,BB)← SubmitBallot(B,BB)
(r′,BB′)← SubmitBallot(B′,BB′)
Return (r,B)
BallotOracle(B)
(r,BB)← SubmitBallot(B,BB)
if r = accept then
(r′,BB′)← SubmitBallot(B,BB′)
Return r
Figure 4.5: The Ballot Privacy experiment, and the oracles provided to the adversary
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4.4.2 A Referendum Voting Scheme
We will now describe a delayed voting scheme ΠREF for a yes-no referendum, based on
an additively homomorphic encryption scheme such as (PKEGen,E ,D) and with a non-
interactive designated verifier argument system (RKGen,P,V) for a plaintext being 0 or 1
such as the one given in Fig. 4.2.
For simplicity, we omit correctness proofs for keys having been generated correctly
but point out that since the setup involves a limited number of parties we could assume
the use of online zero-knowledge protocols using standard techniques. We also assume
that the bulletin board behaves honestly. We now give descriptions of the Voting Protocol
Algorithms:
Setup The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ . The decryption trustee
TD runs PKEGen(1λ ) to produce (ek,dk) and the verification trustee then runs
RKGen(1lz(λ )) to obtain (pk,vk). Let, PUB = (ek, pk), AUG = vk and SEC = dk.
The procedure also initialises the bulletin board BB to be hidden, and publishes PUB.
Vote(m) Pick r ← {0,1}`r(λ ) and return (c,pi), where c = Eek(m;r) and pi ←
P(pk,(ek,c,r)).
SubmitBallot(B,BB) Return (accept,BB +←B).
CheckBoard(BB,AUG) The bulletin board BB becomes visible. TV publishes AUG. For
every ballot B = (c,pi) in BB we check whether c ∈ Cek and V(vk,(ek,c),pi) = 1. If
not, they will be omitted from the tally.
Tally(BB,SEC) The decryption trustee publishes result = Ddk(∏ki=1 ci), where c1, . . . ,ck
are the encrypted votes that passed the validity check.
Theorem 4. The referendum scheme ΠREF defined above is correct, if (RKGen,P,V) is
adaptive culpablby sound.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against ExpCORΠ,A(λ ) that causes result to be out of bounds
with non-negligible probability. We construct a simulator B that contradicts the adaptive
culpable soundness of (RKGen,P,V). B will simulate the correctness experiment for A
while acting as the adversary for the adaptive culpable soundness experiment. B operates
by running the correctness experiment normally with the difference that it does not generate
(pk,vk) but instead obtains pk from the adaptive culpable soundness experiment.
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Because (PKEGen,E ,D) is correct and additively homomorphic, result being out of
bounds implies one of the submitted ballots B = (c,pi) is such that c encrypts a value other
than 0 or 1 while at the same time V(vk,(ek,c),pi) = 1. Choosing one of the q ballots at
random, B outputs (u,pi,wguilt) to the experiment, where u= (c, pk) and wguilt = dk. Since q
is polynomial in λ this gives B a non-negligible probability of winning the experiment.
Theorem 5. The scheme ΠREF satisfies delayed ballot privacy, if the (RKGen,P,V) argu-
ment has statistical zero-knowledge, and (PKEGen,E ,D) is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. We will prove thatA can not do better than guess the value of b in the delayed ballot
privacy experiment via a series of hybrid games. We exploit the delay on the bulletin board
and also take advantage of the fact that in a referendum the number of possible results is
linear in the number of votes.
We will focus on the VoteOracle calls that the adversary makes, as that is where the ex-
periment diverges depending on b. Let qv,qb be upper bounds on the number of VoteOracle
and BallotOracle queries made byA for a particular security parameter λ . Let qΣ = qv+qb
be the total number of queries.
We define as Exp2 the experiment ExpBPΠREF ,A where all VoteOracle calls produce a
ballot with a simulated proof pi instead of a real one. We also define a series of hybrid games
H1i for i ∈ {0,qv} in which the first i VoteOracle calls produce a ballot with a simulated
proof pi instead of a real one. Via a straightforward hybrid argument, if A can distinguish
between Exp2 = H1qv and Exp
BP
ΠREF ,A = H
1
0 with a non-negligible probability there must be
a value of i such that he can distinguish H1i and H
1
i+1. This contradicts the honest verifier
zero knowledge property of (G,P,V), since for all i, H1i and H1i+1 differ (at most) only in a
single proof transcript. Thus A wins Exp2 with probability negligibly close to ExpBPΠREF ,A.
We also define a series of hybrid games H2i for i ∈ {0,qv} as Exp2 in which the first
i VoteOracle calls operate as if b = 1 and the rest as if b = 0. If A can win Exp2 with
non-negligible probability, he can distinguish between H20 and H
2
qv and thus there must be a
value of i such that A can distinguish H2i and H2i+1.
Let the variable RES be the sum of the votes contained in ballots with correct proofs
which appear in the bulletin board BB′ before CheckBoard is called. We note that RES
only takes values in {0, . . . ,qΣ}.
Let p(λ ) be a polynomial such that A can distinguish between H2i and H2i+1 with
probability at least 12 +
1
p(λ ) for an infinite number of λ ∈N. We will construct an adversary
4.4. Applications in Voting with Homomorphic Tallying 79
B that can obtain non-negligible advantage against the IND-CPA security of (K,E ,D) by
simulating an election against A. Initially B obtains a public key ek from the IND-CPA
experiment and completes the setup as normal, obtaining (pk,vk) from G. B proceeds by
following ΠREF with the following difference: the first i VoteOracle calls operate as if
b = 1. The next VoteOracle (which we can assume w.l.o.g to be v∗ = 1) is answered as if
it was successful, but B does not update BB. Afterwards, before CheckBoard is called, the
experiment is suspended and the state st of A is saved along with the bulletin boards and
keys as σ = (ek,(pk,vk),st,BB,BB′). B does not know the value of RES, but knows that it
takes values in {0, . . . ,qΣ}.
Let Exp3(σ ,v,r), where σ = (ek,(pk,vk),st,BB,BB′) be the following experiment:
Produce B∗ as a fresh ballot (with simulated proof) containing v, add B∗ to BB, restore the
adversary’s state to st and resume the voting protocol starting at CheckBoard. The Tally
query is answered with r. The result of the experiment is 1 only if v = bˆ where bˆ is A’s
reply.
We note when r = RES, Exp3(σ ,v,r) produces the same output as H2i or H2i+1 de-
pending only on v. We call a saved state σ “good” if A has a non-negligible advantage in
distinguishing Exp3(σ ,0,RES) from Exp3(σ ,1,RES), where RES is determined uniquely
by BB′. Because A can distinguish between H2i and H2i+1, a state created by B must be
“good” with non-negligible probability.
B repeats the following λ · p(λ ) times: run Exp3(σ ,v,r) for all combinations of v ∈
{0,1} and r ∈ {0, . . . ,qΣ}.
Afterwards, B can determine the value of r for whichA has best distinguished between
v = 0 and 1. We note that because the true value of RES is included in the iterations, if σ
is a “good” state, there is a value of r for which A achieves at least 1p(λ ) advantage in
distinguishing v, and after λ · p(λ ) experiments Chernoff-bounds show that B has a good
estimate of A’s advantage for each value of r.
After determining the optimal value of r, B will send (0,1) to the IND-CPA experiment
and obtain a challenge ciphertext cˆ. B produces a simulated proof pˆi for c, adds Bˆ to the
saved board and resumes the experiment a final time. B finally forwards the reply of A to
the IND-CPA experiment.
Because B will proceed without restarting with non-negligible probability, it runs in
expected polynomial time. Because with overwhelming probability B proceeds only when
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Reference Elements Size (bits) Total (bits)
G F GL G. F. GL.
ElGamal (ECC) 4 3 256 256 1.75K
ElGamal (Zp) 4 3 4.4K 256 18.5K
This work (naive) 3 3 4.4K 15K 58.2K
This work (baseline) 3 3 4.4K 11.6K 48K
Table 4.1: Size comparison between our work and baseline Helios - ElGamal, for parame-
ters targeting 128 bit security.
σ is a “good” state, the advantage in distinguishing whether c contains 0 or 1 is non-
negligible.
4.4.3 Efficiency
In this section, we compare the size of a simple 0/1 ballot for our scheme, compared to a
standard Helios instantiation with ElGamal. We use the guidelines from [Len05] and target
128 bit security. In both cases, we give the cost in terms of group elementsG, field elements
F and large group elementsGL. Large group elements are used for the outer encryption layer
of our DFN-based construction (i.e the keys in ).
The three variants of our instantiation differ as follows: In the the naive version, p and
q increase in size proportionally. In the baseline version, only p increases in size, as the size
of q is already large enough and the size of the message space depends only on p.
Chapter 5
Efficient Protocols for Arithmetic Circuits
In the previous chapter, we gave a protocol for the satisfiability of a binary circuit. While
simple conceptually, it was not particularly efficient as we relied on a separate subprotocol
for every multiplication gate and wire. In this chapter we will construct a much more
efficient but also more complex protocol that is tailored to arithmetic circuits. The additional
complexity means that the DFN transformation is no longer applicable: some aspects (e.g.
multiple rounds or answers linear in higher powers of the challenge) could be handled by
generalising the transformation, but others (like answers involving group elements with
the challenge used as an exponent) would require a large jump in its expressive power.
This leaves us with either a multi-round argument or using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the
random oracle model.
With regards to efficiency, we provide a zero-knowledge argument for arithmetic cir-
cuit satisfiability with a communication complexity that grows logarithmically in the size
of the circuit. The round complexity is also logarithmic and for an arithmetic circuit with
fan-in 2 gates the computation of the prover and verifier is linear in the size of the cir-
cuit. The soundness of our argument relies solely on the well-established discrete logarithm
assumption in prime order groups.
At the heart of our new argument system is an efficient zero-knowledge argument
of knowledge of openings of two Pedersen multicommitments satisfying an inner product
relation, which is of independent interest. The inner product argument requires logarithmic
communication and interaction, and linear computation for both the prover and the verifier.
We also develop a scheme to commit to a polynomial and later reveal the evaluation
at an arbitrary point, in a verifiable manner. This is used to build an optimised version
of the constant round square root complexity argument of Groth [Gro09b], reducing both
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communication and round complexity.
The research presented in this chapter was joint work with Jonathan Bootle, Andrea Cerulli,
Jens Groth and Christophe Petit, and published in [BCC+16b]. The author contributed to
the investigation in the recursive version of the main protocol and in the idea of utilising
the homomorphic property of the bases in our commitment scheme. Additionally, in the
root version of the protocol, and specifically in using the constraints system required by
the multiplication argument to handle additions “for free”. The author also contributed
the Python implementation of the protocol, together with Andrea Cerulli as well as the
benchmarking.
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5.1 Introduction
Our goal is to build an efficient argument system for the satisfiability of an arithmetic cir-
cuit, i.e., a circuit that consists of addition and multiplication gates over a finite field Zp.
Moreover we want to base the security of this argument solely on the discrete logarithm as-
sumption: this will provide both strong security guarantees and good efficiency since there
exists no known attacks better than generic ones for well-chosen elliptic curve subgroups.
The most efficient zero-knowledge arguments solely based on the discrete logarithm
assumption are Groth’s protocol based on linear algebra [Gro09b] and its variant by
Seo [Seo11]. Both of these protocols have a communication complexity that is proportional
to the square root of the circuit size. This square root complexity has since then appeared
(Sect. 2.1.2) as a (perhaps fundamental) barrier for discrete logarithm-based arguments for
circuit satisfiability in this setting.
5.1.1 Contributions
We provide an honest verifier zero-knowledge argument for arithmetic circuit satisfiability
based on the discrete logarithm assumption that only requires a logarithmic communication
complexity. Our argument has perfect completeness and perfect special honest verifier zero-
knowledge. Soundness is computational and based on the discrete logarithm assumption.
We require a logarithmic number of moves, and both the prover and verifier have linear
computational complexity. The argument is therefore efficient on all parameters with the
biggest improvement being in the communication complexity.
Improved Square Root Complexity Argument. We start from the circuit satisfiability ar-
gument of Groth [Gro09b], which requires 7 moves and has square root communication
complexity in the total number of gates. In this argument the prover commits to all the
wires using homomorphic multicommitments, verifies addition gates using the homomor-
phic properties, and uses a product argument to show that the multiplication gates are satis-
fied.
We first improve Groth’s argument into a 5 moves argument with square root commu-
nication complexity in the number of multiplication gates only. We achieve fewer moves
compared to [Gro09b] by avoiding generic reductions to linear algebra statements. We re-
move the communication cost of the addition gates in the argument by providing a technique
that can directly handle a set of Hadamard products and linear relations together. Another
efficiency improvement is a subroutine to commit to a polynomial and later reveal its eval-
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uation at an arbitrary point in a verifiable manner. In Section 5.4 we provide a protocol to
perform this task, which has a square root communication complexity with respect to the
degree of the polynomial, and which may be of independent interest.
Logarithmic Complexity Argument. In spite of all these improvements, the above argu-
ment still requires a square root communication complexity with respect to multiplication
gates. In the first move the prover commits to all circuit wires using 3m commitments to n
elements each, where mn = N is a bound on the number of multiplication gates, and in the
last move after receiving a challenge he opens one commitment that can be constructed from
the previous ones and the challenge. By setting m ≈ n we get a minimal communication
complexity of O(
√
N).
Our key idea to break this square root communication complexity barrier is to replace
the last opening step in this protocol by an argument of knowledge of the opening values.
Using specific properties of Pedersen multicommitments, namely homomorphic properties
with respect to the keys, we rewrite this argument as an argument of knowledge of openings
of two homomorphic commitments, satisfying an inner product relation. In Section 5.5 we
provide an argument system for this problem, which only requires a logarithmic communi-
cation with respect to the vector sizes. The argument is built in a recursive way, reducing the
size and complexity of the statement further in each recursion step. Using this inner prod-
uct argument as a subroutine we obtain an arithmetic circuit satisfiability argument with
logarithmic communication.
Implementation. In Section 5.7 we report on an implementation of our arguments. To
show the practicality of our results we compare the efficiency of our implementation to that
of Pinocchio [PHGR13]. Pinocchio is a practical verifiable computation scheme allowing
a constrained client to outsource computation of a function to a powerful worker and to
efficiently verify the outcome of the function. It uses quadratic arithmetic programs, a
generalisation of arithmetic circuits, and for some functions achieves verification that is
faster than local computation. While we do not achieve comparably fast verification, we
compare favourably in terms of prover computation, and do so under simpler assumptions.
5.2 Related Work
Table 5.1 compares the most efficient previous zero-knowledge arguments based on the
discrete logarithm assumption with our scheme, when allowing for 5 moves or a logarith-
mic number of moves. Using 5 moves, our scheme requires significantly less computation
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Reference Moves Communication Prover Complexity Verifier Complexity
G Zp exp. mult. exp. mult.
[CD98] 3 6N 5N+2 6N 6N 6N 0
[Gro09b] 7 9
√
N+4 7
√
N+6 6NlogN O(N logN)
39
√
N
logN O(N)
[Gro09b] 2 logN+5 2
√
N 7
√
N 6NlogN O(N)
18
√
N
logN O(N)
[Seo11] 5 30
√
N 7
√
N 6NlogN O(N logN)
77
√
N
logN O(N)
This work 5 2
√
N 2
√
N 6NlogN 3N logN
8
√
3N
logN O(N)
This work 2logN+1 4logN+7 2logN+6 12N O(N) 4N O(N)
Table 5.1: Efficiency comparison between our arguments and the most efficient interactive
zero-knowledge arguments relying on discrete logarithm. We express communication in
number of group elements G and field elements Zp and computation costs in number of
exponentiations overG and multiplications over Zp. The efficiency displayed is for a circuit
with N multiplication gates.
than [Seo11]. On the other hand when using a logarithmic number of moves and apply-
ing a reduction similar to [BG12], our scheme dramatically improves the communication
costs with respect to all previous work without incurring any significant overhead. We note
that [BG12] uses the reduction to reduce computation whereas we use it to reduce commu-
nication.
As part of our construction we give a protocol for committing to a polynomial and
later revealing an evaluation of the polynomial in a given point. Kate et al. [KZG10] have
also provided protocols to commit to polynomials and then evaluate them at a given point
in a verifiable way. Their protocols only require a constant number of commitments but
security relies on pairing assumptions. Our polynomial commitment protocol has square
root communication complexity but relies solely on the discrete logarithm assumption.
5.3 Preliminaries
Throughout the chapter we let G be a group of prime order p. Let ~g = (g1, . . . ,gn) ∈ Gn
and ~f = ( f1, . . . , fn) ∈ Znp. We write ~g~f for the multi-exponentiation ~g~f = ∏ni=1 g fii . A
multi-exponentiation of size n can be computed at a cost of roughly nlogn single group expo-
nentiations using the multi-exponentiation techniques of [Lim00, Mo¨l01, MR08].
5.3.1 Arithmetic Circuits
Our satisfiability arguments consider arithmetic circuits described as a list of multiplication
gates together with a set of linear consistency equations relating the inputs and outputs of
the gates. In this section, we show how to reduce an arbitrary arithmetic circuit to this
format.
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An arithmetic circuit over a field Zp and variables (a1, . . . ,am) is a directed acyclic
graph whose vertices are called gates. Gates of in-degree 0 are inputs to the circuit and
labelled with some ai or a constant field element. All other gates are labelled + or ×. We
may consider fan-in 2 circuits, in which case all of the + and × gates have in-degree 2, or
arbitrary fan-in circuits.
Arithmetic circuits can be described alternatively as a list of multiplication gates with
a collection of linear consistency equations relating the inputs and outputs of the gates.
Our zero-knowledge protocols for circuit satisfiability use circuits in this form. Any circuit
described as an acyclic graph can be efficiently converted into the alternative description.
We show how to remove addition and multiplication-by-constant gates from an arith-
metic circuit A, and replace them with bilinear consistency equations on the inputs and
outputs of the remaining gates, such that satisfiability of the equations is equivalent to sat-
isfiability in the original circuit.
Let B be the sub-circuit of A containing all wires and gates before a multiplication
gate, with m input wires and n output wires. Label the m inputs of B with the unit vectors
~ei = (0, . . . ,1, . . . ,0) of length m. For every addition gate with inputs labelled as ~x,~y, label
the output wire as~x+~y. For every multiplication-by-constant gate with inputs~x and constant
c label the output with c~x. By proceeding inductively, the n outputs of B are now labelled
with vectors of length m representing them as linear combinations of the inputs.
This requires at most m |B| arithmetic operations. Note however that all outputs of B
are linear combinations of the inputs, and that B can be written with n(2m− 1) fan-in 2
gates in such a way that the consistency equations can be trivially read off from the circuit
description. More specifically, a linear combination ∑mi=1 aixi can be produced using m
multiplication-by-constant gates and m−1 addition gates to add the answers together.
We can now remove the gates of B from A. We also remove any multiplication gates
whose inputs are the inputs of the new circuit. Now we simply repeat the process of finding
consistency equations until we have considered the whole of A. In Figure 5.1 there is an
example of a circuit together and the corresponding consistency equations.
The first (input) and final (output) sub-circuits require additional processing. We show
how to do this for the output sub-circuit. The input sub-circuit is very similarly handled.
Let B be the output sub-circuit. Write (a1, . . . ,am) = ~a for the input wires of B and
(b1, . . . ,bn) =~b for the output wires. Without loss of generality, we may ignore variable
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c4 a5
b6
b5
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c6
c1 = a4
c2 = b4
c4 = a5
4c3+ c4 = b5
4c3+ c4 = a6
4c3 = b6
Figure 5.1: A simple arithmetic circuit, and the corresponding consistency equations.
The first sub-circuit contains the wires a1,b1,c1,a2,b2,c2,a3,a3,c3. The second sub-
circuit contains the wires c1,a4,c2,b4,c4,c5,c6. The third sub-circuit B contains the wires
c3,c4,a5,b5,a6.
output wires. By construction of B, each output bi is of the form ∑ni=1 qi ja j + pi, with
consistency equations obtained as above. We write this in terms of an m×n matrix Q and a
column vector ~p of size m, namely
~b = Q~a+~p.
Let r be the rank of Q. We convert Q into reduced row echelon form R, writing
~b′′ = R~a.
By the properties of reduced row echelon form, after relabelling the ai and permuting
the columns of R to match, we have that b′′i = ai +∑
m
j=l+1 ri ja j for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Therefore,
we may consider al+1, . . . ,am as free wires and express other ai as linear functions of these
wires plus constants.
Note that if b′′i 6= 0 for some i > l, the circuit can never be satisfied anyway. However,
assuming that our statement is a satisfiable circuit, with a witness consisting of satisfying
wire values, this never occurs. Then the original circuit is satisfied if and only if the ai
values satisfy the consistency equations.
If Q is an m×n matrix then it can be converted into reduced row echelon form using
O(max(m,n)mn) operations. It is trivial that m ≤ 2 |B| and n ≤ |B|. This gives an upper
bound of O(|B|3) computation for the output sub-circuit. Note that this is often a large
over-estimate; this upper bound occurs for circuits of depth 1 where inputs feed into distinct
gates. For circuits of large depth, where the same input is fed into several gates, the upper
bound will definitely not be reached.
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The case of the input sub-circuit is very similar, except that we take the transpose of
the matrix.
5.3.2 Full zero knowledge & non-interactivity
In real life applications special honest verifier zero knowledge may not suffice since a ma-
licious verifier may give non-random challenges. However, it is easy to convert an SHVZK
argument into a full zero-knowledge argument secure against arbitrary verifiers in the com-
mon reference string model using standard techniques [Gro04b, GMY06] . The conversion
can be very efficient and only costs a small additive overhead.
The Fiat-Shamir transformation (Sect. 3.4.6) can be applied to our arguments to make
them non-interactive, as well as full zero knowledge at the cost of using the random oracle
model in the security proofs. From an efficiency point of view this is especially useful for
the arguments in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.4, reducing a logarithmic number of moves to a single
one.
5.4 Commitments to Polynomials
In this section, we present a protocol to commit to a polynomial t(X) and later reveal the
evaluation of t(X) at any point x ∈ Z∗p together with a proof that enables a verifier to check
that the evaluation is correct with respect to the committed t(X). We will consider Lau-
rent polynomials t(X) ∈ Zp[X ,X−1] i.e. polynomials in which we allow terms of negative
degree. This protocol will be used as a subroutine for the arguments described in Sec-
tions 5.6.3 and 5.6.4.
A simple solution for this problem would be to send commitments to coefficients of
t(X) individually, from which the evaluation of t(X) at any particular point can be verified
using the homomorphic properties. This solution requires d group elements to be sent,
where d is the number of non-zero coefficients in t(X). As we shall show it is possible to
reduce the communication costs to O(
√
d) group elements, where d = d2 + d1 if t(X) =
∑d2k=−d1 tkX
k.
For clarity we first informally describe our protocol for a standard (not Laurent) poly-
nomial t(X) = ∑dk=0 tkXk. We then extend this informal description to Laurent polynomials
with zero constant term. We finally provide a formal description of the protocol and analyze
its security and efficiency.
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5.4.1 Main idea for standard polynomials.
Let t(X) = ∑dk=0 tkXk be a polynomial with coefficients in Zp and assume d+1 = mn. We
can write t(X) = ∑m−1i=0 ∑
n−1
j=0 ti, j(X)X
in+ j and arrange the coefficients in a m×n matrix

t0,0 t0,1 · · · t0,n−1
t1,0 t1,1 · · · t1,n−1
...
...
...
tm−1,0 tn−1,1 · · · tm−1,n−1

Now, t(X) can be evaluated by multiplying the matrix by row and column vectors.
t(X) =
(
1 Xn · · · X (m−1)n
)

t0,0 t0,1 · · · t0,n−1
t1,0 t1,1 · · · t1,n−1
...
...
...
tm−1,0 tn−1,1 · · · tm−1,n−1


1
X
...
Xn−1

The idea behind the protocol is to commit to the rows of this matrix using commitments
T0, . . . ,Tm−1. Later, when given an evaluation point x ∈ Zp we can use the homomorphic
property of the commitment scheme to compute the commitment ∏m−1i=0 T
xin
i to the vector
~¯t =
(
1 xn · · · x(m−1)n
)

t0,0 t0,1 · · · t0,n−1
t1,0 t1,1 · · · t1,n−1
...
...
...
tm−1,0 tm−1,1 · · · tm−1,n−1

The prover opens this latter commitment and now it is easy to compute v = t(x) from~¯t and
x.
The problem with this straightforward solution is that it leaks partial information about
the coefficients of t(X). We remedy this by inserting some blinding values u1, . . . ,un−1 to
hide the weighted sum of the coefficients in each column. However, we make sure that
the blinding values cancel each other out so that we still get the correct evaluation of the
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polynomial. More precisely, we commit to the rows of the following (m+1)×n matrix
T =

t0,0 t0,1−u1 · · · t0,n−2−un−2 t0,n−1−un−1
t1,0 t1,1 · · · t1,n−2 t1,n−1
...
...
...
tm−1,0 tm−1,1 · · · tm−1,n−2 tm−1,n−1
u1 u2 · · · un−1 0

with U being a commitment to the last row. This time
t(X) =
(
1 Xn · · · X (m−1)n X
)
T

1
X
X2
...
Xn−1

We now open Ux∏m−1i=0 T
xin
i by revealing the vector
~¯t =
(
1 xn · · · x(m−1)n x
)
T
This still allows us to compute t(x), but due to the blinders we no longer leak in-
formation about the coefficients of t(X). In fact, each element of ~¯t is uniformly random,
conditional on their weighted sum being equal to t(x), which the prover intends for the
verifier to learn anyway.
5.4.2 Extension to Laurent polynomials.
Let now t(X) be a Laurent polynomial t(X) = ∑d2i=−d1 tiX
i with constant term t0 = 0.
Let m1,m2,n be positive integers such that d1 = nm1 and d2 = nm2 and write t(X) =
X−m1nt ′(X)+Xt ′′(X) for degree d1− 1 and d2− 1 polynomials t ′(X), t ′′(X) ∈ Zp[X ]. We
can write t ′(X) = ∑m1−1i=0 ∑
n−1
j=0 t
′
i, jX
in+ j and t ′′(X) = ∑m2−1i=0 ∑
n−1
j=0 t
′′
i, jX
in+ j.
We can arrange the coefficients of t ′(X) and t ′′(X) in a (m1 +m2)× n matrix T . We
commit to both t ′(X) and t ′′(X) simultaneously by committing to the rows of the matrix
using commitments T ′i and T
′′
i . As when committing to polynomials we add blinders
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u1, . . . ,un−1 and make a commitment U to the additional last row arising from this.
T =

t ′0,0 t
′
0,1 · · · t ′0,n−1
t ′1,0 t
′
1,1 · · · t ′1,n−1
...
...
...
t ′m1−1,0 t
′
m1−1,1 · · · t ′m1−1,n−1
t ′′0,0 t
′′
0,1−u1 · · · t ′′0,n−1−un−1
t ′′1,0 t
′′
1,1 · · · t ′′1,n−1
...
...
...
t ′′m2−1,0 t
′′
m2−1,1 · · · t ′′m2−1,n−1
u1 u2 · · · 0

=

~t ′0
~t ′1
...
~t ′m1−1
~t ′′0
~t ′′1
...
~t ′′m2−1
~u

Define vectors
~Z =~Z(X) =
(
X−m1n,X−(m1−1)n, . . . ,X−n,X ,Xn+1, . . . ,X (m2−1)n+1,X2
)
~X = ~X(X) =

1
X
...
Xn−1

and we have t(X) =~ZT~X .
To evaluate at x ∈ Z∗p we open
(
∏m1−1i=0 (T
′
i )
x(i−m1)n
)(
∏m2−1i=0 (T
′′
i )
xin+1
)
Ux
2
to the vector
~¯t = ~Z(x)T . This allows us to compute t(x) as~¯t~X(x). The blinders hide the weighted sums
of each column as before, and now the verifier is able to compute t(x) without gaining
additional information about its coefficients.
5.4.3 Evaluation Protocol.
Our protocol is made of the following three algorithms.
• PolyCommit(ck,m1,m2,n, t(X))→ (pc,st): Take as input a commitment key ck and a
Laurent polynomial t(X) = ∑nm2i=−m1n tiX
i with constant coefficient t0 = 0. Pick blin-
ders u1, . . . ,un−1 ← Zp and randomness τu,τ ′0, . . . ,τ ′m1−1, τ ′′0 , . . . ,τ ′′m2−1 ← Zp. Set
~τ =
(
τ ′0, . . . ,τ ′m1−1,τ
′′
0 , . . . ,τ ′′m2−1,τu
)
. Compute
T ′i = Comck(~t
′
i ;τ
′
i ), T
′′
i = Comck(~t
′′
i ;τ
′′
i ), U = Comck(~u;τu)
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Return a polynomial commitment pc =
(
{T ′i }m1−1i=0 ,{T ′′i }m2−1i=0 ,U
)
and private infor-
mation st = (t(X),~τ).
• PolyEval(st,x)→ pe: Compute
~¯t =~Z(x)T, τ¯ =~Z(x) ·~τ
Return pe = (~¯t, τ¯).
• PolyVerify(ck,m1,m2,n,pc,pe,x)→ v: The verifier checks whether
Comck(~¯t; τ¯) =
(
m1−1
∏
i=0
(T ′i )
x(i−m1)n
)(
m2−1
∏
i=0
(T ′′i )
xin+1
)
Ux
2
If the check is satisfied the verifier returns v = t(x) =~¯t~X(x).
Otherwise, the verifier rejects pe as invalid with respect to pc and x and returns v=⊥.
5.4.4 Security Properties.
We define three security properties for our protocol: completeness, `-special soundness,
and special-honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Later, the protocol is used as a sub-protocol
inside our zero-knowledge arguments-of-knowledge. We opt out of using the definitions
of [KZG10] as our context is somewhat narrow (e.g. we do not intent to reveal an entire
polynomial) so we opt to only model the security properties we require. These properties
will help us to prove the completeness, witness-extended emulation, and special honest
verifier zero knowledge for the zero knowledge argument.
The definition of completeness simply guarantees that if PolyCommit, PolyVerify are
carried out honestly, then PolyVerify will accept and return a commitment to the evaluation
of the polynomial.
Definition 22 (Perfect Completeness). (PolyCommit,PolyEval,PolyVerify) has perfect
completeness if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A
Pr

(ck,m1,m2,n, t(X),x)←A(1λ )
(pc,st)← PolyCommit(ck,m1,m2,n, t(X))
pe← PolyEval(st,x)
v← PolyVerify(ck,m1,m2,n,pc,pe,x)
: v = t(x)
= 1
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where ck is a key for a homomorphic commitment scheme, t(X) is a Laurent polynomial of
degrees d1 = m1n,d2 = m2n and x ∈ Z∗p.
The definition of `-Special Soundness says that given ` accepting evaluations for dif-
ferent evaluation points, but from the same commitment pc, then it is possible to extract
either a valid Laurent polynomial t(X) with zero constant term that is consistent with the
evaluations produced or a breach in the binding property of the commitment scheme. Fur-
thermore, any other accepting evaluations for the same commitment will also be evaluations
of t(X).
Definition 23 (Statistical `-Special Soundness). (PolyCommit,PolyEval,PolyVerify) is sta-
tistically `-special sound if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm χ that,
given ` accepting transcripts with the same commitment pc, either extracts the committed
polynomial t(X), or extracts a break of the binding property of the underlying commitment
scheme. For all adversaries A and all L≥ `
Pr

ck← CGen(1λ )
(m1,m2,n,pc,x1,pe1, . . . ,xL,peL)←A(ck)
Parse pei = (~¯ti, τ¯i)
(T,~τ)← χ(ck,m1,m2,n,pc,x1,pe1, . . . ,xl,pel)
vi← PolyVerify(ck,m1,m2,n,pc,pei,xi)
:
∀i : vi =~Z(xi)T~X(xi)
or ∃ j s.t.
Comck(~¯t j; τ¯ j) =
Comck
(
~Z(x j)T ;~Z(x j)~τ
)
,
where~¯t j 6=~Z(x j)T

≈ 1,
where x1, . . . ,x` are distinct, xi ∈ Z∗p, pei ∈ Znp×Zp, T ∈ Z(m1+m2)×np , and~τ ∈ Zm1+m2p .
Perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge means that given any value v and eval-
uation point x, it is possible to simulate pc and pe, distributed exactly as in a real execution
of the protocol where v was the evaluation of t(X) at x.
Definition 24 (Perfect Special Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge). (PolyCommit,
PolyEval,PolyVerify) has perfect special honest verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK) if there
exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that for all interactive non-uniform
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polynomial time adversaries A
Pr

(ck,m1,m2,n, t(X),x)←A(1λ )
(pc,st)← PolyCommit(ck,m1,m2,n, t(X))
pe← PolyEval(st,x)
:A(pc,pe) = 1

= Pr
 (ck,m1,m2,n, t(X),x)←A(1λ )
(pc,pe)←S(ck,m1,m2,n,x, t(x))
:A(pc,pe) = 1

where ck is a key for a homomorphic commitment scheme, t(X) is a Laurent polynomial of
degrees d1 = m1n,d2 = m2n and x ∈ Z∗p.
Theorem 6. The polynomial commitment protocol has perfect completeness, perfect special
honest verifier zero-knowledge and (m1+m2)n+1-special soundness for extracting either
a breach of the binding property of the commitment scheme or openings to the polynomial.
Proof. Direct verification of the protocol shows that the verifier correctly obtains the eval-
uation of the committed polynomial t(X) at the point x.
For simplicity, we prove SHVZK and special-soundness for the case of Pedersen com-
mitments, but all aspects of the proof carry over in the general case.
For special honest verifier zero-knowledge suppose we have an evaluation point x and
an evaluation v. To simulate the polynomial evaluation we first pick random t¯2, . . . , t¯n, τ¯ ←
Zp and T ′0, . . . ,T ′m1−1,T
′′
0 , . . . ,T
′′
m2−1←G. Now, t¯1 is computed as
t¯1 = v−
n
∑
i=2
t¯ixi−1
Let~¯t = (t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and compute
U = Comck(~¯tx−2; τ¯x−2)
[
m1−1
∏
i=0
(T ′i )
x(i−m1)n
]x−2 [m2−1
∏
i=0
(T ′′i )
xin+1
]x−2
This is a perfect simulation. Given x,v observe that both in the simulation and in the real
execution we get uniformly random t¯2, . . . , t¯n, τ¯ ∈ Zp and T ′0, . . . ,T ′m1−1,T ′′0 , . . . ,T ′′m2−1←G.
Now, conditioning on the values of x,v and the verification equations, U and t¯1 are uniquely
determined. Therefore, the simulation is perfect, and we have special honest verifier zero-
knowledge.
5.4. Commitments to Polynomials 95
Finally, for special soundness note that if we have valid evaluations of l =(m1+m2)n+
2 different challenges x ∈ Z∗p the vectors (x−m1n, . . . ,xm2n−n+1) form the rows of a Vander-
monde matrix multiplied by x−m1n and we can obtain any unit vector (0, . . . ,1, . . . ,0) by
taking an appropriate linear combination of these vectors. By taking the correct linear com-
binations of the l verification equations
Comck(~¯t; τ¯) =
[
m1−1
∏
i=0
(T ′i )
x(i−m1)n
][
m2−1
∏
i=0
(T ′′i )
xin+1
]
Ux
2
for these l different challenges, we can then extract an opening of any T ′i = Comck(~t
′
i ;τ ′i ),
T ′′i = Comck(~t
′′
i ;τ ′′i ) and U = Comck(~u;τu).
This implies that whenever we have L≥ l different challenges x ∈ Z∗p with valid eval-
uations we must either have ~¯t = ~Z(x)T for each (x,pe) pair, where the rows of T are the
extracted ~t ′i and ~t
′′
i and ~u, or we could extract a violation of the binding property of the
commitment scheme.
In the first case where ~¯t = ~Z(x)T , for each pair, χ sets τ = (τ ′0, . . . ,τ ′m1−1,
τ ′′0 , . . . ,τ ′′m2−1,τu), and sets S,~σ to be all zeroes. Since ~¯t = ~Z(x)T , it follows that
vi =~Z(xi)T~X(xi) for each i.
Alternatively, if ~¯ti 6= ~Z(xi)T for some xi and pei = (~¯ti, τ¯i, then since the verifier was
accepting, we have Comck(~¯ti; τ¯i) = Comck(~Z(xi)T ;~Z(xi)~τ), and this gives a violation of the
binding property of the commitment scheme.
5.4.5 Efficiency.
We now discuss the efficiency of the above protocol when instantiated with the Pedersen
multicommitment scheme. The outputs pc,pe of the polynomial commitment protocol have
sizes of m1 +m2 + 1 group elements and n+ 1 field elements respectively. The computa-
tional cost of computing pc is dominated by computing commitments T ′i and T
′′
i , corre-
sponding to m1+m2 n-wide multi-exponentiations. Using multi-exponentiation techniques
as in [Lim00, Mo¨l01, MR08], the total cost is roughly (m1+m2)nlogn group exponentiations. The
main cost for computing pe is dominated by the n(m1 +m2) field multiplications required
to compute ~ZT . The dominant cost in PolyVerify is to check the verification equation. This
costs roughly m1+m2+nlog(m1+m2+n) group exponentiations.
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5.5 Recursive Argument for Inner Product Evaluation
We will now give an inner product argument of knowledge of two vectors ~a,~b ∈ Znp such
that A =~g~a, B =~h~b and ~a ·~b = z, given z ∈ Zp, A, B ∈G and ~g,~h ∈Gn. The argument will
be used later as a subroutine where zero-knowledge is not required, so the prover could in
principle just reveal the witness ~a,~b to the verifier. In the following we show how to use
interaction to reduce the communication from linear to logarithmic in n, the length of the
vectors.
The basic step in our inner product argument is a 2-move reduction to a smaller state-
ment using techniques similar to [BG12]. It will suffice for the prover to reveal the witness
for the smaller statement in order to convince the verifier about the validity of the original
statement. In the full argument, prover and verifier recursively run the reduction to obtain
increasingly smaller statements. The argument is then concluded with the prover revealing
a witness for a very small statement. The outcome of this is a O(logn)-move argument
with an overall communication of O(logn) group and field elements. The inner product
argument will be used in the next section to build a logarithmic size argument for circuit
satisfiability.
Due to the obvious relationship with Pedersen commitments, we will think of multi-
exponentiations~g~a and~h~b as commitments with randomness set equal to zero, and to~a,~b as
openings with respect to commitment keys~g,~h.
5.5.1 Main Idea
We now describe the basic step in our argument. Consider the common input for both
prover and verifier to be of the form (G, p,~g,A,~h,B,z,m) where m divides n, the length of
the vectors. For arbitrary n one can always reduce to the case where m|n by appending at
most m−1 random group elements to~g and~h.
We split the bases for the multi-exponentiations into m sets ~g = (~g1, . . . ,~gm) and
~h = (~h1, . . . ,~hm), where each set has size nm . We want to prove knowledge of vectors
~a = (~a1, . . . ,~am) and~b = (~b1, . . . ,~bm) such that
A =~g~a =
m
∏
i=1
~g~aii B =~h
~b =
m
∏
i=1
~h
~bi
i ~a ·~b =
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·~bi = z
The key idea is for the prover to replace A with A′, a commitment to a shorter vector ~a′ =
∑mi=1~aixi, given a random challenge x← Z∗p provided by the verifier. In the argument, the
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prover first computes and sends
Ak =
min(m,m−k)
∏
i=max(1,1−k)
~g~ai+ki for k = 1−m, . . . ,m−1
corresponding to the products over the diagonals of the following matrix
~a1 ~a2 · · · ~am
~g1
...
~gm−1
~gm

~g~a11 ~g
~a2
1 · · · ~g~am1
. . . ~g~a22
. . .
...
~g~a1m−1
. . . . . . ~g~amm−1
~g~a1m ~g
~a2
m · · · ~g~amm
 Am−1
...
Am−2
A1−m A2−m · · · A0 = A
Notice that A0 = A is already known to the verifier since it is part of the statement. The
verifier now sends a random challenge x← Z∗p.
At this point, both the prover and the verifier can compute ~g′ := ∏mi=1~gx
−i
i and A
′ :=
∏m−1k=1−m A
xk
k . If the prover is honest then we have A
′ = (~g′)~a′ , namely A′ is a commitment
to ~a′ under the key ~g′. Furthermore, even if the prover is dishonest, we can show that if the
prover can open A′ with respect to the key ~g′ for 2m− 1 different challenges, then we can
extract opening (~a1, . . . ,~am) corresponding to A =∏mi=1~g
~ai
i .
The same type of argument can be applied in parallel to B with the inverse challenge
x−1 giving us a sum of the form~b′ = ∑mi=1~bix−i and a new base~h′ =∏
m
i=1
~hx
i
i .
All that remains is to demonstrate that z is the constant term in the product ~a′ ·~b′ =
∑mi=1~aixi ·∑mj=1~b jx− j. Similarly to A and B, the prover sends values
zk =
min(m,m−k)
∑
i=max(1,1−k)
~ai ·~bi+k for k = 1−m, . . . ,m−1
where z0 = z = ∑mi=1~ai ·~bi, and shows that z′ :=~a′ ·~b′ = ∑m−1k=1−m zkx−k.
To summarise, after the challenge x has been sent, both parties compute ~g′,A′,~h′,B′,z′
and then run an argument for the knowledge of~a′,~b′ of length nm . Given n=mµmµ−1 · · ·m1,
we recursively apply this reduction over the factors of n to obtain, after µ − 1 iterations,
98 Chapter 5. Efficient Protocols for Arithmetic Circuits
vectors of length m1. The prover concludes the argument by revealing a short witness
associated with the last statement.
5.5.2 Formal description
We now give a formal description of the argument of knowledge introduced above.
Common input: (G, p,~g,A,~h,B,z,mµ =m,mµ−1 =m′, . . . ,m1) such that~g,~h ∈Gn, A,B ∈
G and n =∏µi=1 mi.
Prover’s witness: (~a1, . . . ,~am,~b1, . . . ,~bm) satisfying
A =
m
∏
i=1
~g~aii B =
m
∏
i=1
~h
~bi
i
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·~bi = z
Argument if µ = 1:
P→ V: Send (a1, . . . ,am,b1, , . . . ,bm).
P← V: Accept if and only if
A =
m
∏
i=1
gaii B =
m
∏
i=1
hbii
m
∑
i=1
aibi = z
Reduction if µ 6= 1:
P→ V: Send A1−m,B1−m,z1−m, . . . ,Am−1,Bm−1,zm−1 where
Ak =
min(m,m−k)
∏
i=max(1,1−k)
~g~ai+ki Bk =
min(m,m−k)
∏
i=max(1,1−k)
~h
~bi+k
i zk =
min(m,m−k)
∑
i=max(1,1−k)
~ai ·~bi+k
Observe A0 = A,B0 = B,z0 = z so they can be omitted from the message.
P← V: x← Z∗p.
Both prover and verifier compute a reduced statement of the form
(G, p,~g′,A′,~h′,B′,z′,mµ−1, . . . ,m1)
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where
~g′ = (~g′1, . . . ,~g
′
m′) =
m
∏
i=1
~gx
−i
i A
′ =
m−1
∏
k=1−m
Ax
k
k
~h′ = (~h′1, . . . ,~h
′
m′) =
m
∏
i=1
~hx
i
i B
′ =
m−1
∏
k=1−m
Bx
−k
k z
′ =
m−1
∑
k=1−m
zkx−k
The prover computes a new witness as (~a′1, . . . ,~a
′
m′) = ∑
m
i=1~aix
i and (~b′1, . . . ,~b
′
m′) =
∑mi=1~bix−i.
5.5.3 Security Analysis.
Theorem 7. The argument has perfect completeness and statistical witness extended emu-
lation for either extracting a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation or a valid witness.
Proof. Perfect completeness can be verified directly. To prove witness-extended emulation
we start by giving an extractor that either extracts a witness for the original statement or a
non-trivial discrete logarithm relation.
For µ = 1 we have (perfect) witness-extended emulation since the prover reveals a
witness and the verifier checks it.
Before discussing extraction in the recursive step, note that if we get a non-trivial
discrete logarithm relation for ~g′1, . . . ,~g
′
m′ then we also get a non-trivial discrete logarithm
relation for~g1, . . . ,~gm, since x 6= 0. A similar argument applies to~h′1, . . . ,~h′m′ and~h1, . . . ,~hm.
Now, assume we get witness~a′,~b′ such that
A′ =
m−1
∏
k=1−m
Ax
k
k =
(
m
∏
i=1
~gx
−i
i
)~a′
B′ =
m−1
∏
k=1−m
Bx
−k
k =
(
m
∏
i=1
~hx
i
i
)~b′
~a′ ·~b′ =
m−1
∑
k=1−m
zkx−k
for 2m− 1 different challenges x ∈ Z∗p. We will show that they yield either a witness for
the original statement, or a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation for either ~g1, . . . ,~gm or
~h1, . . . ,~hm.
Take 2m− 1 different challenges x ∈ Z∗p. They form a shifted Vandermonde matrix
with rows (x1−m,x2−m, . . . ,xm−1). By taking appropriate linear combinations of the vectors
we can obtain any unit vector (0, . . . ,0,1,0, . . . ,0). Taking the same linear combinations of
the 2m−1 equations
m−1
∏
k=1−m
Ax
k
k =
(
m
∏
i=1
~gx
−i
i
)~a′
we get vectors~ak,i such that Ak =
m
∏
i=1
~g~ak,ii
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For each of the 2m− 1 challenges, we now have ∏m−1k=1−m Ax
k
k =
(
∏mi=1~gx
−i
i
)~a′
, which
means that for all i we have
x−i~a′ =
m−1
∑
k=1−m
~ak,ixk
unless we encounter a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation for ~g1, . . . ,~gm. This means
that ~a′ = ∑m−1k=1−m~ak,ix
k+i for all i, and in particular ∑m−1k=1−m~ak,ix
k+i = ∑m−1k=1−m~ak,1x
k+1 =
∑m−1k=1−m~ak,mx
k+m. Matching terms of degree outside {1, . . . ,m} reveals ~ak,i = 0 for k+ i /∈
{1, . . . ,m}. Defining~ai =~a0,i, and matching terms of similar degree we get
~ak,i =
 ~ak+i if k+ i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}0 otherwise
This means
~a′ =
m−1
∑
k=1−m
~ak,1xk+1 =
m−1
∑
k=0
~ak+1xk+1 =
m
∑
i=1
~aixi
A similar analysis of B1−m, . . . ,Bm−1 and openings~b′ for 2m− 1 different challenges
x−1 ∈ Z∗p gives us either a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation for~h1, . . . ,~hm or vectors~bi
such that~b′ = ∑mi=1~bix−i and B =∏
m
i=1
~h
~bi
i .
Finally, with ∑mi=1~aixi ·∑mj=1~b jx− j = ∑m−1k=1−m zkx−k for 2m−1 different challenges we
get z = z0 = ∑mi=1~ai ·~bi.
We can now apply the forking lemma to a tree of size (2mµ−1)(2mµ−1−1) · · ·(2m2−
1) ≤ n2, which is polynomial in λ , to conclude that the argument has witness-extended
emulation.
Note that the argument is not zero-knowledge, as it is not necessary for its use in the
next section.
5.5.4 Efficiency.
The recursive argument uses 2µ − 1 moves. The communication cost of all steps sums up
to 4∑µi=2(mi−1) group elements and 2∑µi=2(mi−1)+2m1 field elements.
At each iteration, the main cost for the prover is computing the Ak and Bk values, using
less than
4(m2µmµ−1...m1)
log(mµ ...m1)
group exponentiations via multi-exponentiation techniques, and the
zk values using m2µmµ−1 · · ·m1 field multiplications. The cost of computing the reduced
statements is dominated by 2(mµmµ−1...m1)logmµ group exponentiations for both the prover and the
verifier. In the case where mµ = . . . = m1 = m, the verifier complexity is bounded above
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by 2m
µ
logm
m
m−1 group exponentiations. The prover complexity is bounded above by
6mµ+1
logm
m
m−1
group exponentiations and mµ+1 mm−1 field multiplications.
5.6 Logarithmic Communication Argument for Arithmetic Cir-
cuit Satisfiability
In this section, we revisit zero knowledge arguments for the satisfiability of an arithmetic
circuit under the discrete logarithm assumption. We will explain how to build an argument
with square root communication complexity, and superior efficiency to the argument of
[Gro09b]. We then observe that our new argument involves computing a large inner product,
and can achieve as good as logarithmic communication complexity by using our recursive
inner product argument.
At a high level, we transform an arithmetic circuit into two kinds of equations. Mul-
tiplication gates are directly represented as equations of the form a · b = c, where a,b,c
represent the left, right and output wires. We will arrange these values in matrix form pro-
ducing a Hadamard matrix product. This process will lead to duplicate values, when a wire
is the output of one multiplication gate and the input of another, or when it is used as input
multiple times. We keep track of this by using a series of linear constraints. For example,
if the output of the first multiplication gate is the right input of the second, we would write
c1−b2 = 0.
We also add linear constraints representing the addition and multiplication by constant
gates of the circuit. We then rewrite those equations so that the only wires that are referenced
in the equations are those linked to (non-constant) multiplication gates. We describe this
process in Section 5.3.1.
Finally, we fold both the Hadamard matrix product and the linear constraints into a
single polynomial equation, where a Laurent polynomial has 0 as its constant term, and use
the construction of Section 5.4 to prove this. We can optionally integrate the inner product
argument of Section 5.5 to reduce communication.
Our technique improves on the efficiency of [Gro09b] by making three main changes,
each resulting in efficiency improvements.
1. We do not need commitments to the input and output wires of addition gates. We
handle addition gates with linear consistency equations thus yielding a significant
performance improvement proportional to the number of addition gates. This par-
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allels [GGPR13] who also manage to eliminate addition gates when constructing
Quadratic Arithmetic Programs from circuits.
2. We avoid black-box reductions to zero-knowledge arguments for generic linear al-
gebra statements and instead design an argument directly for arithmetic circuit sat-
isfiability. As a result, our square-root argument has only 5 moves, while the argu-
ment from [Gro09b] requires 7 moves. We note that [Seo11] reduced the complexity
of [Gro09b] to 5 moves as well, but at a significant computational overhead whereas
we also reduce the computational cost.
3. We use our protocol from Section 5.4 to reduce the communication costs of a poly-
nomial commitment.
These improvements give us a square root communication complexity with respect to
the number of multiplication gates in the circuit. This is because for a circuit with N = mn
multiplication gates, the prover makes 3m commitments to wire values in his first move,
and later provides an opening consisting of n field elements to a homomorphic combination
of these commitments. Optimising the parameters by choosing m≈ n≈√N leads to square
root complexity.
In our square root complexity argument, the verifier uses the n field elements to check
an inner product relation. Our key idea to reduce communication further is to use our
inner product evaluation argument instead of sending these field elements. This allows
for verification of the inner product, and also provides an argument of knowledge of the
opening of the commitment. We no longer need to open a large commitment, leading to
a drastic reduction in communication complexity depending on the settings for the inner
product argument.
Below we give a first informal exposition of our arguments, and follow with a formal
description.
5.6.1 Reduction of Circuit Satisfiability to a Hadamard Matrix Product and
Linear Constraints.
We consider an arithmetic circuit containing N = mn multiplication gates over a field Zp.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the circuit has been pre-processed (see Ap-
pendix 5.3.1 for a way to do this) , so that the input and the output wires feed into and
go out from multiplication gates only. We number the multiplication gates from 1 to N and
we arrange the inputs and outputs of these gates into three m×n matrices A,B and C such
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that the (i, j) entries of the matrices correspond to the left input, right input and output of
the same multiplication gate.
As shown in Sect. 5.3.1, anarithmetic circuit can be described as a system of equations
in the entries of the above matrices. The multiplication gates define a set of N equations
A◦B =C (5.1)
where ◦ is the Hadamard (entry-wise) product. The circuit description also contains con-
straints on the wires between multiplication gates. Denoting the rows of the matrices A,B,C
as
~ai = (ai,1, . . . ,ai,n) ~bi = (bi,1, . . . ,bi,n) ~ci = (ci,1, . . . ,ci,n) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
these constraints can be expressed as Q < 2N linear equations of inputs and outputs of
multiplication gates of the form
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·~wq,a,i+
m
∑
i=1
~bi ·~wq,b,i+
m
∑
i=1
~ci ·~wq,c,i = Kq for q ∈ {1, . . . ,Q} (5.2)
for constant vectors ~wq,a,i,~wq,b,i,~wq,c,i and scalars Kq.
For example, suppose that the circuit contains a single addition gate, with a1,1 and a1,2
as inputs, and b1,1 as output. In this case, Q = 1 and we would set ~w1,a,1 = (1,1,0, . . . ,0),
~w1,b,1 = (−1,0, . . . ,0), and all other ~w vectors would be set to~0. Then (5.2) would simply
read
a1,1+a1,2−b1,1 = 0
to capture the constraint imposed by the addition gate.
In total, to capture all multiplications and linear constraints, we have N+Q equations
that the wires must satisfy in order for the circuit to be satisfiable.
5.6.2 Reduction to a Single Polynomial Equation.
Let Y be a formal indeterminate. We will reduce the N +Q equations above to a single
polynomial equation in Y by embedding each equation into a distinct power of Y . In our
argument we will then require the prover to prove that this single equation holds when
replacing Y by a random challenge received from the verifier.
Let ~Y ′ denote the vector (Y m, . . . ,Y mn) and ~Y denote (Y,Y 2, . . . ,Y m). Then, we can
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multiply (5.1) by ~Y from the left and ~Y ′T on the right to obtain ~Y (A ◦B)~Y ′T =~YC~Y ′T , or
equivalently
m
∑
i=1
Y i(~ai ◦~bi) ·~Y ′ =
m
∑
i=1
Y i(~ci ·~Y ′)
Since (~a◦~b) ·~Y ′ =~a · (~b◦~Y ′), we obtain the following expression
m
∑
i=1
~ai · (~bi ◦~Y ′)Y i =
(
m
∑
i=1
~ciY i ·~Y ′
)
This is easily seen to be equivalent to (5.1), because ai, jbi, j = ci, j appears in the coef-
ficients of Y i+ jm, and i+ jm takes every value from m+1 to M = N+m exactly once.
Moreover, the Q linear constraints on the wires in Eq. 5.2 are satisfied if and only if
Q
∑
q=1
(
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·~wq,a,i+
m
∑
i=1
~bi ·~wq,b,i+
m
∑
i=1
~ci ·~wq,c,i
)
Y q =
Q
∑
q=1
KqY q
since the qth constraint arises from comparing the coefficients of Y q. Combining the two
polynomial equations by adding them after multiplying the latter by Y M, and swapping
summations, we see that the circuit is satisfied if and only if(
m
∑
i=1
~ai · (~bi ◦~Y ′)Y i
)
+
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·
(
Q
∑
q=1
~wq,a,iY M+q
)
+
m
∑
i=1
~bi ·
(
Q
∑
q=1
~wq,b,iY M+q
)
+
m
∑
i=1
~ci ·
(
−Y i~Y ′+
Q
∑
q=1
~wq,c,iY M+q
)
=
(
Q
∑
q=1
KqY M+q
)
Let us define
~wa,i(Y ) =
Q
∑
q=1
~wq,a,iY M+q ~wb,i(Y ) =
Q
∑
q=1
~wq,b,iY M+q
~wc,i(Y ) =−Y i~Y ′+
Q
∑
q=1
~wq,c,iY M+q K(Y ) =
Q
∑
q=1
KqY M+q
Then the circuit is satisfied if and only if
m
∑
i=1
~ai · (~bi ◦~Y ′)Y i+
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·~wa,i(Y )+
m
∑
i=1
~bi ·~wb,i(Y )+
m
∑
i=1
~ci ·~wc,i(Y )−K(Y ) = 0 (5.3)
In the argument, the prover will commit to ~ai,~bi and ~ci. The verifier will then issue
a random challenge y← Z∗p and the prover will convince the verifier that the committed
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values satisfy Eq. 5.3, evaluated on y. If the committed values do not satisfy the polynomial
equation, the probability the equality holds for a random y is negligible, so the prover is
unlikely to be able to convince the verifier.
5.6.3 Square Root Communication Argument
In order to show that (5.3) is satisfied, we craft a special Laurent polynomial t(X) in a
second formal indeterminate X , whose constant coefficient is exactly twice the left-hand
side of (5.3). Therefore, this polynomial will have zero constant term if and only if (5.3)
is satisfied. In our argument this is proved using the polynomial commitment protocol of
Section 5.4. We define
~r(X) :=
m
∑
i=1
~aiyiX i+
m
∑
i=1
~biX−i+Xm
m
∑
i=1
~ciX i+ ~dX2m+1
~s(X) :=
m
∑
i=1
~wa,i(y)y−iX−i+
m
∑
i=1
~wb,i(y)X i+X−m
m
∑
i=1
~wc,i(y)X−i
~r′(X) := ~r(X)◦~y′+2~s(X)
t(X) := ~r(X) ·~r′(X)−2K(y)
Here~y′ is the vector~Y ′ evaluated at y, and ~d is a blinding vector consisting of random scalars
that the prover commits to in the first round. In the square root argument the prover will
reveal~r(x) for a randomly chosen challenge x ∈ Z∗p, and the blinding vector ~d ensures that
we can reveal~r(x) without leaking information about~ai,~bi and~ci. We also observe that~s(x)
is efficiently computable from public information about the circuit and the challenges.
We have designed these polynomials such that the constant term of~r · (~r ◦~y′) is equal
to 2∑mi=1~ai · (~bi ◦~y′)yi and the constant term of ~r ·~s is equal to ∑mi=1~ai · ~wa,i(y)+∑mi=1~bi ·
~wb,i(y)+∑mi=1~ci ·~wc,i(y). We conclude that the constant term of t(X) is exactly twice the
left-hand side of (5.3), and is therefore zero if and only if the circuit is satisfied.
We are now in a position to describe an argument with square root communication
complexity.
The prover first commits to vectors ~ai,~bi,~ci and ~d and the verifier replies with a
challenge y← Z∗p. The prover computes t(X) and commits to it by using the algorithm
PolyCommit defined in Section 5.4. Then, the verifier sends a random challenge x← Z∗p
and the prover responds by revealing ~r(x) and blinded openings pe of t(X) obtained by
running algorithm PolyEval as described in Section 5.4.
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The verifier first checks that~r(x) is consistent with the previously sent commitments
of ~ai,~bi,~ci and ~d using the homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme. She also
computes~s(x),~r′(x) and K. Then, she computes v = t(x) using the PolyVerify algorithm of
Section 5.4, and checks if v =~r(x) ·~r′(x)− 2K. The verifier accepts the argument if both
checks are satisfied.
As described so far, the argument requires communicating O(m) group elements and
O(n) field elements, so setting m ≈ n leads to square root communication. The argument
improves on [Gro09b, Seo11] by requiring only 5 moves without computational overhead
and significantly reduces the computational complexity. However, breaking this ostensible
square root communication barrier (Sect. 2.1.2) requires new ideas that we describe in the
next section.
5.6.4 Breaking the Square Root Barrier
The square root complexity argument described above was designed so that the verifier uses
~r =~r(x) to check the inner product v =~r ·~r′−2K, where v is the evaluation of a committed
polynomial at x. Sending~r has a cost of n field elements. In order to break the square root
barrier we try to avoid sending~r directly so that we can then let n be larger and m be smaller
and thus globally lower the communication of the argument.
Rather than sending ~r to the verifier, the prover could instead send commitments to
~r and~r′, and use our inner product argument to show that v+ 2K was a correctly formed
inner product. In fact, the prover does not even need to send commitments to~r and~r′! The
verifier can compute a commitment to~r(x) directly from Ai,Bi,Ci and D, the commitments
to~ai,~bi,~ci and ~d which were previously used to check that~r is correctly formed
Comck(~r;0) = Comck(0;−ρ)
[
m
∏
i=1
Ax
iyi
i
][
m
∏
i=1
Bx
−i
i
][
m
∏
i=1
Cx
m+i
i
]
Dx
2m+1
=~g~r
where ρ is an appropriate randomness value, which is sent by the prover to the verifier, and
the vector~g = (g1, . . . ,gn) for a given commitment key ck = (G, p,g,g1, . . . ,gn).
As for a commitment to~r′, we observe that the Pedersen commitment, besides its well-
known homomorphic properties with respect to the message and the randomness, also has
the useful property that it is homomorphic with respect to the commitment key. Specifi-
cally, let~h = (gy
−m
1 , . . . ,g
y−mn
n ), so that ~g~r =~h~r◦~y
′
. Multiplying ~g~r by~h2~s, the verifier obtains
Comck′(~r′;0) =~h~r
′
, with respect to the new commitment key ck′ which uses~h instead of ~g.
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We note that~h and~s =~s(x) can be computed by the verifier.
Now the prover and verifier can run the inner product argument with statement
(G, p,~g,r,~h,r′,v+2K,mµ ,mµ−1, . . . ,m1) where
ck = (G, p,g,~g) n = mµmµ−1 · · ·m1
~g = (g1,g2, . . . ,gn) ~h = (g
y−m
1 ,g
y−2m
2 , . . . ,g
y−mn
n )
R = Comck(0;−ρ)
[
∏mi=1 A
xiyi
i
] [
∏mi=1 Bx
−i
i
][
∏mi=1Cx
m+i
i
]
Dx
2m+1
=~g~r
R′ = R ·~h2~s =~h~r′
and the prover’s witness is~r,~r′.
The values of mµ , . . . ,m1 can be chosen according to the desired efficiency of the circuit
satisfiability argument.
5.6.5 Formal Description
We now give the formal description of the above arguments of knowledge for the satisfi-
ability of an arithmetic circuit C. Both prover and verifier take the move parameter µ as
common input. For square root communication complexity, the inner product argument is
not used and we set µ = 0. For µ > 0, the common input includes the values (mµ , . . . ,m1)
used in the inner product argument. The description of the arithmetic circuit C is given as
a number N of multiplication gates and the values ~wq,a,i,~wq,b,i,~wq,c,i, which specify linear
consistency constraints between the input and output values of the multiplication gates.
Common Input: (ck,C,N,m,n,m′1,m′2,n′,mµ , . . . ,m1,µ) where ck is a commitment key,
C is the description of an arithmetic circuit with N = mn multiplication gates, µ is
the move parameter and n = mµ · · ·m1. Parameters (m′1,m′2,n′) are set to satisfy both
3m≤ m′1n′ and 4m+2≤ m′2n′.
Prover’s Witness: Satisfying assignments~ai,~bi and~ci to the wires of C.
Argument:
P→ V: Pick randomness α1,β1,γ1, . . . ,αm,βm,γm,δ ← Zp and blinding vector ~d ← Znp.
Compute for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Ai = Com(~ai;αi) Bi = Com(~bi;βi) Ci = Com(~ci;γi) D = Com(~d;δ ).
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Send to the verifier A1,B1,C1, . . . ,Am,Bm,Cm,D.
P← V: y← Z∗p.
As argued before, the circuit determines vectors of polynomials ~wa,i(Y ), ~wb,i(Y ),
~wc,i(Y ) and K(Y ) such that C is satisfiable if and only if
m
∑
i=1
~ai · (~bTi ◦~Y ′)Y i+
m
∑
i=1
~ai ·~wa,i(Y )+
m
∑
i=1
~bi ·~wb,i(Y )+
m
∑
i=1
~ci ·~wc,i(Y ) = K(Y )
where ~Y ′ = (Y m, . . . ,Y mn). Given y, both the prover and verifier can compute K =
K(y), ~wa,i = ~wa,i(y), ~wb,i = ~wb,i(y) and ~wc,i = ~wc,i(y).
P→ V: Compute Laurent polynomials~r,~s,~r′, which have vector coefficients, and Laurent
polynomial t, in the indeterminate X
~r(X) =
m
∑
i=1
~aiyiX i+
m
∑
i=1
~biX−i+Xm
m
∑
i=1
~ciX i+ ~dX2m+1
~s(X) =
m
∑
i=1
~wa,iy−iX−i+
m
∑
i=1
~wb,iX i+X−m
m
∑
i=1
~wc,iX−i
~r′(X) =~r(X)◦~y′+2~s(X)
t(X) =~r(X) ·~r′(X)−2K =
4m+2
∑
k=−3m
tkXk
When the wires ~ai,~bi,~ci correspond to a satisfying assignment, the Laurent polyno-
mial t(X) will have constant term t0 = 0.
Commit to t(X) by running
(pc,st)← PolyCommit(ck,m′1,m′2,n′, t(X))
Send pc to the verifier.
P← V: x← Z∗p
P→ V: Compute PolyEval(st,x)→ pe, and
~r =
m
∑
i=1
~aixiyi+
m
∑
i=1
~bix−i+ xm
m
∑
i=1
~cixi+ ~dx2m+1
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ρ =
m
∑
i=1
αixiyi+
m
∑
i=1
βix−i+ xm
m
∑
i=1
γixi+δx2m+1
• If µ = 0 : the inner product argument is not used. The prover sends (pe,~r,ρ) to
the verifier.
• If µ > 0 : the inner product argument is used. The prover computes~r′ =~r′(x)
and sends (pe,ρ) to the verifier.
Verification: First, the verifier computes
PolyVerify(ck,m′1,m
′
2,n
′,pc,pe,x)→ v
and rejects the argument if v =⊥.
• If µ = 0 : the inner product argument is not used. The verifier computes~r′ =
~r ◦~y′+2~s(x), and accepts only if
~r ·~r′−2K = v
Comck(~r;ρ) =
[
∏mi=1 A
xiyi
i
][
∏mi=1 Bx
−i
i
][
∏mi=1Cx
m+i
i
]
Dx
2m+1
• If µ> 0 : prover and verifier run the inner product argument with common input
(G, p,~g,R,~h,R′,v+2K,mµ ,mµ−1, . . . ,m1) where
ck = (G, p,g,~g) n = mµmµ−1 · · ·m1
~g = (g1,g2, . . . ,gn) ~h = (g
y−m
1 ,g
y−2m
2 , . . . ,g
y−mn
n )
R = Comck(0;−ρ)
[
∏mi=1 A
xiyi
i
] [
∏mi=1 Bx
−i
i
][
∏mi=1Cx
m+i
i
]
Dx
2m+1
=~g~r
R′ = R ·~h2~s(x) =~h~r′
and the prover’s witness is~r and ~r′.
The verifier accepts if the inner product argument is accepting.
5.6.6 Security Analysis.
Theorem 8. The argument for satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit has perfect complete-
ness, perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge and statistical witness-extended emu-
lation for extracting either a breach of the binding property of the commitment scheme or a
witness for the satisfiability of the circuit.
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Proof. Perfect completeness follows by inspection and using the fact that the polynomial
commitment protocol and inner product argument also have perfect completeness.
For perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge we are given y,x∈Z∗p, which allows
us to compute ~wa,i,~wb,i,~wc,i and K from the circuit. The simulator picks~r←Znp and ρ←Zp
and random commitments Ai,Bi and Ci. It computes
D =
[
m
∏
i=1
Ax
iyi
i B
x−i
i C
xm+i
i Comck(−~r;−ρ)
]−x−2m−1
v =~r ·~r′−2K
and simulates pc and pe from the polynomial commitment protocol.
To see that the simulated components have the same distribution as a real argument
observe that since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding the commitments Ai,Bi and
Ci have the same distribution as in a real argument. Also, in both the simulation and a real
argument~r and ρ are uniformly random. Given these values the commitment D is uniquely
defined. Furthermore, since the polynomial commitment protocol is perfect special hon-
est verifier zero-knowledge, pc and pe have the same distribution as in a real argument,
conditioned on the value of v.
When µ > 0 we simply remove ~r from the transcript and execute a fresh run of the
inner product argument, given our knowledge of~r.
It remains to show that we have witness-extended emulation. We treat the cases µ = 0
and µ > 0 separately.
Square Root Argument. Assume that we have N +Q different challenges y ∈ Z∗p for the
same initial message, and for each of these challenges a further 7m+3 different challenges
x ∈ Z∗p for the same third message, all with valid answers. We begin by showing that from
this information we either extract a satisfying assignment to the wires~ai,~bi,~ci in the circuit,
or encounter a breach of the binding property of the commitment scheme.
Let us first consider a fixed initial transcript (A1, . . . ,Am, . . . ,Cm,D,y,pc) and sup-
pose we have valid arguments with 3m + 2 different values of x. Then the vectors
(x−m, . . . ,x2m+1) form the rows of a shifted Vandermonde matrix and we can obtain any unit
vector (0, . . . ,1, . . . ,0) by taking an appropriate linear combination of these vectors. By tak-
ing this linear combination of the 3m+2 verification equations Dx
2m+1
∏mi=1 A
xiyi
i B
x−i
i C
xm+i
i =
Comck(~r;ρ), we can then extract openings to each Ai,Bi and Ci, since y ∈ Z∗P.
We have valid arguments for (m′1 +m
′
2)n
′+ 1 = 7m+ 3 different challenges x ∈ Z∗p.
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By the proof of Theorem 6 this implies that there exists a Laurent polynomial t(X) =
∑n
′m′2
i=−n′m′1 tix
i with constant term t0 = 0 that is consistent with respect to all 3m+ 2 evalu-
ations of~r(X) ·~r′(X)−2K. This directly implies that Equation 5.3 holds for Y = y.
Finally, suppose that this holds for N+Q different challenges y ∈ Z∗p. Then, we have
equality of polynomials in Equation 5.3, since a non-zero polynomial of degree N+Q−1
cannot have N+Q roots. This means that the circuit is satisfied.
Now we can apply the forking lemma to get witness-extended emulation, as the tree
formed by the transcripts has size (N+Q) · (7m+3) which is polynomial in λ .
Inner Product Variant Assume that we have (N +Q) · (7m+ 3) · (2mµ − 1) . . .(2m2− 1)
accepting transcripts for the same statement arranged in a tree as follows:
• The root is labeled with the statement.
• Each of the (N +Q) depth 1 nodes is labeled with a different challenge y and has
7m+3 children labeled x.
• The children are subtrees of size (2mµ −1) . . .(2m2−1)
• Each level has nodes labeled with the challenges xi used in the i-th move of the recur-
sive argument, and of degree 2mµ−i+1−1.
Given the above tree of transcripts, we are able to do a two-stage extraction: First,
we invoke the witness-extended emulation of the recursive inner product argument. At this
point, we either have a a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation, in which case we are done,
or we have an accepting~r for each y,x pair. In this case, we proceed with the second stage
and repeat the extraction procedure for µ = 0 to obtain either a witness for the original
statement or a breach of the binding property of the commitment scheme.
We now point out that the size of the tree will be O(N · (2m)µ) ≈ O(N2+logm 2) which
is polynomial in the security parameter λ and invoke the Forking Lemma to complete the
proof.
5.6.7 Efficiency.
Square Root Communication. When we set µ = 0, the argument above has a communi-
cation cost of m′1 +m
′
2 + 2+ 1+ 3m commitments and n+ n
′+ 2 field elements. Setting
m≈
√
N
3 , n≈
√
3N, n′ ≈√7m, m′1 ≈ 3
√m
7 and m
′
2 ≈ 4
√m
7 we get a total communication
complexity where the total number of group and field elements sent is as low as possible
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and approximately 2
√
N each. The main computational cost for the prover is computing
the initial commitments, corresponding to 3mnlogn group exponentiations. The prover can com-
pute t(X) using FFT-based techniques. Assuming that p is of a suitable form [Can89], the
dominant number of multiplications for this process is 32 mn logm. The main cost in the ver-
ification is computing ~s(X) given the description of the circuit which requires in the worst
case Qn multiplications in Zp, considering arbitrary fan-in addition gates. In case of O(N)-
size circuits with fan-in 2 gates, computing~s(X) requires O(N) multiplications. Evaluating
~s(x) requires 3N multiplications. The last verification equation costs roughly (n+3m)logn+3m group
exponentiations to the verifier.
(µ + 1)-Root Communication. We can reduce communication by using µ = O(1) itera-
tions of the inner product argument. Choosing m = N
1
µ+1 , n = N
µ
µ+1 and mi = (Nm)
1
µ will
give us a communication complexity of 4µN
1
µ+1 group elements and 2µN
1
µ+1 field ele-
ments. The prover’s complexity is dominated by 6µNlogN group exponentiations and fewer than
3N
2µ logN field multiplications. The verifier’s cost is dominated by
2µN
logN group exponentia-
tions and O(N) field multiplications.
Logarithmic Communication. By increasing the number of iteration of the inner product
argument we can further reduce the communication complexity.
To minimise the communication, we set µ = logN− 1, n = N2 , m = mi = 2, m′1 = 2,
m′2 = 3 and n
′ = 4 in the above argument gives us 2 logN + 1 moves. The total commu-
nication amounts to 4 logN + 7 group elements and 2logN + 6 field elements. The prover
computational cost is dominated by 12N group exponentiations, and O(N) multiplications
in Zp.The main verification cost is bounded by 4N group exponentiations and O(N) multi-
plications in Zp.
Alternatively, we can optimise the computation while maintaining logarithmic com-
munication by setting µ = logN− log log2N, m = logN, n = NlogN , n′ ≈
√
7logN, m′1 ≈
3
√
logN
7 , m
′
2 ≈ 4
√
logN
7 , mi = 2 for 1≤ i≤ µ . In this way we obtain a 2logN−2loglogN+
1 moves argument. With respect to the previous settings, we now save 2loglogN moves by
starting the inner product argument with a smaller statement. The resulting communication
is at most 7 logN+
√
7logN group elements and at most 2 logN+
√
7logN field elements.
Thus, the prover computation is dominated by 3NlogN group exponentiations and 11N log logN
field multiplications. For the verifier, it is bounded from above by 4NlogN log logN group expo-
nentiations and O(N) field multiplications.
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5.7 Implementation using Python
To verify the practicality of our construction we produced a proof of concept implementa-
tion in Python using the NumPy [Oli06] package. The more costly operations are executed
natively: we use Petlib [Dan15] to outsource elliptic curve operations to the OpenSSL li-
brary, and also use a small C++ program to calculate the polynomial multiplication pro-
ducing~t(X) using NTL [Sho01]. Our implementation is single-threaded, but the operations
performed are easily parallelisable. The implementation is open source and consists of
approximately 3000 lines of Python and 100 lines of C++.
Our implementation accepts the circuit description format used by Pinocchio [PHGR13],
which it preprocesses to remove addition and multiplication by constant gates, encoding
them as a constraint table as in Section 5.3.1. Pinocchio also supports split gates, taking as
input a single arithmetic wire and producing a fixed number of binary wires as outputs, so
the binary wires correspond to the binary representation of the arithmetic wire. We handle
split gates by adding appropriate multiplication gates and constraints to ensure binary wires
can only carry zeroes or ones, and that their values scaled by the appropriate powers of 2
sum up to the gate’s input.
5.7.1 Performance Comparison
We compared the performance of our implementation to that of Pinocchio [PHGR13] using
the same set of circuits they used for their performance testing. The circuits implement
multiplication of a vector by a fixed matrix, multiplication of two matrices, evaluation of a
multivariate polynomial, and other applications for which we refer to [PHGR13]. We used
an i5-4690K running Pinocchio under Windows 10 and our software under Ubuntu 14.04
for the tests.
We note here that Pinocchio operates in a pairing-based setting, using knowledge of
exponent assumptions, whereas we operate in the discrete log setting. Even so, we feel
the comparison is meaningful, as we are not aware of previous implementations of circuit-
evaluation arguments in our setting.
From the comparison in Table 5.2, it is clear that our implementation is extremely
competitive in terms of prover computation. For certain applications, the square root ver-
sion outperformes Pinocchio by a factor larger than 10 in terms of prover speed. There is
a significant amount of variance in terms of the speedups achieved. The worst cases are
those where the number of constraints is high in comparison with the number of multi-
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Application
This work Pinocchio
Square Root Logarithmic (Constant)
Mult. Key Proof Key Proof Key Proof
Gates Gen Size Prove Verify Size Gen Size Prove Verify Size Gen Size Prove Verify Size
s B s s B s B s s B s B s s B
Vector Matrix 600 0.07 1120 0.38 0.25 6K 0.03 3872 0.55 0.31 3552 0.42 0.3M 0.23 .023 288
Product 1000 0.10 1440 0.76 0.61 8K 0.06 6464 1.05 0.67 3744 0.93 0.5M 0.53 .035 288
Matrix 347K 1.1 19K 14.7 3.4 76K 5.3 618K 49.9 22.9 5792 47.3 97.9M 167.4 .201 288
Product 1343K 2.7 37K 60.8 12.7 160K 18.6 2.2M 187.0 81.7 6496 170.4 374.8M 706.8 .503 288
Polynomial 203K 1.0 14K 30.0 2.1 88K 3.3 383K 53.1 14.0 5440 24.4 55.9M 146.8 .007 288
Evaluation 571K 1.7 24K 97.0 5.6 160K 8.3 962K 164.5 36.0 6272 60.2 156.8M 422.1 .007 288
Image 86K 0.7 9K 2.6 1.0 44K 1.5 171K 11.4 6.2 5120 15.2 23.6M 25.1 .007 288
Matching 278K 1.2 17K 7.4 2.9 72K 4.2 490K 34.3 18.1 5920 38.9 75.8M 88.8 .007 288
Shortest 366K 1.5 19K 9.3 3.7 52K 5.6 644K 45.6 23.9 5792 50.4 99.6M 130.7 .015 288
Paths 1400K 2.6 38K 35.1 12.6 72K 19.2 2.2M 169.8 84.0 6496 177.6 381.4M 523.3 .026 288
Gas 144K 0.8 12K 8.8 6.1 64K 2.3 271K 23.7 13.9 5440 22.6 39.6M 47.6 .007 288
Simulation 283K 1.2 17K 26.7 20.7 160K 4.3 503K 54.8 34.5 5920 45.9 77.7M 103.1 .007 288
SHA-1 24K 0.18 5K 3.7 3.3 24K 0.5 54K 6.5 4.3 4992 7.9 6.5M 9.0 .007 288
Table 5.2: Performance comparison between our implementation and Pinocchio. Pinocchio
was set to use public verifiability and zero-knowledge.
plication gates: the calculation of ~s(X) is performed entirely in Python and thus becomes
the dominant term in the computation. We expect that in a fully compiled implementation,
optimisation would prevent this issue.
The logarithmic communication version is slower in comparison but still outperforms
Pinocchio for most applications. The performance also becomes more even, as the con-
straints are irrelevant in the recursive part.
Our verification times are much higher than Pinocchio’s, which can often verify circuit
evaluation faster than native execution of an equivalent program. As with the prover, some
speedups can be gained by moving to a compiled language, but we would still not expect to
match Pinocchio’s performance; our verification cost would still be linear. Our proofs are
considerably larger as well, especially for the square root version.
Our key generation is simply a commitment key generation, and is not application-
specific. Therefore, it can be easily amortised even across different circuits. For a circuit
with N multiplication gates, the size of our commitment key is
√
N elements for the square
root version and NlogN for the log version. In comparison, Pinocchio’s key generation is
bound to specific circuits and produces keys of size 8N. Thus, if the keys need to be com-
municated, our arguments are competitive in terms of total communication if the number
of circuit evaluations is up to
√
N for the square root version, and up to NlogN for the log
version.
Chapter 6
Accountable Ring Signatures
Multiuser signatures (i.e. ring signatures and group signatures) are prominent cryptographic
primitives offering a combination of privacy and authentication. They enable individual
users to anonymously sign messages on behalf of a group of users. In ring signatures,
the group, i.e. the ring, is chosen in an ad hoc manner by the signer. In group signatures,
group membership is controlled by a group manager. Group signatures additionally enforce
accountability by providing the group manager with a secret tracing key that can be used to
identify the otherwise anonymous signer when needed.
Accountable ring signatures, introduced by Xu and Yung (CARDIS 2004), bridge the
gap between the two notions. They provide maximal flexibility in choosing the ring, and at
the same time maintain accountability by supporting a designated opener that can identify
signers when needed.
In this chapter, we revisit accountable ring signatures and offer a formal security model
for the primitive. Our model offers strong security definitions incorporating protection
against maliciously chosen keys and at the same time flexibility both in the choice of the
ring and the opener. We will give a generic construction using standard tools.
We will also give a highly efficient instantiation of our generic construction in the
random oracle model by meticulously combining Camenisch’s group signature scheme
(CRYPTO 1997) with a generalization of the one-out-of-many proofs of knowledge by
Groth and Kohlweiss (EUROCRYPT 2015). Our instantiation yields signatures of logarith-
mic size (in the size of the ring) while relying solely on the well-studied decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption. In the process, we offer a number of optimizations for the recent
Groth and Kohlweiss one-out-of-many proofs, which may be useful for other applications.
Accountable ring signatures imply traditional ring and group signatures. We can there-
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fore also obtain highly efficient instantiations of those primitives with signatures shorter
than all existing ring signatures as well as existing group signatures relying on standard
assumptions.
The research presented in this chapter was joint work with Jonathan Bootle, Andrea Cerulli,
Essam Ghadafi, Jens Groth and Christophe Petit, and was published in [BCC+15]. The
author contributed to the investigation in the construction and proofs of the tree/list protocol
(together with Andrea Cerulli), in the construction and proofs of the other NIZK protocols
(together with Andrea Cerulli and Christophe Petit), the security proofs of the main Scheme
(the move from CCA encryption to CPA coupled with straighline extractability is due to Jens
Groth) and the discussion on revocation.
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6.1 Introduction
Significant effort has been devoted to the study of signature schemes with privacy properties
that allow a signer to remain anonymous within a set of users. Two prominent examples of
anonymous signature schemes are ring signatures [RST01] and group signatures [CvH91].
Ring signatures allow a signer to choose any ad hoc set of users, i.e. a ring, and sign anony-
mously on behalf the ring. Group signatures also allow a signer to sign anonymously on
behalf of a group of users but here group membership is controlled by a designated group
manager. The advantage of group signatures is accountability; in case of abuse, the group
manager can revoke anonymity and identify the signer.
Accountable ring signatures [XY04] bridge the gap between ring signatures and group
signatures. They offer the flexibility of freely choosing the ring of users when creating
a signature and at the same time enforce accountability by including an opener who can
open a signature and reveal who signed it. The combination of flexibility and accountability
allows applications where ring signatures or group signatures are less suitable. Consider,
for instance, an online forum that wants to offer anonymity to users but also wants to be able
to trace people who violate the code of conduct. A forum can achieve this by allowing user
posts with accountable ring signatures where the owner is the specified opener. This system
is decentralised and flexible since different fora can have their own opener keys and users do
not have to register with each individual forum they post to. Another potential application is
an auction system where bids are public but unsuccessful bidders want anonymity. Bidders
sign bids with the seller as opener and at the end of the auctions the seller can disclose the
winner in a verifiable way.
6.1.1 Contributions
We introduce a new security model for accountable ring signatures. The signer specifies, in
addition to a set of users that could have produced the signature, the public key of an opening
entity, which will be able to remove anonymity. This opening mechanism offers protection
against misbehaving signers while at the same time not relying on a single, centralised group
manager. Our security definitions are stringent and, when possible, incorporate protection
against maliciously chosen keys.
We provide a generic construction of accountable ring signatures from standard cryp-
tographic tools. We also give a concrete instantiation, combining ideas from Camenisch’s
group signature [Cam97] with a generalization of the one-out-of-many proof of knowl-
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edge of Groth and Kohlweiss [GK14]. The most efficient ring and group signatures
[ACJT00, CL02, CKS09, BBS04, DKNS04, CG05, Ngu05, GK14] in the literature are in the
random oracle model [FS87] and so is ours. However, the only other assumption we make
is the hardness of the well-established decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.1
From a technical viewpoint, we offer two optimisations of Groth-Kohlweiss one-out-
of-many proofs. One perspective on their proof system is that they form a binary tree and
prove that one of the leaves is selected. We generalise their approach to n-ary trees, allowing
us to fine-tune the parameters for better performance. For N = nm, our optimisations reduce
the number of group elements in the 1-out-of-N proof from 4m to 2m with little impact on
the number of field elements or computational cost. Also, while their proofs can be used for
ElGamal encryption, which is what we need for our scheme, this imposes an overhead in
all parts of their protocol. We deploy more efficient Pedersen commitments in some parts
of the proof, thus limiting the overhead of ElGamal.
The end result is an accountable ring signature scheme with efficient computation and
very small signatures. Namely, for a ring with N = poly(λ ) users, we obtain signatures of
size approximately 52λ log2 N bits, which is smaller than all existing group and ring signa-
tures based on standard assumptions.
6.2 Defining Accountable Ring Signatures
An accountable ring signature (ARS) scheme over a PPT setup Setup is a tuple of
polynomial-time algorithms (OKGen,UKGen,Sign,Vfy,Open,Judge).
Setup(1λ ): Given the security parameter, produces public parameters pp used (sometimes
implicitly) by the rest of the scheme. The public parameters define key spaces
PK,DK,VK,SK with efficient algorithms for sampling and deciding membership.
OKGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, produces a public key pk ∈ PK and secret
key dk ∈ DK for an opener. Without loss of generality, we assume dk defines pk
deterministically and write pk = OKGen(pp,dk) when computing pk from dk.
UKGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, produces a verification key vk ∈ VK and a
secret signing key sk ∈ SK for a user. We can assume sk deterministically determines
vk and write vk = UKGen(pp,sk) when computing vk from sk.
1An important advantage of working over a discrete logarithm group is that so do many standard signature
schemes, e.g., DSS. We therefore already have many users with suitable public verification keys in a standard
cyclic group, e.g., NIST’s 256-bit elliptic curve group P-256.
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Sign(pk,m,R,sk): Given an opener’s public key, a message, a ring (i.e. a set of verification
keys) and a secret key, produces a ring signature σ . The algorithm returns the error
symbol ⊥ if the inputs are malformed, i.e., if pk /∈ PK,R 6⊂ VK,sk /∈ SK or vk =
UKGen(pp,sk) /∈ R.
Vfy(pk,m,R,σ): Given an opener’s public key, a message, a ring and a signature, returns
1 if accepting the signature and 0 otherwise. We assume the algorithm always returns
0 if the inputs are malformed, i.e., if pk /∈ PK or R 6⊂ VK.
Open(m,R,σ ,dk): Given a message, a ring, a ring signature and an opener’s secret key,
returns a verification key vk and a proofψ that the owner of vk produced the signature.
If any of the inputs is invalid, i.e., dk /∈ DK or σ is not a valid signature using pk =
OKGen(pp,dk), the algorithm returns ⊥.
Judge(pk,m,R,σ ,vk,ψ): Given an opener’s public key, a message, a ring, a signature, a
verification key and a proof, returns 1 if accepting the proof and 0 otherwise. We
assume the algorithm returns 0 if σ is invalid or vk /∈ R.
An accountable ring signature scheme should be correct, fully unforgeable, anonymous
and traceable as defined below.
Definition 25 (Perfect correctness). An accountable ring signature scheme is perfectly cor-
rect if for any PPT adversary A
Pr

pp← Setup(1λ );(vk,sk)← UKGen(pp);
(pk,m,R)←A(pp,sk);σ ← Sign(pk,m,R,sk) :
If pk ∈ PK,R⊂ VK,vk ∈ R then Vfy(pk,m,R,σ) = 1
= 1.
We remark that correctness of the opening algorithm (w.r.t. an honestly generated opener
key) is implied by the other requirements.
Full unforgeability ensures that an adversary, who may control the opener, can neither
falsely accuse an honest user of producing a ring signature nor forge ring signatures on
behalf of an honest ring. The former should hold even when all other users in the ring are
corrupt. This requirement combines the non-frameability of group signatures [BSZ05] and
the unforgeability of ring signatures [BKM09] requirements.
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Definition 26 (Full Unforgeability). An accountable ring signature scheme is fully unforge-
able if for any PPT adversary A
Pr

pp← Setup(1λ );(pk,vk,m,R,σ ,ψ)←AUKGen,Sign,Reveal(pp) :(
vk ∈ QUKGen \QReveal ∧ (pk,vk,m,R,σ) /∈ QSign
∧Judge(pk,m,R,σ ,vk,ψ) = 1
)
∨
(
R⊂ QUKGen \QReveal ∧ (pk, ·,m,R,σ) /∈ QSign
∧ Vfy(pk,m,R,σ) = 1
)

≈ 0.
• UKGen runs (vk,sk)←UKGen(pp) and returns vk. QUKGen is the set of verification
keys vk that have been generated by this oracle.
• Sign is an oracle that on query (pk,vk,m,R) returns σ ← Sign(pk,m,R,sk) if vk ∈
R∩QUKGen. QSign contains the queries and responses (pk,vk,m,R,σ).
• Reveal is an oracle that when queried on vk ∈ QUKGen returns the corresponding
signing key sk. QReveal is the list of verification keys vk for which the corresponding
signing key has been revealed.
Anonymity ensures that a signature does not reveal the identity of the ring member
who produced it without the opener explicitly wanting to open the particular signature. We
allow the adversary to choose the secret signing keys of the users which implies anonymity
against full key exposure attacks [BKM09] where the users’ secret signing keys have been
revealed. Our definition also captures unlinkability as used in [XY04]: if an adversary can
link signatures by the same signer, it can break anonymity.
Definition 27 (Anonymity). An accountable ring signature scheme is anonymous if for any
PPT adversary A
Pr
 pp← Setup(1λ );b←{0,1};(pk,dk)← OKGen(pp) :
AChalb,Open(pp, pk) = b
≈ 1
2
.
• Chalb is an oracle that the adversary can only call once. On query (m,R,sk0,sk1)
it runs σ0← Sign(pk,m,R,sk0); σ1← Sign(pk,m,R,sk1). If σ0 6= ⊥ and σ1 6= ⊥ it
returns σb, otherwise it returns ⊥.
• Open is an oracle that on a query (m,R,σ) returns Open(m,R,σ ,dk). If σ was
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obtained by calling Chalb on (m,R), the oracle returns ⊥.
Traceability ensures that the specified opener can always identify the ring member who
produced a signature and that she is able to produce a valid proof for her decision. We allow
the adversary full control in specifying the decryption key of the opener, as well as the ring
R.
Definition 28 (Traceability). An accountable ring signature scheme is traceable if for any
PPT adversary A
Pr

pp← Setup(1λ );(dk,m,R,σ)←A(pp);
pk← OKGen(pp,dk);(vk,ψ)← Open(m,R,σ ,dk) :
Vfy(pk,m,R,σ) = 1 ∧ Judge(pk,m,R,σ ,vk,ψ) = 0
≈ 0.
Tracing soundness ensures that a signature cannot trace to two different users; only
one person can be identified as the signer even when all users as well as the opener are fully
corrupt. Similarly to the setting of group signatures [SSE+12], this requirement is vital for
some applications, e.g., where users might be rewarded for signatures they produced, or to
avoid shifting blame when signatures are used as evidence of abuse. We allow the adversary
full control in specifying the keys of the opener, the ring R and all the users. The setting of
tracing soundness is different than that of the traceability game, but is compatible with that
of full unforgettability. However, in the interest of readability, we cover it separately.
Definition 29 (Tracing Soundness). An accountable ring signature scheme satisfies tracing
soundness if for any PPT adversary A
Pr
 pp← Setup(1λ );(m,σ ,R, pk,vk1,vk2,ψ1,ψ2)←A(pp) :
∀i ∈ {1,2}, Judge(pk,m,R,σ ,vki,ψi) = 1∧ vk1 6= vk2
≈ 0.
6.2.1 Ring and Group Signatures from Accountable Ring Signatures
We will now relate accountable ring signatures to ring signatures and group signatures by
showing that the latter are implied by accountable ring signatures.
RING SIGNATURES. Traditional ring signatures [RST01] do not have an opener and their
security requires anonymity of the signer and unforgeability [RST01, BKM09]. By mod-
ifying the signing algorithm to produce a freshly sampled opener key and attach it to the
signature, we obtain a traditional ring signature scheme from an accountable ring signature.
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As the public key is freshly sampled, the opening and judge algorithms are ignored no user
can derive the private key required to open signatures and produce proofs. Correctness and
anonymity follow from those of the accountable ring signature, whereas unforgeability is
implied by full unforgeability and traceability.
GROUP SIGNATURES. Bellare et al. [BMW03] defined group signatures for static groups,
where the population of the group is fixed once and for all at the setup time, and where
the group manager additionally acts as the designated opener. Besides correctness, their
model requires full anonymity and full traceability. The latter requires that an adversary in
possession of the group master secret key who can corrupt members of the group, cannot
produce a new signature that does not trace to a user in set of corrupt users. An accountable
ring signature satisfying our security definitions gives rise to a group signature scheme as
follows: We fix the group manager as the designated opener and set the corresponding
decryption key as the group master secret key gmsk used as the tracing key. In the setup,
the group members generate their personal key pairs and the group manager publishes the
ring containing the public keys of the members as part of the group signature public key.
Group membership is enforced by the manager’s control over the ring. Group signatures
are then just accountable ring signatures w.r.t. this ring. Full anonymity follows from the
anonymity of the accountable ring signature scheme, whereas full traceability follows from
full unforgeability and traceability. In Sect. 7.4.3, we give a detailed example based on the
generic accountable ring signature construction of the following section.
The group public key in our scheme is quite large since it grows linearly in the number
of members. However, the cost of transmitting the public key that can be amortised over
many signatures: a user needs to obtain the public key only once in the static version, and
once per epoch in the dynamic one (furthermore, the dynamic case is also well suited to
delta-based solutions). An advantage of a group signature scheme based on ARS on the
other hand is that it can easily be made dynamic, something that we will cover in detail in
the next chapter. The group manager can enrol or remove users by adding or deleting their
verification keys from the group public key [DKNS04]. In the dynamic group signature
scheme, the group public key is changing and group signatures must be verified against the
group as it was at the time of signing, but for scenarios where the group is not changing too
often or where great flexibility is desired this is a price worth paying.
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6.3 Constructing Accountable Ring Signatures
6.3.1 Building Blocks
Our generic construction (shown in Fig. 6.1) uses a one-way function f (Sect. 3.2.2), an
IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme (PKEGen,E ,D) (Sect. 3.2.2), a signature
of knowledge (Sect. 3.4.7), and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (Sect. 3.4.5), all
of which share the same setup gk. The setup gk defines domain SK and range VK for f ,
and key, message, randomness and ciphertext spaces PK,DK,M,Rnd,C for the encryption
scheme. The range of f and the message space of the encryption scheme need to be com-
patible such that VK ⊆M. We describe the relations w.r.t the signature of knowledge and
the zero knowledge proof operate in the next section.
6.3.2 Design
The idea is that an opener will have a key pair for the encryption scheme and the user will
have a secret key sk and corresponding verification key vk = f (sk). To sign a message m
w.r.t. a ring R, the signer first encrypts her verification key under the opener’s public key
and provides a signature of knowledge on m proving the ciphertext encrypts a verification
key in the ring and that she knows the secret key associated with the encrypted verification
key. To open a signature, the opener decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the user’s verification
key and provides an NIZK proof of correct decryption.
The relationsRsig andRopen associated with the signature of knowledge and the NIZK
system, respectively, are as follows:
Rsig :=

(
(pk,R,c),(sk,r)
)
:
R⊂ VK ∧ vk := f (sk) ∈ R ∧ c = E(pk,vk;r)
 ·
Ropen :=

(
(pk,c,vk),dk
)
:
pk = PKEGen(gk;dk) ∈ PK ∧ vk =D(dk,c) ∧ vk ∈ VK
 ·
6.3.3 Security
Lemma 2. The accountable ring signature scheme in Fig. 6.1 is anonymous if SoK forRsig
is SimExt secure, the NIZK for Ropen is zero knowledge, and (PKEGen,E ,D) is IND-CPA
secure.
Proof. We start by replacing the algorithm SoKSetup of the signature of knowledge with
SoKSimSetup, and when answering the challenge query, we use SoKSimSign instead of
SoKSign. By the SimExt security of the SoK, the adversary has a negligible probability in
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Setup(1λ )
gk← G(1λ );crs← CRSGen(gk)
crsSoK← SoKSetup(gk)
Return pp := (gk,crsSoK,crs)
OKGen(pp)
(pk,dk)← PKEGen(gk)
Return (pk,dk)
Open(m,R,σ ,dk)
pk← OKGen(pp;dk)
If Vfy(pk,m,R,σ) = 0 return ⊥
Parse σ as (c,σSoK)
vk :=D(dk,c)
ψ ← Prove(crs,(pk,c,vk),dk)
Return (vk,ψ)
UKGen(pp)
sk← SK; vk := f (sk); Return (vk,sk)
Sign(pk,m,R,sk)
vk← f (sk);r← Rnd;c← E(pk,vk;r)
σSoK← SoKSign(crsSoK,(pk,R,c),(sk,r),m)
Return σ := (c,σSoK)
Vfy(pk,m,R,σ)
Parse σ as (c,σSoK)
Return SoKVerify(crsSoK,(pk,R,c),m,σSoK)
Judge(pk,m,R,σ ,vk,ψ)
If Vfy(pk,m,R,σ) = 0 return 0
Parse σ as (c,σSoK)
Return PVfy(crs,(pk,c,vk),ψ)
Figure 6.1: A generic construction for Accountable Ring Signatures
distinguishing between the two settings. This ensures that the signature of knowledge σSoK
reveals no information about the underlying witness.
Next, we replace the algorithm CRSGen of the NIZK system with SimCRSGen
and when answering opening queries, we use SimProve instead of Prove. By the zero-
knowledge property of the NIZK system, the adversary has a negligible probability in dis-
tinguishing between the two settings.
Now, we modify the Open oracle into Open′ such that instead of decrypting the cipher-
text, we run SoKExtract to extract the verification key vk from the signature of knowledge
σSoK. By the SimExt security of the signature of knowledge, with overwhelming probability
in each query, we get the same vk as the plaintext of c.
As we are no longer using the decryption algorithm, by the IND-CPA security of the
encryption scheme, the probability of A winning the anonymity game is close to 12 .
Lemma 3. The accountable ring signature scheme in Fig. 6.1 is fully unforgeable if SoK
forRsig is SimExt secure, the NIZK forRopen is sound, and f is one-way.
Proof. We start by running the Setup algorithm as normal with the exception that here we
replace SoKSetup with SoKSimSetup. We forward crs to the adversary. By the simulatabil-
ity of the signature of knowledge, the adversary has a negligible probability in distinguish-
ing between the two settings. From now on, we use SoKSimSign instead of SoKSign when
answering Sign queries. The adversary can win in two ways:
• Case I: The adversary forges a valid ring signature on a message m w.r.t. an hon-
est ring R where (pk, ·,m,R,σ) /∈ QSign. By the SimExt security of the signature of
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knowledge, we can extract a valid witness for the statement (pk,R,c) ∈ LRsig from
which we obtain (vk,sk) such that vk := f (sk) ∈ R. We use this to break the one-
wayness of the function f which contradicts the security of the function f .
• Case II: The adversary outputs a valid ring signature σ := (c,σSoK) on a message m
w.r.t. a ring R and a proof ψ that the honest user with key vk produced the signature
while such user never did so.
We start by guessing the user the adversary is going to frame. We have a probability
1
η(λ ) of guessing correctly, where η(λ ) is a polynomial representing an upper bound
on the number of honest users A uses in the game. By the soundness of the NIZK
system, ψ is a proof for a valid statement (pk,c,vk) ∈ LRopen . In the game, we abort
if A asks for the secret key of the user we guessed. For all other honest users, we
have chosen their key pairs ourselves and thus know their secret keys.
Again, by the simulation extractability of the signature of knowledge, with over-
whelming probability, we can extract a valid witness for the statement (pk,R,c) ∈
LRsig from σSoK, from which we obtain (vk,sk) such that vk := f (sk) ∈ R. We use
this to break the one-wayness of f which contradicts the security of the function f .
Lemma 4. The accountable ring signature scheme in Fig. 6.1 is traceable, if SoK for Rsig
is SimExt secure, the NIZK for Ropen is complete, and is (PKEGen,E ,D) perfectly correct.
.
Proof. By the security of the signature of knowledge, we are able to extract a valid witness
from σSoK part of the valid signature σ = (c,σSoK) the adversary outputs. The witness thus
satisfies vk = f (sk) where vk ∈ R⊂VK, pk ∈ PK and c= E(pk,vk;r) for some r ∈Rnd and
sk ∈ SK.
Since pk = PKEGen(gk;dk), we see from pk 6= ⊥ that dk ∈ DK. Correctness of the
encryption algorithm implies that D(dk,c) = vk, which is the first part of the opening algo-
rithm’s output. Now the opening algorithm has a statement (pk,c,vk) and a corresponding
witness dk. By the completeness of the NIZK proof system, ψ will verify correctly. This
means that the Judge algorithm will output 1 which is a contradiction.
Lemma 5. The construction satisfies tracing soundness if SoK is SimExt secure, the NIZK
proof system is sound and the encryption scheme is perfectly correct.
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Proof. The SimExt security of the signature of knowledge ensures that from any signature
σSoK (w.r.t. a statment s) output by the adversary, we can extract a valid witness w such
that (s,w) ∈Rsig which eliminates the case that the adversary forges a signature for a state-
ment s∗ /∈ LRsig . If this is not the case, we can use such an adversary to construct another
adversary against the SimExt security of the signature of knowledge.
The soundness of the NIZK system for the relation Ropen ensures that ciphertext c
contained in the ring signature decrypts to vk, which eliminates the case that the adver-
sary can produce a proof ψ for a statement s∗ /∈ LRopen . Finally, the perfect correctness of
the public-key encryption scheme (which is regarded as a perfectly-binding commitment
scheme) ensures that a ciphertext has a unique decryption.
Theorem 9. The accountable ring signature construction in Fig. 6.1 is perfectly correct,
anonymous, fully unforgeable, traceable, and satisfies tracing soundness if SoK for Rsig is
SimExt secure, the NIZK forRopen is complete, sound and zero knowledge, (PKEGen,E ,D)
is perfectly correct and IND-CPA secure, and f is one-way. .
Proof. Perfect correctness follows from that of the building blocks and is easy to verify.
Lemmata 2, 3, 4 and 5 complete the rest of the proof.
Since all the building blocks can be constructed from (doubly enhanced [Gol11]) trap-
door permutations, we get as a corollary that trapdoor permutations imply the existence of
accountable ring signatures.
6.4 Efficient Instantiation
We give here an efficient instantiation of the generic construction from Fig. 6.1. The instan-
tiation is secure in the random oracle model under the well-established DDH assumption.
We instantiate f with group exponentiation and the IND-CPA encryption scheme with El-
Gamal. We will get the Signature of Knowledge and NIZK proof for the relations Rsig
andRopen by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to suitable Σ-protocols for these relations.
Thanks to the straightline f -Extractability of our instantiation of the signature of knowl-
edge, we can answer the adversary’s Open queries in the anonymity game by extracting
vk = f (sk) from σSoK without rewinding.
For all Σ-protocols, the setup includes the group description gk and the common ref-
erence string crs := (ck,ek), where ck← CGen(gk), (ek,τ)← PKEGen(gk) and ek = gτ
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for τ ← Z∗p, for the Pedersen commitment scheme and the ElGamal encryption scheme,
respectively.
6.4.1 Committed bits
We first give a Σ-protocol for a commitment B having an opening consisting of sequences
of bits, where in each sequence there is exactly one 1. More precisely, we give in Fig. 6.2 a
Σ-protocol (Gcrs,P1,V1) for the relation
R1 =
 (B,(b0,0, . . . ,bm−1,n−1,r)) :(∀i, j : b j,i ∈ {0,1})∧ (∀ j : ∑n−1i=0 b j,i = 1)∧B = Comck(b0,0, . . . ,bm−1,n−1;r)

The main idea is to prove that b j,i(1−b j,i) = 0 for all i, j, and also that ∑ni=1 b j,i = 1.
P1(gk,crs,B,(b0,0, . . . ,bm−1,n−1,r)) V1(gk,crs,B)
rA,rC,rD,a j,1, . . . ,a j,n−1← Zp
∀ j : a j,0 :=−∑n−1i=1 a j,i A,C,D
A := Comck(a0,0, . . . ,am−1,n−1;rA) -
C := Comck({a j,i(1−2b j,i)}m−1,n−1j,i=0 ;rC) Accept if and only if
D := Comck(−a20,0, . . . ,−a2m−1,n−1;rD) x←{0,1}λ A,B,C,D ∈G
ﬀ f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC ∈ Zp
∀ j, i : f j,i := b j,ix+a j,i ∀ j : f j,0 := x−∑n−1i=1 f j,i
zA := rx+ rA f0,1, f1,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC BxA = Comck( f0,0, . . . , fm−1,n−1;zA)
zC := rCx+ rD
- CxD = Comck({ f j,i(x− f j,i)}m−1,n−1j,i=0 ;zC)
Figure 6.2: Σ-protocol for relationR1.
Lemma 6. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 6.2 is perfectly complete, perfect SHVZK, computational
3-special sound and has quasi-unique responses, under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by inspection. The SHVZK simulator, given a chal-
lenge x, can simulate the transcript by picking f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC ← Zp, C← G and
computing f j,0 := x−∑n−1i=1 f j,i, A :=Comck( f0,0, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA)B−x, D=Comck({ fi, j(x−
fi, j)}m−1,n−1i, j=0 ;zC)C−x. In both simulations and real proofs, f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC and C
are independent, uniformly random and uniquely determine { f j,0}m−1j=0 ,A,D, so the sim-
ulation is perfect. We also have quasi-unique responses, since two different valid answers
f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC and f ′0,1, . . . , f
′
m−1,n−1,z
′
A,z
′
C to one challenge would break the bind-
ing property of BxA and CxD.
We prove 3-special soundness in three parts. First, we show that any answers to 3
(actually 2) different challenges provide an opening of B. Second, we show that these
answers imply that committed values are bits. Finally, we show that they imply that
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the sum of the committed values is 1. For the first part, suppose that a prover has
answered two different challenges x,x′ correctly with answers ( f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC)
and ( f ′0,1, . . . , f
′
m−1,n−1,z
′
A,z
′
C). Since we have B
xA = Comck( f0,0, . . . , fm−1,n−1;zA) and
Bx
′
A = Comck( f ′0,0, . . . , f
′
m−1,n−1;z
′
A), from the first verification equation we have B
x−x′ =
Comck( f0,0 − f ′0,0, . . . , fm−1,n−1 − f ′m−1,n−1;zA − z′A). Thus bi, j =
fi, j− f ′i, j
x−x′ , with r =
zA−z′A
x−x′ ,
gives us an opening of B. The first verification equation also gives an opening (a0, . . . ,a0;rA)
of A using a j,i = f j,i−xb j,i and rA = zA−xr. Note that by the binding properties of the com-
mitment scheme, the prover cannot know a second opening of A or B, and must respond to
any challenge with f j,i = b j,ix+ a j,i. We can get openings of C and D to values c j,i, d j,i
from the second equation in a similar way.
By the second verification equation, the values satisfy c j,ix+ d j,i = f j,i(x− f j,i) =
b j,i(1− b j,i)x2 +(1− 2b j,i)a j,ix− a2j,i. If this holds for three different x,x′ and x′′ then the
polynomials are identical. So, b j,i(1−b j,i) = 0 and b j,i ∈ {0,1} for all i, j.
By construction we have ∑n−1i=0 f j,i = ∑
n−1
i=0 b j,ix+∑
n−1
i=0 a j,i = x for all j = 0, . . . ,m−1.
This holds for two challenges x and x′. Therefore ∑n−1i=0 b j,i = 1.
6.4.2 List Containing Encryption of 1
We now describe a Σ-protocol that a list of N ElGamal ciphertexts (c0, . . . ,cN−1) includes
an encryption of 1. More precisely, we give a Σ-protocol (Gcrs,P2,V2) (see Fig. 6.3) for the
relation:
R2 =
{
(({ci}N−1i=0 ),(`,r)) : (∀i,ci ∈G2)∧ ` ∈ {0, . . . ,N−1}∧ c` = Eek(1;r)
}
This generalises easily to other homomorphic encryption and commitment schemes.
Since we can pad the list with copies of the last ciphertext (at little extra cost in the
protocol), we may assume N = nm. We will later discuss the efficiency implications of
different choices of n. The idea behind our Σ-protocol is to prove knowledge of an index `
for which the product ∏N−1i=0 c
δ`,i
i is an encryption of 1, where as usual δ`,i = 1 when i = `
and δ`,i = 0 otherwise. We have δ`,i =∏m−1j=0 δ` j,i j , where ` = ∑
m−1
j=0 ` jn
j and i = ∑m−1j=0 i jn
j
are the n-ary representations of ` and i respectively.
The prover first commits to m sequences of n bits (δ` j,0, . . . ,δ` j,n−1). It runs the
Σ-protocol in Fig. 6.2 to prove that the commitment is well-formed. On receiving a chal-
lenge x, the prover discloses elements f j,i = δ` j,ix+ a j,i as in Fig. 6.2. Observe that for
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every i ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}, the product ∏m−1j=0 f j,i j is the evaluation at x of the polynomial
pi(x) =∏m−1j=0 (δ` j,ix+a j,i). For 0≤ i≤ N−1, we have:
pi(x) =
m−1
∏
j=0
δ` j,i j x+
m−1
∑
k=0
pi,kxk = δ`,ixm+
m−1
∑
k=0
pi,kxk, (6.1)
for some coefficients pi,k depending on ` and a j,i. Note that pi,k can be computed by
the prover independently of x, and that p`(x) is the only degree m polynomial amongst
p0(x), . . . , pN−1(x). From these coefficients and some random noise values ρk, the prover
computes ciphertexts Gk :=∏N−1i=0 c
pi,k
i · Eek(1;ρk) and includes them in the initial message.
These ciphertexts are then used to cancel out the low degree terms in (6.1). Namely, if c` is
an encryption of 1, the following product is an encryption of 1 for any x
N−1
∏
i=0
c
∏m−1j=0 f j,i j
i ·
m−1
∏
k=0
G−x
k
k =
(
N−1
∏
i=0
cδ`,ii
)xm
.
P2(gk,crs,(c0, . . . ,cN−1),(`,r)) V2(gk,crs,(c0, . . . ,cN−1))
rB,ρk← Zp
B := Comck(δ`0,0 , . . . ,δ`m−1,n−1 ;rB)
(A,C,D)←P1(gk,crs,B,({δ` j,i}m−1,n−1j,i=0 ,rB))
For k = 0, . . . ,m−1 A,B,C,D,{Gk}m−1k=0 Accept if and only if
Gk =∏N−1i=0 c
pi,k
i · Eek(1;ρk) - A,B,C,D,G0, . . . ,Gm−1 ∈G
using pi,k from (6.1) x←{0,1}λ f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC,z ∈ Zp
ﬀ V1(gk,crs,B,x,A,B,C,{ f j,i}m−1,n−1j=0,i=1 ,zA,zC) = 1
( f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC)←P1(x) f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1,zA,zC,z ∀ j : f j,0 := x−∑n−1i=1 f j,i
z := rxm−∑m−1k=0 ρkxk - ∏N−1i=0 c
∏mj=1 f j,i j
i ·∏m−1k=0 G−x
k
k = Eek(1;z)
Figure 6.3: Σ-protocol for a list c0, . . . ,cN−1 containing an encryption of 1
Lemma 7. Let m ≥ 2. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 6.3 is perfectly complete, SHVZK, (m+ 1)-
special sound and has quasi-unique responses, under the DDH assumption.
Proof. First we prove perfect completeness. By the perfect completeness of the Σ-protocol
in Fig. 6.2 we have that V1 always accepts. Correctness of the last equation follows from
the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption since
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N−1
∏
i=0
c
∏m−1j=0 f j,i j
i ·
m−1
∏
k=0
G−x
k
k =
N−1
∏
i=0
cpi(x)i ·
m−1
∏
k=0
(
N−1
∏
i=0
cpi,ki ·Enc(1;ρk)
)−xk
=
N−1
∏
i=0
cpi(x)i ·
m−1
∏
k=0
(
N−1
∏
i=0
c−pi,kx
k
i ·Enc(1;−xkρk)
)
=
N−1
∏
i=0
cpi(x)i ·
N−1
∏
i=0
c−∑
m−1
k=0 pi,kx
k
i ·Enc
(
1;−
m−1
∑
k=0
xkρk
)
=
N−1
∏
i=0
cδ`,ix
m
i ·Enc
(
1;−
m−1
∑
k=0
xkρk
)
= cx
m
` Enc
(
1;−
m−1
∑
k=0
xkρk
)
= Enc(1;rxm) ·Enc(1;−∑m−1k=0 xkρk) = Enc(1;z).
We now describe a special honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator. It picks B←
G and G1, . . . ,Gm−1 ← G2. It runs the SHVZK simulator for P1 to simulate A,C,D,zA,
zC, f0,1, . . . , fm−1,n−1 and computes the f j,0’s accordingly. It picks z← Zp and computes G0
from the last verification equation.
By the DDH assumption, G1, . . . ,Gm−1 in a real proof are indistinguishable from pick-
ing random pairs inG2 as in the simulation. We get independent, uniformly random B and z
in both real proofs and simulations. By the perfect SHVZK of the simulator for P1 we also
have the same distribution of A,B,C, f j,i,zA,zC as in a real proof. Finally, G0 is uniquely
determined by the last verification equation in both real proofs and in simulations, so the
two are indistinguishable. The last verification equation uniquely determines z, thus quasi-
unique responses follow from the quasi-unique responses of the underlying Σ-protocol for
R1.
Now we prove the protocol is (m+ 1)-special sound. Suppose an adversary can pro-
duce (m+1) different accepting responses ( f (0)j,i ,z
(0)), . . . ,( f (m)j,i ,z
(m)) with respect to m+1
different challenges x(0), . . . ,x(m) and the same initial message. Assume that m > 1. We
use 3-special soundness of the Σ-protocol for R1 to extract openings δ` j,i,a j,i for B and A
with δ` j,i ∈ {0,1} and ∑n−1i=0 δ` j,i = 1. The openings define ` := ∑m−1j=0 ` jn j, where ` j is the
index of the only 1 in the sequence (δ` j,0, . . . ,δ` j,n−1). Following the proof, all answers sat-
isfy f (e)j,i = δ` j,ix
(e)+a j,i for 0 ≤ e ≤ m, with overwhelming probability due to the binding
property of the commitment scheme.
From δ` j,i,a j,i we can compute the polynomials pi(x) =∏
m−1
j=0 (δ` j,ix+a j,i). Note that
p`(x) is the only such polynomial with degree m in x. Based on this observation we rewrite
the last verification equation as: cx
m
` ·∏m−1k=0 G˜x
k
k = Enc(1;z). Here the G˜k values are derived
from the initial statement and δ` j,i,a j,i. This equation holds for x(0), . . . ,x(m). Consider
the Vandermonde matrix with the eth row given by (1,x(e), . . . ,(x(e))m). The x(e) values are
distinct, so the matrix is invertible. We can thus obtain a linear combination θ0, . . . ,θn of the
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rows producing the vector (0, . . . ,0,1). We deduce c` =∏me=0
(
c(x
(e))
m
` ·∏m−1k=0 G˜(x
(e))
k
k
)θe
=
Enc
(
1;∑me=0 θez(e)
)
, which provides an opening of c` to the plaintext 1 with randomness
r = ∑me=0 θez(e).
6.4.3 Correct Signature
We give in Fig. 6.4 a Σ-protocol for the relation
Rsig =
{
((pk,m,R,c),(sk,r)) : sk ∈ Zp∧ vk = gsk ∈ R⊂G∗∧ c = Epk(vk;r)
}
Psig(gk,crs,(pk,m,R,c),(r,sk)) Vsig(gk,crs,(pk,m,R,c))
s, t,ra,rb← Zp; d←Eek(gsk; t)
A←Epk(gs;ra); B←Eek(gs;rb) d,A,B,a2 Accept iff
c0 := d · Eek(vk−10 ;0), . . . ,cN−1 := d · Eek(vk−1N−1;0) - R⊂G; pk ∈G∗; d,A,B ∈G2
a2←P2(gk,crs,(c0, . . . ,cN−1),(`, t)) x←{0,1}λ zs,za,zb ∈ Zp
ﬀ cxA = Epk(gzs ;za)
zs := sk · x+ s ; za := rx+ ra ; zb := tx+ rb za,zb,zs,z2 dxB = Eek(gzs ;zb)
z2←P2(x) - V2(gk,crs,(c0, . . . ,cN−1),a2,x,z2) = 1
Figure 6.4: Σ-protocol forRsig
Lemma 8. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 6.4 is perfectly complete, SHVZK, (m+1)-special sound
and has quasi-unique responses, under the DDH assumption.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by direct verification and the perfect completeness
of (P2,V2). The SHVZK simulator chooses za,zb,zs ← Zp and d ← G2 at random and
computes A,B from the verification equations. It runs the perfect SHVZK simulator for P2
to get a2 and z2. By the DDH assumption, d is indistinguishable from the ciphertexts in the
real proof. In Both real proofs and simulations, za,zb,zt are uniformly random and uniquely
determine A,B giving us SHVZK. Since the verification equations uniquely determine za,zb
and zs and (P2,V2) has quasi-unique responses, so must this protocol.
For (m + 1)-special soundness, consider accepting answers za,zb,zs and z′a,z′b,z
′
s
to distinct challenges x and x′. From the first verification equation we get cx−x′ =
Epk(gzs−z′s ;za− z′a) giving sk = zs−z
′
s
x−x′ and r =
za−z′a
x−x′ . The second verification equation gives
dx−x′ = Epk(gzs−z′s ;zb− z′b) so d also encrypts gsk. Finally, (m+1)-special soundness of the
Σ-protocol forR2 then shows that gsk ∈ R.
Lemma 9. Applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to the protocol in Fig. 6.4 with
SoKSetup as in Sect. 6.4 produces a signature of knowledge in the random oracle model,
that is extractable and straightline f -extractable, under the DDH assumption.
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Proof. For simulatability, SoKSimSetup is identical to SoKSetup and SoKSimSign pro-
grams the random oracle to simulate proofs. Simulatability then follows from SHVZK.
For extractability we rely on rewinding, (m+ 1)-special soundness and quasi-unique
responses, using [FKMV12]. For straightline f -extractability, we use the trapdoor τ to
decrypt d in the proof transcript and obtain vk = f (sk).
6.4.4 Correct Opening
Writing out the details of ElGamal encryption we get
Ropen =
 ((pk,c,vk),dk) :dk ∈ Zp∧ pk = gdk 6= 1∧ c = (u,v) ∈G2∧ vk ∈G∧ (v/vk)dk = u

Popen(gk,crs,(pk,u,v,vk),dk) Vopen(gk,crs,(pk,u,v,vk))
a← Zp A,B Accept if and only if
A := ga - pk,u,v,vk ∈G
B := (v/vk)a x← Zp pk 6= 1
ﬀ pkxA = gz
z = dk · x+a z uxB = (v/vk)z
-
Figure 6.5: Σ-protocol for correct decryption
Lemma 10. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 6.5 is perfectly complete, perfect SHVZK, perfect 2-
special sound and has unique responses. Also, applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to
it produces a NIZK proof.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by direct verification. The SHVZK simulator picks
z←Zp and computes A,B from the verification equations. Both in real proofs and simulated
proofs z is uniformly random and the verification equations determine the initial message
uniquely, so we have perfect simulation. As the first verification equation determines z we
have unique responses.
For 2-special soundness, let z and z′ be accepting answers to distinct challenges x, x′.
The first verification equation gives pkx−x′=gz−z′, so dk= z−z
′
x−x′ . The second gives u
x−x′ =
(v/vk)z−z′, which shows u=(v/vk)dk. Thus, vk was encrypted in (u,v).
6.4.5 Efficiency of our schemes
The efficiency of our schemes is determined by the signature of knowledge of Fig. 6.4.
For a ring of N = nm users, this requires the prover to send m+ 4 ElGamal ciphertexts, 4
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Scheme Signature Size Assumptions Type
[ACJT00] 3Z∗n+4Z Strong RSA Group
[CL02] 6Z∗n+8Z Strong RSA Group
[DKNS04] 12Z∗n+12Z Strong RSA Ring/Group
[CG05] 4Z∗n+4Z Strong RSA + DDH Group
[GK14] (4log2 N)G+(3log2 N+1)Z∗p DDH Ring
Ours (log2 N+12)G+ 12(3log2 N+12)Z
∗
p DDH Ring/Group
Table 6.1: Efficiency comparison between our instantiation and most efficient group and
ring signatures based on RSA and/or DDH assumptions. Z∗n,Z,G,Z∗p represent the size of
RSA ring elements, integers, group elements and field elements, respectively.
Pedersen commitments and m(n−1)+6 elements of Zp . A full accountable ring signature
includes an additional ElGamal encryption, i.e. 2m+ 12 group elements and m(n− 1)+ 6
field elements in total.
A signature can be computed using mN + 3mn+ 2m+ 12 group exponentiations as
follows. Computing A, C and D in the bit proof requires 2mn+ 3 exponentiations since
exponentiation by (1−2bi, j) amounts to a multiplication. By construction of ci in Fig. 6.4,
the first components of all ci are identical in Fig. 6.3, so computing the first components
of all Gk costs 2m exponentiations. The second components of all Gk require mN +m
exponentiations. We also need 9 exponentiations to compute B in Fig. 6.3, d, A and B in
Fig. 6.4, and the ElGamal encryption of the public key.
Signatures can be verified using N+2mn+2m+15 group exponentiations as follows:
N + 2m+ 3 exponentiations for the last verification equation in Fig. 6.3, 2mn+ 4 for the
equations in Fig. 6.2 and 8 for the first two verification equations in Fig. 6.4.
Our schemes can be instantiated over any group G where the DDH problem is com-
putationally hard. Let us say the security parameter λ determines the bit size of the field
elements as |p| ≈ λ bits and let N = poly(λ ). When group elements are much larger than
field elements, say more than a factor λ , it is convenient to choose a large n. For instance,
setting n = λ + 1 (in which case m = O(1)) the communication complexity amounts to
a constant number of group elements and mλ + 6 field elements. When group and field
elements are of roughly the same size, as can be the case for elliptic curve groups, our
signatures have total size m(n+ 1)+ 18 elements. Setting n = 4 gives communication of
roughly 5log4 N+18 =
5
2 log2 N+18 elements.
In table 6.1, we compare our instantiation with prior work. Since our signatures re-
quire a logarithmic number of group elements, they enjoy shorter sizes than all previous
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signatures based on RSA and/or DDH assumptions, for sufficiently large security parame-
ters. Indeed, a constant number of RSA ring elements typically requires O(λ 3) bits whereas
the elliptic curve instantiation of our protocol achieves O(λ logN) bit size. As long as λ is
large enough our signatures will be shorter. Strictly speaking, we also require that N ≤ 2λ 2 ,
but this is trivially satisfied for any meaningful value of λ (e.g. for 80 bit security, we can
handle 26400 users). Our signatures are also a factor 2.8 shorter than Groth and Kohlweiss
ring signatures.
Chapter 7
Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
In the previous Chapter we focused on accountable ring signatures, giving a particularly ef-
ficient construction and instantiation. In Sect. 6.2.1, we also sketched how one could derive
static group signatures from accountable group signatures. In this Chapter we will flesh out
that construction and move our attention to fully dynamic group signatures, i.e. where users
can join and leave the group at any time. Compared to accountable ring signatures the main
difference is that the opener is fixed ahead of time and most importantly, that membership
in the group is controlled centrally by a manager.
We start by taking a close look at existing security definitions for fully dynamic group
signatures. We identify a number of shortcomings in existing security definitions and fill the
gap by providing a formal rigorous security model for the primitive. Our model is general
and is not tailored towards a specific design paradigm and can therefore, as we show, be
used to argue about the security of different existing constructions following different design
paradigms, including the one based on the scheme of Sect. 6.3. Our definitions are stringent
and when possible incorporate protection against maliciously chosen keys.
In the process, we identify a subtle issue inherent to one design paradigm, where new
members might try to implicate older ones by means of back-dated signatures. This is
not captured by existing models. We propose some inexpensive fixes for some existing
constructions to avoid the issue.
The research presented in this chapter was joint work with Jonathan Bootle, Andrea Cerulli,
Essam Ghadafi and Jens Groth, and was published in [BCC+16a]. The author contributed
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to the investigation in developing the definitions for fully dynamic group signatures (to-
gether with the other authors), developing the attacks against existing schemes (with Andrea
Cerulli), and the real-world motivation for the backdating attacks.
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7.1 Introduction
Group signatures, put forward by Chaum and van Heyst [CvH91], are a fundamental cryp-
tographic primitive allowing a member of a group (administered by a designated manager)
to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group. In the case of a dispute, a des-
ignated tracing manager can revoke anonymity by revealing the signer. In many settings
it is desirable to offer flexibility in joining and leaving the group. In static group signa-
tures [BMW03], the group population is fixed once and for all at the setup phase. Partially
dynamic group signatures [BSZ05, KY06] allow the enrolment of members in the group at
any time but members cannot leave once they have joined. A challenging problem in group
signatures is that of revocation, i.e. allowing removal of members from the group.
Shortcomings in Existing Models. While the security of the static and partially dynamic
group settings has been rigorously formulated [BMW03, BSZ05, KY06, SSE+12] and is
now well understood, unfortunately, the security of their fully dynamic groups counterpart,
which is more relevant to practice, has received less attention and is still lacking. In partic-
ular, the different design paradigms assume different (sometimes informal) models which
do not necessarily generalise to other design approaches. This resulted in various models,
the majority of which lack rigour. As a consequence, it can be difficult to compare the
merits of the different constructions in terms of their security guarantees. Moreover, exist-
ing models place a large amount of trust in the different authorities and assume that their
keys are generated honestly. This does not necessarily reflect scenarios arising in real ap-
plications. Furthermore, some existing models, as we show, fail to take into account some
attacks which might be problematic for some applications of the primitive.
7.1.1 Motivation
“He Who Controls the Present Controls the Past”, (George Orwell). Consider a scenario
where the new leadership of an organisation or country wants to justify an unpopular policy
(e.g. layoffs or removal of personal freedoms). A way to do that would be to back-date
documents justifying the policy: thus, any animosity for the policy would be towards the
old leadership. The new leadership is only maintaining the status quo.
Re-framing this in technical terms, we show that the notion of traceability in exist-
ing models following the revocation list approach, where the group manager periodically
publishes information (i.e. revocation lists) about members excluded from the group, is too
weak. In those models, the life of the scheme spans over different intervals (epochs) at
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the start of which the manager updates the revocation lists. Signatures in those models are
bound to a specific epoch. It is vital for functionality that old valid signatures (i.e. those
produced at earlier epochs by then-legitimate members) are accepted by the verification
algorithm.
The issue we identify in those models is that they allow members who joined at recent
epochs to sign messages w.r.t earlier epochs during which they were not members of the
group. In a sense this may be considered as an attack against traceability, as those members
were not in the group at that interval. Technically however, the scenario we describe is
allowed by the model: the underlying issue is a gap between one’s interpretation of group
signatures and what the definition implies. Our expectation is that a signature bound to
epoch τ was produced by a member of the group at that time. Current definitions however,
allow for all past, current, and future members, as long as they were not revoked at time τ .
One may dismiss this attack as theoretical, since the old leadership might appeal to
the opener. However, this might not always be possible: the opener may be controlled by
the new leadership, or in a business setting an outgoing CEO or board member might be
disinterested or disincentivised from pursuing the issue. Another possible criticism might
be that the weakness is trivial, and would be silently fixed in any construction using the
model.
We show that some state of the art constructions, as [NFHF09, LPY12b, LPY12a], are
susceptible to this attack. Specifically, their membership certificates are not bound to the
epochs of their issuance. As a result, a member can sign w.r.t. earlier epochs. We stress that
neither the authors of those schemes claimed their schemes were immune against such an
issue nor that their models were supposed to capture such an attack. Thus, such an issue
might not be a problem for the applications they originally had in mind, but only in a more
general case.
In order to have strong security guarantees from the different constructions, a rigorous
and unified security model is necessary. This is the aim of this work as we believe this
is a challenging problem that needs to be addressed, especially given the relevance of the
primitive.
7.1.2 Contributions
We take a close look at the security definitions of fully dynamic group signatures. We
provide a rigorous security model that generalises to the different design paradigms. In
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particular, our model covers both accumulator based and revocation list based approaches.
Our model offers stringent security definitions and takes into account some attacks which
were not considered by existing models. We give different flavors of our security definitions
which capture both cases when the authorities’ keys are adversarially generated and when
such keys are honestly generated. We also show that our security definitions imply existing
definitions for static and partially dynamic group signatures.
In the process, we identify a subtle difference between accumulator based and revo-
cation list based approaches. Specifically, we identify a simple attack against traceability
inherent to constructions following the latter approach and which is not captured by existing
models. The attack allows a group member to sign w.r.t. intervals prior to her joining the
group. The security notion modelled by current definitions prevents users from signing only
if they are explicitly revoked.
To address this, our traceability definition models a stricter security notion: users are
not authorised to sign unless they are non-revoked and are active (i.e. part of the group)
at the time interval associated with the signature. We note this is already implied in the
accumulator based approach: the signer proves membership in the current version of the
group at the time of signing. We also propose a number of possible fixes to this issue in
some existing schemes.
Finally, we show that a fully dynamic group signature scheme obtained from the
generic construction of accountable ring signatures given in Sect. 6.3 is secure w.r.t. the
stronger variant of our security definitions.
Outline. We present our model for fully dynamic group signatures in Section 7.2 and show
that it implies existing definitions for static and partially dynamic group signatures. In
Section 7.4 we analyse the security of three existing fully dynamic group signature schemes
in our model.
7.2 Syntax and Security of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
The parties involved in a Fully Dynamic Group Signature (FDGS) are: a group manager
GM who authorises who can join the group; a tracing manager TM who can revoke
anonymity by opening signatures; a set of users, each with a unique identity i ∈ N, who
are potential group members. Users can join/leave the group at any time at the discretion of
the group manager. We assume the group manager will regularly publish some information
infoτ , associated with a distinct index τ (hereafter referred to as epoch). We assume that
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τ can be recovered given infoτ and vice versa (i.e. there is bijection between the epochs
and associated information). The information depicts changes to the group, for instance,
it could include the current members of the group (as in accumulator-based constructions)
or those who have been excluded from the group (as, e.g. required by constructions based
on revocation lists ). As in existing models, we assume that anyone can verify the well-
formedness and authenticity of the published group information. By combining the group
information for the current epoch with that of the preceding one, any party can identify the
list of members who have been revoked at the current epoch. We assume that the epochs
preserve the order in which their corresponding information was published. More precisely,
for all τ1,τ2 ∈ T (T being the space of epochs) we require that τ1 < τ2 if infoτ1 preceded
infoτ2 .
Unlike existing models, which assume honestly generated authorities’ keys, we sepa-
rate the generation of the authorities’ keys from that of the public parameters, which might
need to be generated by a trusted party. This allows us (where appropriate) to define strin-
gent security that protects against adversarial authorities who might generate their keys
maliciously. Our definitions can be adapted straight away to work for the weaker setting
where authorities’ keys are generated honestly as in existing models. For the sake of gener-
ality, we define the group key generation as a joint protocol between the group and tracing
managers. Clearly, it is desirable in some cases to avoid such interaction and allow authori-
ties to generate their own keys independently. This is a special case of our general definition
where the protocol is regarded as two one-sided protocols.
An FDGS scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:
• GSetup(1λ )→ crs: is run by a trusted third party. On input a security parameter λ ,
it outputs public parameters crs. The algorithm also initialises the registration table
reg.
• 〈GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)〉: is an interactive protocol between algorithms
GKGenGM and GKGenTM run by GM and TM, respectively, to generate their re-
spective private keys as well as the rest of the group public key gpk. The input to both
algorithms is the public parameters crs. If completed successfully, the private output
of GKGenGM is a secret manager key msk, whereas its public output is a public key
mpk, and the initial group information info. The private output of GKGenTM is the
secret tracing key tsk, whereas its public output is a public key tpk. The group public
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key is then set to gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
• UKGen(1λ )→ (usk[i],upk[i]): outputs a secret/public key pair (usk[i], upk[i]) for
user i. We assume the public key table upk to be publicly available (possibly via
PKI) so that anyone can get authentic copies of it.
• 〈Join(infoτcurrent ,gpk, i,usk[i]), Issue(infoτcurrent ,msk, i,upk[i])〉: is an interactive proto-
col between a user i (who has already obtained a personal key pair, i.e. ran the UKGen
algorithm) and the group manager GM. Upon successful completion, i becomes a
member of the group. The final state of the Issue algorithm is stored in the registra-
tion table at index i (i.e. reg[i]), whereas that of the Join algorithm is stored in gsk[i].
The epoch τcurrent is part of the output of both parties.
We assume that the protocol takes place over a secure (i.e. private and authentic)
channel. The protocol is initiated by calling Join. The manager may update the group
information after running this protocol. The registration table reg stores additional
information used by the group manager and the tracing manager for updating and
tracing, depending on the scheme specifics.
• UpdateGroup(gpk,msk, infoτcurrent ,S, reg)→ infoτnew : is run by the group manager
to update the group information while also advancing the epoch. It takes as input
the group manager’s secret key msk, a (possibly empty) set S of active members
to be removed from the group and the registration table reg, it outputs a new group
information infoτnew and might also update the registration table reg. If there has been
no changes to the group information, the algorithm returns ⊥ to indicate that no new
information has been issued. The algorithm aborts if any i ∈ S has not run the join
protocol.
• Sign(gpk,gsk[i], infoτ ,m)→ Σ: on input the group public key gpk, a user’s group
signing key gsk[i], the group information infoτ at epoch τ , and a message m, outputs
a group signature Σ on m by the group member i. If the user owning gsk[i] is not an
active member of the group at epoch τ , the algorithm returns ⊥.
• Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ)→ 1/0: is a deterministic algorithm checking whether Σ is a
valid group signature on m at epoch τ and outputs a bit accordingly.
• Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ)→ (i,piTrace): is a deterministic algorithm which is run
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by the tracing manager. It returns an identity i> 0 of the group member who produced
Σ plus a proof piTrace attesting to this fact. If the algorithm is unable to trace the
signature to a particular group member, it returns (0,piTrace) to indicate that it could
not attribute the signature.
• Judge(gpk, i, infoτ ,piTrace,upk[i],m,Σ)→ 1/0 : is a deterministic algorithm which on
input the group public key gpk, a user identity i, the group information at epoch τ , a
tracing proof piTrace, the user’s public key upk[i] (which is ⊥ if it does not exist), a
message m, and a signature Σ, outputs 1 if piTrace is a valid proof that i produced Σ,
and outputs 0 otherwise.
ADDITIONAL ALGORITHM. We will also use the following polynomial-time algorithm
which is only used in the security games to ease composition.
IsActive(infoτ , reg, i)→ 1/0 : returns 1 if the user i is an active member of the group at
epoch τ and 0 otherwise.
7.2.1 Security of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
The security requirements of a fully dynamic group signature are: correctness, anonymi-
ty, non-frameability, traceability and tracing soundness. To define those requirements, we
use a set of games in which the adversary has access to a set of oracles. The following
global lists are maintained: HUL is a list of honest users; CUL is a list of corrupt users
whose personal secret keys have been chosen by the adversary; BUL is a list of bad users
whose personal and group signing keys have been revealed to the adversary; SL is a list of
signatures obtained from the Sign oracle; CL is a list of challenge signatures obtained from
the challenge oracle.
The details of the following oracles are given in Fig. 7.1.
UToM(i) adds an honest user i to the group at the current epoch.
CI(i,pk) creates a new corrupt user whose public key upk[i] is chosen by the adversary.
This is called in preparation for calling the SndToM oracle.
SndToM(i,Min) used to engage in the Join-Issue protocol with the honest, Issue-executing
group manager.
SndToU(i,Min) used to engage in the Join-Issue protocol with an honest, Join-executing
user i on behalf of the corrupt group manager.
7.2. Syntax and Security of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures 143
UToM(i)
 If i ∈ HUL∪CUL Then Return ⊥.
 (usk[i],upk[i])← UKGen(1λ ).
 HUL := HUL∪{i}, gsk[i] :=⊥,deciIssue := cont.
 stiJoin := (τcurrent,gpk, i,usk[i]).
 stiIssue := (τcurrent,msk, i,upk[i]).
 (stiJoin,MIssue,deciJoin)← Join(stiJoin,⊥).
 While (deciIssue = cont and deciJoin = cont) Do
◦ (stiIssue,MJoin,deciIssue)← Issue(stiIssue,MIssue).
◦ (stiJoin,MIssue,deciJoin)← Join(stiJoin,MJoin).
 If deciIssue = accept Then reg[i] := stiIssue.
 If deciJoin = accept Then gsk[i] := stiJoin.
 Return upk[i].
SndToU(i,Min)
 If i ∈ CUL∪BUL Then Return ⊥.
 If i /∈ HUL Then
◦ HUL := HUL∪{i}.
◦ (usk[i],upk[i])← UKGen(1λ ).
◦ gsk[i] :=⊥, Min :=⊥.
 If deciJoin 6= cont Then Return ⊥.
 If stiJoin is undefined
◦ stiJoin := (τcurrent,gpk, i,usk[i]).
 (stiJoin,Mout,deciJoin)← Join(stiJoin,Min)
 If deciJoin = accept Then gsk[i] := stiJoin.
 Return (Mout,deciJoin).
Trace(m,Σ, infoτ)
 Return (⊥,⊥) if Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0.
 Return (⊥,⊥) if (m,Σ,τ) ∈ CL.
 Return Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ).
ReadReg(i)
 Return reg[i].
Reveal(i)
 Return ⊥ if i /∈ HUL\ (CUL∪BUL).
 BUL := BUL∪{i}.
 Return (usk[i],gsk[i]).
CI(i,pk)
 Return ⊥ if i ∈ HUL∪CUL.
 CUL := CUL∪{i}.
 upk[i] := pk, deciIssue := cont.
 Return accept.
SndToM(i,Min)
 Return ⊥ if i 6∈ CUL.
 Return ⊥ if deciIssue 6= cont.
 stiIssue := (τcurrent,msk, i,upk[i]).
 (stiIssue,Mout,deciIssue)← Issue(stiIssue,Min).
 If deciIssue = accept Then reg[i] := stiIssue.
 Return (Mout,deciIssue).
Sign(i,m,τ)
 Return ⊥ if i /∈ HUL or gsk[i] =⊥ or infoτ =⊥.
 Return ⊥ if IsActive(infoτ , reg, i) = 0.
 Σ← Sign(gpk,gsk[i], infoτ ,m).
 SL := SL∪{(i,m,Σ,τ)}.
 Return Σ.
Chalb(infoτ , i0, i1,m)
 Return ⊥ if i0 /∈ HUL or i1 /∈ HUL.
 Return ⊥ if ∃b ∈ {0,1} s.t. gsk[ib] =⊥.
 Return ⊥ if ∃b ∈ {0,1} s.t. IsActive(infoτ , reg, ib) = 0.
 Σ← Sign(gpk,gsk[ib], infoτ ,m).
 CL := CL∪{(m,Σ,τ)}.
 Return Σ.
ModifyReg(i,val)
 reg[i] := val.
UpdateGroup(S)
 Return UpdateGroup(gpk,msk, infoτcurrent ,S, reg).
Figure 7.1: Details of the oracles used in the security games
ReadReg(i) returns the registration information reg[i] of user i.
ModifyReg(i,val) modifies the entry reg[i], setting reg[i] := val. For brevity we will assume
ModifyReg also provides the functionality of ReadReg.
Reveal(i) returns the personal secret key usk[i] and group signing key gsk[i] of group mem-
ber i.
Sign(i,m,τ) returns a signature on the message m by the group member i for epoch τ as-
suming the corresponding group information infoτ is defined.
Chalb(infoτ , i0, i1,m) is a left-right oracle for defining anonymity. The adversary chooses
an epoch τ , the group information infoτ , two identities (i0, i1), and a message m and
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receives a group signature by member ib for b← {0,1} for the chosen epoch. It is
required that both challenge users are active members at epoch τ . The adversary can
only call this oracle once.
Trace(m,Σ, infoτ) returns the identity of the signer of the signature Σ on m w.r.t. infoτ if the
signature was not obtained from the Chalb oracle.
UpdateGroup(S) allows the adversary to update the group. S here is the set of the active
members to be removed from the group.
The following security requirements are defined by the games in Fig. 7.2.
Correctness. This requirement guarantees that signatures produced by honest, non-revoked
users are accepted by the Verify algorithm and that the honest tracing manager can identify
the signer of such signatures. In addition, the Judge algorithm accepts the tracing manager’s
decision.
Formally, an FDGS scheme is (perfectly) correct if for all λ ∈ N, the advantage
AdvCorrFDGS,A(λ ) := Pr[Exp
Corr
FDGS,A(λ ) = 1]
is negligible (in λ ) for all adversaries A.
Note that the above definition of (perfect) correctness protects against even unbounded
adversaries. If computational correctness suffices, i.e. when we consider correctness only
against computationally-bounded adversaries, we can drop the last three lines from the cor-
rectness game in Fig. 7.2. Computational correctness of the Trace and Judge algorithms is
implied by the other requirements.
(Full) Anonymity. This requires that signatures do not reveal the identity of the group
member who produced them. In the game, the adversary, A, can corrupt any user and fully
corrupt the group manager by choosing her key. We require that both challenge users are
active members of the group at the chosen epoch. Also, note that a Trace query on the
challenge signature will fail.
As A can learn the personal secret and group signing keys of any user, including the
challenge users, our definition captures full key exposure attacks.
The adversary chooses an epoch, the group information for that epoch, a message and
two group members and gets a signature by either member and wins if she correctly guesses
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Experiment: ExpCorrFDGS,A(λ )
− crs← GSetup(1λ ); HUL := /0.
−
(
(msk,mpk, info),(tsk, tpk)
)
← ⟪GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)⟫.
− gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
i,m,τ
)
←AUToM,ReadReg,UpdateGroup
(
gpk, info
)
.
− If i /∈ HUL or gsk[i] =⊥ or infoτ =⊥ or IsActive(infoτ , reg, i) = 0 Then Return 0.
− Σ← Sign(gpk,gsk[i], infoτ ,m).
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 1.
− (i∗,piTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ).
− If i 6= i∗ Then Return 1.
− If Judge(gpk, i, infoτ ,piTrace,upk[i],m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 1, Else Return 0.
Experiment: ExpAnon-bFDGS,A(λ )
− crs← GSetup(1λ );HUL,CUL,BUL,SL,CL := /0.
−
(
stinit,msk,mpk, info
)
←A〈·,GKGenTM(crs)〉(init : crs).
− Return 0 if GKGenTM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
− Parse the output of GKGenTM as (tsk, tpk) and set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
− b∗←AUToM,CI,SndToU,Reveal,Trace,ModifyReg,Chalb
(
play : stinit,gpk
)
.
− Return b∗.
Experiment: ExpNon-FrameFDGS,A (λ )
− crs← GSetup(1λ );HUL,CUL,BUL,SL := /0.
− (stinit, info,msk,mpk, tsk, tpk)←A(init : crs).
− Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed otherwise set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
m,Σ, i,piTrace, infoτ
)
←ACI,SndToU,Reveal,Sign,ModifyReg
(
play : stinit,gpk
)
.
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 0.
− If Judge(gpk, i, infoτ ,piTrace,upk[i],m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 0.
− If i /∈ HUL\BUL or (i,m,Σ,τ) ∈ SL Then Return 0 Else Return 1.
Experiment: ExpTraceFDGS,A(λ )
− crs← GSetup(1λ );HUL,CUL,BUL,SL := /0.
−
(
stinit, tsk, tpk
)
←A〈GKGenGM(crs),·〉(init : crs).
− Return 0 if GKGenGM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
− Parse the output of GKGenGM as (msk,mpk, info). Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
m,Σ,τ
)
←AUToM,CI,SndToM,Reveal,Sign,ReadReg,UpdateGroup
(
play : stinit,gpk, info
)
.
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 0.
− (i,piTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ).
− If IsActive(infoτ , reg, i) = 0 Then Return 1.
− If i = 0 or Judge(gpk, i, infoτ ,piTrace,upk[i],m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 1 Else Return 0.
Experiment: ExpTrace-SoundFDGS,A (λ )
− crs← GSetup(1λ ); CUL := /0.
− (stinit, info,msk,mpk, tsk, tpk)←A(init : crs).
− Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed otherwise set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
m,Σ,{ii,piTracei}2i=1, infoτ
)
←ACI,ModifyReg
(
play : stinit,gpk
)
.
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 0.
− If i1 = i2 or i1 =⊥ or i2 =⊥ Then Return 0.
− If ∃i ∈ {1,2} s.t. Judge(gpk, ii, infoτ ,piTracei ,upk[ii],m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 0.
− Return 1.
Figure 7.2: Security games for fully dynamic group signatures
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the member. Without loss in generality, we allow the adversary a single call to the challenge
oracle. A hybrid argument (similar to that used in [BSZ05]) can be used to prove that this
is sufficient.
Formally, an FDGS scheme is (fully) anonymous if for all λ ∈ N, the advantage
AdvAnonFDGS,A(λ ) is negligible (in λ ) for all PPT adversaries A, where
AdvAnonFDGS,A(λ ) :=
∣∣Pr[ExpAnon-0FDGS,A(λ ) = 1]−Pr[ExpAnon-1FDGS,A(λ ) = 1]∣∣ .
Non-Frameability. This ensures that even if the rest of the group as well as the tracing and
group managers are fully corrupt, they cannot produce a signature that can be attributed to
an honest member who did not produce it.
In the game, the adversary can fully corrupt both the group and tracing managers.
She even chooses the keys of both managers. Thus, our definition is stronger than existing
models. We just require that the framed member is honest.
Formally, an FDGS scheme is non-frameable if for all λ ∈ N, the advantage
AdvNon-FrameFDGS,A (λ ) := Pr[Exp
Non-Frame
FDGS,A (λ ) = 1]
is negligible (in λ ) for all PPT adversaries A.
Remark 1. In the game variant we give in Fig. 7.2, we allow the adversary to generate the
tracing manager’s key herself. While, as we show later, there are schemes which satisfy this
strong variant of the definition, such definition might be too strong to be satisfied by some
existing schemes. A weaker variant of the definition is where the tracing key is generated
by the challenger rather than the adversary. This requires replacing lines 2-4 in the game
in Fig. 7.2 by the following:
− (stinit, info,msk,mpk)←A〈·,GKGenTM(crs)〉(init : crs).
− Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed or GKGenTM did not accept.
− Let (tsk, tpk) be the output of GKGenTM. Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
m,Σ, i,piTrace, infoτ
)
←ACI,SndToU,Reveal,Sign,ModifyReg
(
play : stinit,gpk, tsk
)
.
Traceability. This ensures that the adversary cannot produce a signature that cannot be
traced to an active member of the group at the chosen epoch. In the game, the adversary can
corrupt any user and even chooses the tracing key of the tracing manager. The adversary
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is not given the group manager’s secret key as this would allow her to create dummy users
which are thus untraceable. Note that unlike [LPY12b, LPY12a, NFHF09], our definition
captures that a member of the group should not be able to sign w.r.t. epochs prior to her
joining the group since we do not restrict the adversary’s forgery to be w.r.t. to the current
epoch (i.e. the current version of the group information). The adversary wins if she produces
a signature whose signer cannot be identified or is an inactive member at the chosen epoch.
The adversary also wins if the Judge algorithm does not accept the tracing decision on the
forgery.
Formally, an FDGS scheme is traceable if for all λ ∈ N, the advantage
AdvTraceFDGS,A(λ ) := Pr[Exp
Trace
FDGS,A(λ ) = 1]
is negligible (in λ ) for all PPT adversaries A.
Remark 2. To get an honestly-generated tracing key variant of the game in Fig. 7.2, we
replace lines 2-5 in the game in Fig. 7.2 by the following lines:
−
(
(msk,mpk, info),(tsk, tpk)
)
← ⟪GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)⟫.
− Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
m,Σ,τ
)
←AUToM,CI,SndToM,Reveal,Sign,ModifyReg,UpdateGroup
(
play : stinit,gpk, info, tsk
)
.
Tracing Soundness. As recently defined by [SSE+12] in the context of partially dynamic
group signatures, this requirement ensures that even if both the group and the tracing man-
agers as well as all members of the group collude, they cannot produce a valid signature
that traces to two different members (this is a different, stronger setting than in the Trace-
ability property above). Such a requirement is vital for many applications. For example,
applications where signers get rewarded or where we need to stop abusers shifting blame to
others.
In the definition, the adversary can fully corrupt all parties involved and wins if she
produces a valid signature and valid tracing proofs that the signature traces to different
(possibly corrupt) users. We may also consider a stronger variant where the adversary wins
by producing a signature that traces to different epochs.
Formally, an FDGS scheme has tracing soundness if for all λ ∈ N,
AdvTrace-SoundFDGS,A (λ ) := Pr[Exp
Trace-Sound
FDGS,A (λ ) = 1]
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is negligible (in λ ) for all PPT adversaries A.
Remark 3. To get an honestly-generated tracing key variant of the game in Fig. 7.2, we
replace lines 2-4 in the game in Fig. 7.2 by the following lines:
−
(
stinit,msk,mpk, info
)
←A〈·,GKGenTM(crs)〉(init : crs).
− Return 0 if GKGenTM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
− Parse the output of GKGenTM as (tsk, tpk) and set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
−
(
m,Σ,{ii,piTracei}2i=1, infoτ
)
←ACI,ModifyReg
(
play : stinit,gpk, tsk
)
.
7.2.2 Comparison with Existing Models
Models used by accumulator-based constructions, e.g. [BS01,CL02,TX03,AST01,Ngu05,
NFHF09], the vast majority of which are stated informally, are specific to that particular
design paradigm and do not generalise to other construction approaches. Moreover, most
of them do not take into account some of the attacks that arise in a more formal setting. For
instance, some models only protect against partially but not fully corrupt tracing managers
and do not capture the tracing soundness requirement. On the other hand, models used
by other design approaches, e.g. [NFHF09, LPY12b, LPY12a] are also specific to those
approaches and have their own shortcomings. For instance, as discussed earlier, the models
used by the state-of-the-art constructions by Libert et al. [LPY12b,LPY12a] and Nakanishi
et al. [NFHF09] do not prevent a group member from being able to sign w.r.t. time intervals
before she joined the group. This is an attack that can be problematic in some applications
of the primitive. In the traceability game used in [NFHF09] as well as the misidentification
game used in [LPY12b, LPY12a], the adversary is required to output a signature that is
valid w.r.t. the current interval (epoch) and therefore the definitions do not capture the attack
we highlight. We stress that the authors of the concerned models never claimed that their
models cover such an attack as it might not be a problem for their intended applications.
The traceability issue we shed light on does not apply to accumulator based models.
In these settings, when the group changes, an update is published containing a list of the
currently active group members and most constructions work by having the signer prove
membership in such a list. Therefore, even if a malicious member tries to sign w.r.t. an
earlier version of the group information, she still has to prove she is a member of the group
at the concerned interval.
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−
(
m,Σ, infoτ
)
←ACI,SndToU,Reveal,Sign,ModifyReg
(
play : stinit,gpk
)
.
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 Then Return 0.
− (i,piTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,σ)
− If i /∈ HUL\BUL or (i,m,Σ,τ) ∈ SL Then Return 0 Else Return 1.
Figure 7.3: Modified non-frameability game.
In addition [NFHF09,LPY12b,LPY12a] only consider a partially but not fully corrupt
tracing manager in the non-frameability game. Moreover, they do not capture the require-
ment that a signature should only trace to one member (i.e. tracing soundness). The latter is
vital for many applications of the primitive.
Another distinction from existing models is that our model allows maliciously gen-
erated authorities’ keys when applicable. Therefore, it offers more stringent security than
existing models which rely on such keys being generated honestly.
7.3 Recovering Other Models
We give security reductions which relate our model to other well-known models for group
signatures. All these models assume honest key generation, for both group and tracing
managers, which is a special case of our model. We consider three models. First, the model
for static group signatures given in [BMW03]. We then consider two models for partially
dynamic groups from [BSZ05] and [KY06].
7.3.1 Static Group Signatures [BMW03]
We note that we can recover static group signatures [BMW03] from our group signatures.
We fix the group manager as the designated opener and include tsk in the group master
secret key. In the setup, group members generate their key pairs and interact with the group
manager to join the group. Their Open algorithm does not output proofs, as their model
does not use a Judge algorithm, so we define a variant of our non-frameability game from
Fig. 7.2 where we replace the last 4 lines in the game in Fig. 7.2 by the ones in Fig. 7.3.
This gives a sensible and compatible definition which allows us to recover the model
from the fully dynamic scheme.
Static group signatures are just fully dynamic group signatures with no joining, issuing,
or group updates. Correctness follows trivially from the correctness of the fully dynamic
group signature scheme. [BMW03]-full-anonymity follows from (full) anonymity of the
fully dynamic group signature scheme, while [BMW03]-full-traceability follows from our
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traceability and non-frameability requirements. We now give an explicit construction and
security reductions which show how our model relates to [BMW03].
GSGKg(1λ ,1n)→ (GSgpk,GSgmsk,GSgsk)
 crs← GSetup(1λ ).

(
(msk,mpk, info),(tsk, tpk)
)
← ⟪GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)⟫.
 Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
 For each user:
◦ Run (usk[i],upk[i])← UKGen(1λ ).
◦ Run 〈Join(info,gpk, i,usk[i]), Issue(info,msk, i,upk[i])〉.
 Set GSgmsk := (gpk, tsk, info, reg), GSgpk := (gpk, info)
 Set GSgsk[i] := (gpk,gsk[i], info).
GSGSig(GSgsk[i],m)→ σ
 Parse GSgpk as (gpk, info) and GSgsk[i] as (gpk,gsk[i], info).
 Return Sign(gpk,gsk[i], info,m).
GSGV f (GSgpk,m,σ)→ 0/1
 Parse GSgpk as (gpk, info).
 Return Verify(gpk, info,m,σ).
GSOpen(GSgmsk,m,σ)→{i}∪{⊥}
 Parse GSgpk as (gpk, info) and GSgmsk as (gpk, tsk, info, reg).
 Run (i,piTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,σ).
 Return i.
Figure 7.4: Static group signatures [BMW03] from our group signatures
Theorem 10. The construction of Fig. 7.4 is a secure static group signature scheme in the
sense of [BMW03], if GS is correct, anonymous, non-frameable (in the Fig. 7.3 variant),
traceable and tracing-sound.
Proof. Correctness is straightforward to verify. Next we prove full-anonymity. Suppose that
there exists an efficient adversary B who successfully breaks the [BMW03]-full-anonymity
of the static group signature scheme with probability that is not negligible, with respect to a
particular group of users. We construct an efficient adversary A for the (full) anonymity of
the fully dynamic group signature scheme. While initializing the fully dynamic scheme, A
behaves honestly, so that all parameters are honestly generated. Next, A adds users to the
scheme using the UToM oracle to create the group of users for B, and learns their signing
keys using the Reveal oracle. Now, A is able to start B on input (GSgpk,GSgsk). A can
answer B’s Open queries using her Trace oracle. When B outputs his challenge (i0, i1,m),
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A calls Chalb(info, i0, i1,m) and gets a challenge signature σ∗ which she forwards to B as
the challenge signature. Again, using the Trace oracle, A can answer B’s Open queries
as long as they do not involve the challenge signature σ∗. Eventually, when B outputs his
guess b∗, A returns b∗ in her game. Clearly, if B wins his game, A also wins her game with
the same probability. Therefore, the (full) anonymity of the full dynamic scheme implies
full-anonymity of the static scheme.
Finally, we turn our attention to full-traceability. Suppose that there exists an ef-
ficient adversary B who successfully breaks the [BMW03]-full-traceability of the static
group signature scheme w.r.t. a particular group of users with non-negligible probability.
Using B which produces with non-negligible probability (m,σ) which cannot be opened
in the [BMW03]-full-traceability game, we construct an efficient adversary A1 against the
traceability of the fully dynamic group signature scheme. Adversary A1 behaves honestly
while initializing the fully dynamic scheme, so that all parameters are honestly generated.
As part of the initialization, A1 generates the tracing key tsk for the fully dynamic scheme,
so she knows GSgmsk. Next, A1 adds users to the scheme using the UToM oracle to create
the group of users for B. Now, A1 starts B on input (GSgmsk,GSgpk). Adversary A1 an-
swers signature queries from B using her own Sign oracle if the user requested by B has not
been already corrupted. If the secret key of the user in question has already been revealed
to B, A1 uses the user’s secret signing key to answer signing queries w.r.t. that user. A1 is
also able to answer B’s corrupt queries using her Reveal oracle. When B outputs (m,σ),
the probability that σ cannot be opened is non-negligible, so A1 can use these to output
(m,σ ,τ) to break the traceability of the fully dynamic scheme.
Therefore, if traceability holds, we conclude that when B produces (m,σ) and
successfully breaks full-traceability, we have with overwhelming probability that
Open(gmsk,m,σ) = i for some i. This will allow us to construct an efficient adversary
A2 against the non-frameability of the fully dynamic group signature scheme. Similarly to
A1, adversary A2 behaves honestly while initializing the fully dynamic scheme, so that all
parameters are honestly generated. As part of the initialization, A2 gets the tracing man-
ager’s key tsk for the fully dynamic scheme, so she knows GSgmsk. Note that unlikeA1,A2
additionally has the full dynamic group signature group manager’s secret key msk. A2 can
add users to the group using her SndToU oracle. Now,A2 starts B on input (GSgmsk,GSgpk).
A2 answers B’s sign queries using her own Sign oracle if the user in question is honest or
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directly if she knows the secret key of the user. Also, she can reveal the user’s secret key
requested by B using her Reveal oracle. Now, when B breaks full-traceability, he outputs
(m,σ) such that Open(gmsk,m,σ) = i for some i, with overwhelming probability. It fol-
lows that (m,σ) is a valid signature, and that B did not request a signature for m from user i,
nor did B request the signing key of i. Therefore, A2 can use (m,σ) to break the variant of
non-frameability (Fig. 7.3) of the fully dynamic group signature scheme, with probability
negligibly different from the success probability of B. This shows that full-traceability of
the static scheme of [BMW03] is implied by the traceability and non-frameability of the
fully dynamic scheme.
7.3.2 Partially Dynamic Group Signatures [BSZ05]
Fully dynamic group signatures also imply the partially dynamic group signatures of
[BSZ05] in the case where nobody is removed from the group. Anonymity, non-
frameability and traceability all follow from our corresponding definitions. Correctness
follows trivially from the correctness of the fully dynamic group signature scheme.
We now give an explicit construction (in Fig. 7.5) and security reductions which show
how our model relates to [BSZ05].
Theorem 11. The construction in Fig. 7.5 is a secure partially dynamic group signature
scheme in the sense of [BSZ05], if GS is correct, anonymous, non-frameable, traceable and
tracing-sound.
Proof. Correctness follows trivially from the correctness of the fully dynamic group signa-
ture scheme.
Next we prove anonymity. Suppose that there exists an efficient adversary B
who successfully breaks the [BSZ05]-anonymity of the partially dynamic group signa-
ture scheme. We construct an efficient adversary A for the anonymity of the fully dy-
namic group signature scheme. While initializing the fully dynamic scheme, A behaves
honestly, so that all parameters are honestly generated, but A knows the group man-
ager’s secret key msk, and thus knows DGSik. Adversary A sets DGSgpk := gpk =
(crs,mpk, tpk, info) and starts B on (DGSgpk,DGSik). Adversary B has access to oracles
Ch,Open,SndToU,WReg,USK,CrptU, which directly correspond to the oracles thatA has
access to, namely Chalb,Trace,SndToU, ModifyReg,Reveal,CrptU. Therefore,A can sim-
ulate all necessary oracles for B. When B calls the challenge oracle Ch on (i0, i1,m), adver-
sary A calls her challenge oracle Chalb on (infoτcurrent , i0, i1,m) where τcurrent is the current
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DGSGKg(1λ )→ (DGSgpk,DGSik,DGSok)
 crs← GSetup(1λ ).

(
(msk,mpk, info),(tsk, tpk)
)
← ⟪GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)⟫.
 Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk, info).
 Set DGSgpk := gpk, DGSik := (gpk,msk) and DGSok := (gpk, tsk).
DGSUKg(1λ )→ (DGSupk[i],DGSusk[i])
 Return UKGen(1λ ).
〈Join, Iss〉
 Run 〈Join(infoτcurrent ,gpk, i,usk[i]), Issue(infoτcurrent ,msk, i,upk[i])〉,
with the issuer modifying reg[i] if accepting, and the Join algorithm
outputting DGSgsk[i] = (gpk,gsk[i], infoτ).
DGSGSig(DGSgpk,DGSgsk[i],m)→ σ
 Parse DGSgpk as gpk and DGSgsk[i] as (gpk,gsk[i], infoτ).
 Σ← Sign(gpk,gsk[i], infoτcurrent ,m).
 Return σ = (Σ,τcurrent).
DGSGV f (DGSgpk,m,σ)→ 0/1
 Parse DGSgpk as gpk and σ as (Σ,τ).
 Return Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ).
DGSOpen(DGSgpk,DGSok,DGSreg,m,σ)→ (i,piTrace)
 Set DGSgpk as gpk, DGSok as (gpk, tsk) and σ as (Σ,τ).
 Return Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ).
DGSJudge(DGSgpk, j,DGSupk[ j],m,σ ,piTrace)→ 0/1
 Parse DGSgpk as gpk and σ as (Σ,τ).
 Return Judge(gpk, j, infoτ ,piTrace,upk[ j],m,Σ).
Figure 7.5: Group signatures [BSZ05] from our group signatures.
epoch. Once A gets back a signature Σ from her oracle, she passes σ = (Σ,τcurrent) to B as
the answer. Whenever B outputs his final bit guess b∗, A returns b∗ as her answer. We have
that A breaks anonymity of the fully dynamic group signature whenever B successfully
breaks anonymity of the partially dynamic scheme. Thus, the former anonymity definition
implies the latter.
Next, we prove traceability. Assume there exists an efficient adversary B who
successfully breaks the [BSZ05]-traceability of the partially dynamic scheme. We
construct an efficient adversary A against the traceability of the fully dynamic group
signature scheme. While initializing the fully dynamic scheme, A behaves hon-
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estly, so that all parameters are honestly generated, but A knows the tracing man-
ager’s secret key tsk, so she knows DGSok. Adversary A sets DGSgpk := gpk =
(crs,mpk, tpk, info) and starts B on (DGSgpk,DGSok). Adversary B has access to ora-
cles SndToI,AddU,RReg,USK,CrptU, which directly correspond to some of the oracles A
has access to, namely SndToM,AddU,ReadReg,Reveal,CrptU. Therefore, A can simulate
all necessary oracles for B. When B outputs (m,σ) where σ = (Σ,τ),A returns (m,Σ,τ) in
her game. Now, whenever B breaks [BSZ05]-traceability, A breaks the traceability of the
fully dynamic scheme. This shows that traceability of fully dynamic schemes implies the
same for partially dynamic schemes, in the sense of [BSZ05].
Finally, we prove non-frameability. Suppose that there exists an efficient ad-
versary B who successfully breaks the [BSZ05]-non-frameability of the partially dy-
namic group signature scheme. We construct an efficient adversary A against the
non-frameability of the fully dynamic group signature scheme. While initializing
the fully dynamic scheme, A behaves honestly, so that all parameters are honestly
generated, but A knows the tracing manager’s secret key tsk and the issuer’s secret
key msk. Therefore, A knows DGSik,DGSok. Adversary A sets DGSgpk := gpk =
(crs,mpk, tpk, info) and starts B on (DGSgpk,DGSok,DGSik). Adversary B has access
to oracles SndToU,WReg,GSig,USK,CrptU, which directly correspond to some of the
oracles that A has access to, namely SndToU,ModifyReg,Sign,Reveal,CrptU. There-
fore, A can simulate all necessary oracles for B. Whenever B outputs (m,σ , i,piTrace)
where σ = (Σ,τ), A returns (m,Σ, i,piTrace, infoτ) in her game. Therefore, whenever B
breaks the non-frameability of the partially dynamic scheme, A succeeds in breaking
the non-frameability of the fully dynamic scheme. This shows that non-frameability of
fully dynamic schemes implies the same for partially dynamic schemes, in the sense
of [BSZ05].
7.3.3 Partially Dynamic Group Signatures [KY06]
Finally, we consider the partially-dynamic model of [KY06]. We fix the group manager
as the designated opener and set (msk, tsk) to be the group master secret key. Our group
info and registration table generalise their public state string. Their Join algorithm runs our
user key-generation and Join/Issue algorithms. The membership certificate is then the user’s
public key along with the group information, and the membership secret is the user’s private
key. Again, their Open algorithm does not output proofs, and the model does not have a
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judge algorithm. Therefore, as in the case of [BMW03] we modify our non-frameability
game from Fig. 7.2 where we replace the last 4 lines in the game in Fig. 7.2 with those in
Fig. 7.3.
Correctness follows trivially from the correctness of the fully dynamic group signa-
ture scheme. Security against misidentification-attacks follows from traceability, security
against framing-attacks follows from non-frameability, and anonymity follows from the
(full) anonymity of the fully dynamic group signature.
We now give an explicit construction (in Fig. 7.6) and security reductions which show
how our model relates to [KY06].
Setup(1λ )→ (Y,S)
 crs← GSetup(1λ ).

(
(msk,mpk, info),(tsk, tpk)
)
← 〈GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)〉.
 Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk).
 Set S := (msk, tsk), Y := (gpk, info).
 Set St := (Stusers,Sttrans) := ( /0, reg).
Join
This is an interactive protocol between a user and the group manager.
 The user runs (usk[i],upk[i])← UKGen(1λ ).
 Both parties run 〈Join(infoτcurrent ,gpk, i,usk[i]), Issue(infoτcurrent ,msk, i,upk[i])〉.
 The user receives private outputi,certi,seci :=i,(upk[i], infoτ),gsk[i]
 Set transcripti := reg[i].
 After a successful execution, the state is updated,
with Stusers := Stusers∪{i} and Sttrans := Sttrans||i, transcripti.
Sign(Y,certi,seci,m)→ σ
 Parse Y as (gpk, info) and seci as gsk[i].
 Σ← Sign(gpk,gsk[i], infoτcurrent ,m).
 Return σ = (Σ,τcurrent).
Verify(Y,m,σ)→>/⊥
 Parse Y as (gpk, info) and σ as (Σ,τ).
 Let b = Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ).
 Return > if b = 1, or ⊥ if b = 0.
Open(m,σ ,Y,S,St)→ i ∈ Stusers∪{⊥}
 Parse Y as (gpk, info), S as (msk, tsk), σ as (Σ,τ), and Sttrans as reg.
 Run (i,piTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ).
 Return i if i ∈ Stusers, or ⊥ if i = 0.
Figure 7.6: Group signatures [KY06] from our group signatures
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Theorem 12. The construction in Fig. 7.6 is is a secure partially dynamic group signature
scheme in the sense of [KY06] if GS is correct, anonymous, non-frameable, traceable and
tracing-sound. .
Proof. We begin by proving correctness. User tagging soundness and join soundness are
both trivial by construction of the Setup and Join algorithms. Signing soundness and
opening soundness both follow trivially from the correctness of the fully dynamic group
signature scheme.
Next we prove security against misidentification-attacks. Suppose that B is an efficient
adversary against the misidentification-attack game of [KY06]. As stated in [KY06], with-
out loss of generality, we may consider an adversary who controls all users in the system,
and wins the misidentification-attack game by providing a signature which fails to open
to any user. We construct an efficient adversary A against the traceability of the fully dy-
namic group signature scheme. While initializing the fully dynamic scheme, A behaves
honestly, so that all parameters are honestly generated, but A knows the tracing key tsk. In
the misidentification-attack game, B has access to oracles Qpub,Qread ,Qopen and Qa− join.
Adversary A can simulate all of those oracles using the information available to her in her
traceability game as well as the oracles she has access to in her game. The oracle Qpub
is easy to simulate. The oracle Qread corresponds directly to ReadReg. The oracle Qopen
can be easily simulated by A, since A possesses the tracing key tsk. Also, Qa− join can be
simulated using CrptU and SndToM. Therefore, A can run B, successfully simulating all
oracles, and when B outputs (m,σ), where σ = (Σ,τ), A outputs (m,Σ,τ) as her answer in
her traceability game. Whenever B succeeds in breaking security against misidentification
attacks, A breaks traceability. Therefore, traceability of the fully dynamic group signature
implies security against misidentification attacks.
Next, we prove security against framing-attacks. Suppose that B is an efficient
adversary against the framing-attack game of [KY06]. We construct an efficient ad-
versary A against the non-frameability of the fully dynamic group signature scheme.
While initializing the fully dynamic scheme, A behaves honestly, so that all parameters
are honestly generated, but A knows msk, tsk. In his game, B has access to oracles
Qpub,Qkey,Qb− join,Qread ,Qwrite,Qsign. Using the information available to her in her game
as well as the oracles she has access to in her non-frameability game, A can simulate all
of B’s oracles. The oracle Qpub is easy to simulate. The oracle Qkey is easy to simulate
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since A knows msk and tsk. The oracle Qb− join directly corresponds to SndToU. Ora-
cle Qread ,Qwrite are easily simulated by A since A possesses msk and has access to the
ModifyReg oracle. Also, A can simulate the Qsign oracle for B using her own Sign ora-
cle. This means that A can run B to obtain (m,σ) where σ = (Σ,τ). Note in [KY06],
users created by Qb− join are honest users whose private keys have not been revealed to B.
Therefore, a user i framed by B will be in HUL\BUL, unless A explicitly calls her Reveal
oracle on i. Given the output (m,σ) produced by B, A outputs (m,Σ, infoτ) as her answer
in her game. Adversary A successfully breaks the non-frameability of the fully dynmic
group signatures whenever B wins in his framing-attack game. Therefore, non-frameability
of our fully dynamic group signatures implies security against framing attacks in the sense
of [KY06].
Finally, we prove anonymity. Suppose B is an efficient adversary against the
anonymity game of [KY06]. We construct an efficient adversary A against the anonymity
of the fully-dynamic group signature scheme. While initializing the fully dynamic scheme,
A behaves honestly, so that all parameters are honestly generated, but A knows msk. In
the anonymity game of [KY06], B has access to oracles Qpub,Qa− join,Qread ,Qopen. The
oracle Qpub is easy to simulate. The oracle Qa− join can be easily simulated using CrptU
and knowledge of msk. Similarly, Qread can be simulated using msk. Lastly, Qopen can be
simulated by A by making use of her own Trace oracle. This means that A can simulate
the anonymity game for B, using Chalb on the current epoch τ to provide B with a chal-
lenge signature σ = (Σ,τ). Now, when B returns a bit b∗, A returns that as her answer in
her game. It is clear that whenever B succeeds in winning the [KY06] anonymity game, A
breaks (full) anonmity of the fully dynamic group signature. Therefore, anonymity of fully
dynamic group signatures implies that of partially dynamic group signatures in the sense
of [KY06].
7.4 On the Security of Some Existing Schemes
Here we take a closer look at some of the existing fully dynamic schemes and investigate
whether or not they are secure using our proposed model.
We show that the state-of-the-art certificate-based schemes in [LPY12b, LPY12a] and
[NFHF09] are all susceptible to an attack against traceability which allows any user to sign
w.r.t. an epoch predating her joining. In our model this directly breaks traceability, as the
signature is w.r.t. an epoch in which the signer was not active. We note that our attack does
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not contradict the original security proofs of the schemes, but instead highlights that our
definition is stronger. We also show that it is easy to repair the schemes at a reasonable cost.
At first glance, our attack is the dual of a well known issue with many revocation
systems. If a user is revoked and anonymity is maintained, the revoked user is able to
produce back-dated signatures that still verify. The difference here is that while the revoked
user was authorised to be part of the group for the epoch in question, in our attack the
signing user was in fact not authorised to sign for the group. If the adversary is able to
block the opening of this signature (e.g. via legal action), its existence would implicitly
frame the group’s past membershipas the signature would be attributed to them.
7.4.1 Libert et al. Schemes [LPY12b, LPY12a]
In [LPY12a], users are assigned leaves of a complete binary tree and given a membership
certificate containing a unique tag identifying the user, and a commitment to the path from
the root to the user’s leaf in the tree. Note that the certificate is not bound to the epoch at
which the user joined the group. In fact, users joining does not change infoτ or the epoch τ
itself.
Revocation is based on the subset difference method [NNL01], using disjoint sets Ski,ui
for i = 1, . . . ,m which cover non-revoked users. Sets are represented by two nodes, a node
ki and one of its descendants node ui, and cover all leaves of the sub-tree rooted at node ki
which are not leaves of the sub-tree rooted at ui. Revocations trigger epoch changes with
infoτ updated with a new cover.
To sign, the group member anonymously proves that she holds a membership cer-
tificate, and that the node indicated by the certificate belongs to one of those sets. More
precisely, the user proves that her leaf is a descendant of node ki but not a descendant of
node ui for some i ∈ [m].
Since user certificates are not bound to epochs and leaves are covered until their cor-
responding users are revoked, it is simple to break traceability: a user can join and then
produce a signature for an epoch that predates her joining. A similar argument also applies
to the variant of the scheme given in [LPY12b].
Theorem 13. The fully dynamic scheme of Libert et al. [LPY12a] does not satisfy our
traceability definition even w.r.t. honestly generated tracing manager’s keys.
Proof. Consider the following strategy in the traceability experiment: the adversary asks to
join as a user i1 at epoch τ1. User i1 gets assigned the leaf l1. Then at a later epoch, τ2, the
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adversary asks to join as a second user i2. Finally, the adversary signs using the credentials
of i2 but for epoch τ1.
We can check by inspection that all subproofs in the back-dated signature go through.
The crucial observation is that at epoch τ1, the leaf l2 is not revoked and thus must be
covered by one of the Ski,ui sets. As the proof verifies and i2 used a legitimate certificate,
opening the signature will be successful and indicate i2 as the signer. The adversary wins,
as i2 was not active at epoch τ1.
A possible countermeasure against the above attack is to regard unassigned leaves
as revoked until they are assigned. This is simple to do as the scheme does not bound the
number of revoked users. We do however need to re-examine the number of subsets required
to express this, as the 2|R|−1 bound for |R| revoked users may now seem impractical. If
we assume leaves are allocated sequentially to users, we can bound the number of subsets
by 2|R1|+ log(|N \R2|) where R2 is the set of leaves pending allocation and R1 is the
set of leaves allocated to users who were later revoked. Thus, our fix is only marginally
more expensive than the base system and much more efficient than a naive analysis would
indicate.
If proving set membership/intervals can be done efficiently (and depending on how the
epoch counter is implemented), another possible fix is to bind membership certificates to
the join epoch and then get the signer to prove that their join epoch is not later than the
signing epoch.
7.4.2 Nakanishi et al. Scheme [NFHF09]
The scheme of Nakanishi et al. [NFHF09] is another certificate-based scheme in the random
oracle model. It achieves constant time for both signing and signature verification, relative
to the size of the group and the number of revoked users.
A user’s group membership certificate consists of a signature on (x, ID) produced by
the group manager, where x is a secret owned by the user and ID is a unique integer the
manager assigned to her. The group manager can revoke users by issuing revocation lists
infoτ . Each list consists of a sequence of open integer intervals (Ri,Ri+1) signed by the
manager, whose endpoints are all the revoked ID’s. At each epoch τ , a signer fetches the
current infoτ and proves, as part of the signature, that her ID is contained in one interval of
the revocation list. If the ID lies between two revoked users’ identities, it means it is not an
endpoint and so she has not been revoked.
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As in other certificate-based constructions, verifiers only know of revoked members,
not active ones and, similarly to [LPY12a], the time of joining is not taken into account. This
allows users to sign with respect to any epoch prior to joining the group, which represents
an attack against our traceability definition.
Theorem 14. The Nakanishi et al. [NFHF09] fully dynamic group signature scheme does
not satisfy our traceability definition.
Proof. LetA be an adversary against the traceability game. The adversary adds user i to the
group at epoch τ . Since the user is not revoked, her ID is not an endpoint in any interval of
the revocation list infoτ , as for all previous epochs. Therefore,A could easily produce valid
signatures for i to any epoch τ¯ < τ . Since these signatures trace back to a user which was
inactive at the interval with which the signature is associated,A succeeds in the traceability
game.
The scheme could be easily immunised against the above attack. A first solution, as
for [LPY12a], is to initialise the revocation list with all ID’s of users that have not joined the
group yet. When the manager assigns an ID to a new user, he updates reg and the revocation
list infoτ . This way, the signature size is not affected. On the other hand, revocation lists
are now proportional to the size of the maximum number of users, instead of the number of
revoked users.
An alternative countermeasure requires the group manager to include the joining
epochs in the certificates by signing (x, ID,τjoin), where x is a secret owned by user ID
and τjoin is the joining epoch. A signer then needs to include in the signature a proof that
τjoin is not greater than the signing epoch. To realise the latter, one can use membership
proof techniques from [TS06, CCS08] which are already used in the original scheme. This
would increase the cost of signing and verifying by only a constant factor. The new member-
ship proof would require the group manager to provide signatures for every elapsed epoch,
which could be appended, for instance, to the revocation list. This makes revocation lists
grow linearly with the number of revoked users as well as the number of epochs.
7.4.3 Scheme based on Sect. 6.3
In Sect. 6.3, we gave a generic construction of accountable ring signatures, where every
signature can be traced back to a user in the ring. We also showed how one can obtain fully
dynamic group signatures from accountable ring signatures and gave an efficient instantia-
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tion in the random oracle model, based on the DDH assumption. That instantiation yields
signatures of logarithmic size (w.r.t. the size of the ring), while signing is quasi-linear, and
signature verification requires a linear number of operations.
Each user has a secret key and an associated verification key. To sign, users first encrypt
their verification key. Then, via a membership proof, they provide a signature of knowledge
showing that the verification key belongs to the ring, and that they know the corresponding
secret key. We will now prove this construction is secure w.r.t. the stronger variant of our
model i.e. w.r.t. adversarially generated authorities’ keys..
In what follows, note that each epoch τ specifies an instance of the accountable ring
signature scheme with ring Rτ . Algorithms from the accountable ring signature scheme are
labelled with ARS. We assume that the epoch can be appended to a message using the ||
operation, and removed again without ambiguity.
An accountable ring signature scheme does not involve a group manager. Hence, to
construct a group signature, we assume the existence of a functionality GMg, which allows
a group manager’s key-pair to be derived as (gmk,msk)←GMg(1λ ), and initialises a group
information board which is visible to all parties, but can only be modified by a party with
msk.
The construction of a fully dynamic group signature from an accountable ring signature
is presented in Fig. 7.7.
Theorem 15. The generic group signature scheme construction (Sect. 6.2.1) from the ac-
countable ring signature scheme of Sect. 6.3 satisfies our definitions for a secure, fully-
dynamic group signature scheme.
Proof. We begin by proving correctness. For simplicity and without loss in generality, we
reduce the computational variant of the correctness requirement, i.e. where the last three
lines in the correctness game in Fig. 7.2 are dropped (see Section 7.2.1), to the perfect
correctness of the accountable ring signature. Let A be an adversary against the (computa-
tional) correctness of the fully dynamic group signature scheme. We construct an adversary
B against the (perfect) correctness of the accountable ring signature scheme. On receiving
(pp,sk) from his game, B sets crs = pp and chooses (tpk, tsk) and (mpk,msk) by himself.
He also initialises reg and info. Note that B can compute vk corresponding to sk by comput-
ing vk = ARSUKGen(pp,sk). Now, B sets gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk) and startsA on (gpk, info).
Since B knows msk, he can simulate all oracle queries for A. Let q be a polynomial upper
162 Chapter 7. Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
GSetup(1λ )→ crs
 Compute crs := pp← ARSSetup(1λ ).
 Initialise reg and a counter τ := 0.
〈GKGenGM(crs),GKGenTM(crs)〉
 The group and tracing managers participate in an interactive protocol to generate
(tpk, tsk)← ARSOKGen(pp) and (mpk,msk)← GMg(1λ ).
 Set gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk), and initialise info.
UKGen(1λ )→ (usk[i],upk[i])
 Return (usk[i],upk[i])← ARSUKGen(pp).
〈Join(τ,gpk, i,usk[i]), Issue(τ,msk, i,upk[i])〉
 The group manager and a new user i who already has a key-pair undergo an interactive
protocol to register i.
 Upon completion, the group manager uses msk to update reg with the transcript.
 Set gsk[i] = usk[i].
UpdateGroup(gpk,msk, infocurrent,S, reg)→ infonew
 If Rnew is different from Rcurrent then increment the counter τ
 The new group information infonew contains the current group Rnew and the public keys of
the members as well as the counter τ .
Sign(gpk,gsk[i], infoτ ,m)→ Σ
 Denote the group for the current epoch by Rτ . This is part of infoτ .
 Return Σ← ARSSign(tpk,m||τ,Rτ ,gsk[i]).
Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ)→ 1/0
 Return ARSV f y(tpk,m||τ,Rτ ,Σ).
Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,m,Σ)→ (i,piTrace)
 Return ARSOpen(m||τ,Rτ ,Σ, tsk).
Judge(gpk, i, infoτ ,piTrace,upk[i],m,Σ)→ 1/0
 Return ARSJudge(tpk,m||τ,Rτ ,Σ,upk[i],piTrace).
IsActive(infoτ , reg, i)
 Check infoτ to see if user i is in Rτ , and returns 0/1 accordingly.
Figure 7.7: Construction of a fully dynamic group signature from an accountable ring
signature
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bound on the number of UToM queries A can make in her game. Adversary B randomly
chooses an index i← {1, . . . ,q} and sets the challenge key pair (vk,sk) of his game as
the keys of the i-th user i∗ queried to the UToM oracle: (usk[i∗],upk[i∗]) := (sk,vk). By
construction, user keys do not depend on i, so the simulation is perfect. Whenever A suc-
ceeds in breaking correctness by returning (i,m,τ), B succeeds when i = i∗ by returning
(tpk,m||τ,Rτ). Note that i is independent of the success probability of A. Hence, the suc-
cess probability of B is that of A divided by a factor of q, and thus correctness of the fully
dynamic group signature scheme follows.
For anonymity, suppose thatA is an adversary against the anonymity of the group sig-
nature scheme. We construct an adversary B against the anonymity of the accountable ring
signature scheme. Adversary B gets crs := pp and pk from his anonymity game. He sets
tpk := pk and interacts withA on behalf of the tracing manager of the fully dynamic group
signature scheme to get (msk,mpk, info). Note that B does not know dk corresponding to
pk and hence does not know the secret tracing key tsk of the tracing manager. B now sets
gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk) and initialises reg. For all oracles except Trace and Chalb, B is able
to simulate all queries of A by himself and return the result, since B knows all necessary
keys. If A queries (m,Σ, infoτ) to her Trace oracle, B can simulate the oracle by querying
(m||τ,Rτ ,Σ) to his Open oracle and forwards the answer to A. If A queries (infoτ , i0, i1,m)
to her Chalb oracle, B simulates the oracle by querying (m||τ,Rτ ,gsk[i0],gsk[i1]) to his
Chalb oracle and returns the answer to A. Eventually, when A outputs her guess b∗, B re-
turns b∗ as his answer in his game. It is clear that both adversaries have the same advantage.
Therefore, by anonymity of the accountable ring signature scheme, the fully dynamic group
signature scheme satisfies our full anonymity definition.
Next, we prove non-frameability. Let A be an adversary against the non-frameability
of the fully dynamic group signature scheme. We construct an adversary B attacking the
full-unforgeability of the accountable ring signature scheme. Given pp, B starts A on
crs := pp and receives (info,msk,mpk, tsk, tpk) using which B can compute gpk which he
forwards to A. Now, for all oracles except SndToU, Reveal and Sign, B is able to simulate
all queries of A by himself and return the result. For the other three oracles, B can simulate
those successfully by consulting his own oracles UKGen,Sign and RevealU if necessary.
Eventually, when A outputs (m,Σ, i,piTrace, infoτ), B returns (tpk,upk[i],m||τ,Rτ ,Σ,piTrace)
in his game. Clearly, if A wins her game, B succeeds in breaking the full unforgeability
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of the accountable ring signature since his output satisfies the first clause of the winning
condition.
Next, we prove traceability. Let A be an adversary against the traceability of the fully
dynamic group signature scheme. We construct an adversary B against the traceability of
the accountable ring signature scheme. Given pp, B sets crs := pp, generates (msk,mpk)
and initialises reg and info. He interacts with A on behalf the group manager in order to
obtain (tsk, tpk). He sets gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk) and forwards (gpk, info) to A. Now, B is
able to simulate all of the oracle queries ofA. Eventually, whenA outputs (m,Σ,τ) where Σ
is a valid signature, B returns (tsk,m||τ,Rτ ,Σ) in his game. We have three cases to consider
depending on how A wins her game. If i is inactive group member at epoch τ , then i /∈ Rτ .
If i = 0 then again i /∈ Rτ . The final case is that the group signature judge algorithm returns
0. The probability of success of B is the same as that of A. Thus, by the traceability of
the accountable ring signature scheme, the fully dynamic group signature scheme satisfies
traceability.
Finally, we prove tracing-soundness. Let A be an adversary against the tracing-
soundness of the fully dynamic group signature scheme. We construct an adversary B
against the tracing-soundness of the accountable ring signature scheme. Given pp, B ini-
tialises reg and sets crs := pp. He starts A on crs to get (info,msk,mpk, tsk, tpk). He sets
gpk := (crs,mpk, tpk) which he then forwards to A. Note that all A’s oracle calls can be
simulated by B since he has the required keys. Eventually, A halts by responding with
a tuple
(
m,Σ, i1,piTrace1 , i2,piTrace2 , infoτ
)
. By construction, Σ returned by A is a valid ac-
countable ring signature on m that traces to two different users. Adversary B returns
(
m||τ,
Σ, tpk,upk[i1],upk[i2],piTrace1 ,piTrace2
)
as his output in his game. Clearly, if A wins her
game, B wins his game with the same advantage. Thus, if the accountable ring signature
scheme satisfies tracing soundness so does the fully dynamic group signature scheme.
Chapter 8
Helios Ballot Copying Revisited
In this chapter and the next we will develop two different answers to the problem of voting
receipts. Intuitively, a receipt is information that enables a voter to fully reproduce her ballot
as posted in an election’s bulletin board. This can lead to issues with coercion, as a voter
who can take possession of a receipt can be bribed in a verifiable way.
In the case of Helios [Adi08], the protections against receipts (and coercive attacks
in general) are minimal. The code running the voting booth aims to prevent receipts by
allowing voters to either audit or cast a ballot. If a ballot is audited, the vote and randomness
used is revealed (so that it can be checked later), but the voter cannot cast it. If it is cast,
the the randomness is not displayed to the voter. However, in the usual case, Helios would
be deployed as a web application which users would use by visiting the election web page
using their personal computers. Thus, a user who is technically proficient, (or who is given
ready-built tools) is able to circumvent the “cast or audit” restriction. In fact, it is possible
to both extract and inject ballot parameters from and into the voting booth application.
As such, the Helios voting system suggests that it should not be used for elections
where the risk of coercion is high. Thus, the simple answer to voting receipts is to try
and combat them. In this chapter however, we develop a different possibility: we use the
divertibility of the zero knowledge protocols used in Helios to build a secure ballot copying
protocol.
Cortier & Smyth [CS11] explored ballot copying in the Helios e-voting platform as an
attack against privacy. They also pointed out that their approach to ballot copying could be
detected by a modified Helios. In an earlier version of this work, [DC12] revisited ballot
copying from a different viewpoint: as a tool to prevent vote diffusion (the division of votes
among multiple weak candidates) and to lessen the effect of established voting blocs. This
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approach is based on blinding the ballot casting protocol to create an undetectable copy. A
willing voter can cooperate with a prospective copier, helping the copier produce a blinded
copy of his ballot without revealing his vote. We prove that Helios is unable to detect the
copying. The possibility of such cooperation between voters is manifested only in internet
voting and as such is a fundamental difference between internet and booth voting.
While the techniques of [DC12] are sound, there are two outstanding issues. First, the
copying protocol gives zero knowledge only against honest copiers unless we opt to break
compatibility with Helios. Second, as Smyth and Bernhard [SB13] point out, the (informal)
security guarantees can be misleading. In particular, the act of producing a copy may reveal
information about one’s vote via the election’s result even if the copying protocol itself is
zero knowledge. We correct both issues, producing a fully zero knowledge protocol for
ballot copying without breaking compatibility with Helios.
The research presented in this chapter is joint work with Yvo Desmedt, and significantly
updates work published in [DC12]. The author contributed to the investigation by designing
the updated, full zero knowledge, protocol and providing the appropriate proofs as well as
updating the discussion on privacy.
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8.1 Introduction
Helios [Adi08] is a web-based, universally verifiable Internet voting system. To facilitate
universal verifiability, Helios ballots are encrypted and public. Ballots are cast over the
Internet via a web browser. By way of controlling their web browser, users have full control
over the ballots they submit (see Sect. 8.2.1 ), making them susceptible to coercion. If a
voter is bribed or threatened, they can be instructed to vote in a particular way and keep
the randomness used as a receipt. This way, a potential coercer can check if they complied
or not. Helios is thus best suited for use in low-coercion environments. This might appear
to limit its use to “low-stakes” elections but may not necessarily be the case. In Estonian
parliamentary elections [Est10] for example, the ability of overwriting a vote with a later
one is used in place of coercion resistance. As such, it is conceivable that a system like
Helios might be used in a high profile election.
Even though Helios has been based on 30 years of sound cryptographic primitives, pre-
vious works have described attacks against Helios compromising both secrecy [CS11] and
correctness [ED10]. Furthermore, the exact security achieved by the Helios construction
was the subject of active research [BPW12, SB13]. Other systems [RRI15, GCG15] build
upon Helios with the intention of improving its security or robustness.
Our work here has a different goal though: blinded ballot copying. A blinded copy of
a ballot is a copy that cannot be detected as such. Instead of a forced relationship between
coerced and coercer, this form of ballot copying relies on the cooperation of both parties,
and is based on trust rather than threats or bribes. This demonstrates how the lack of receipt
freeness hides an unspecified property of Helios: the ability to create blinded copies of
votes. In fact, it can be expanded upon to build a secondary system on top of it. The
potential for this was also mentioned in [BGP11], independently of [DC11].
Assume that Alice and Bob are coworkers. Clint and Donnie are candidates for the
“employee of the year award”. Bob has recently returned from a project abroad and is
unsure about the two candidates. He would like to ask Alice whom he trusts. Alice does
not want to reveal her choice so as not to upset the other candidate. Our goal is to provide a
system where Alice (the voter) can assist Bob (the copier) in producing a copy of her ballot
whilst ensuring that:
• Bob will not learn anything about Alice’s vote that is not also revealed by the election
results, and his possessing of a copy of her vote.
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• Alice cannot distinguish the ballot that is produced by the system from a random valid
ballot. Therefore, the copier is explicitly given the option of backing out (by using
his own choice instead of the copied one) undetected.
• Helios (or any observer) cannot recognise the ballot produced by the system as a copy.
Such a system would allow groups of voters to organise around a trusted figure, partly
avoiding the spoiler effect [Arr63] prevalent in plurality elections, thus increasing the weight
of their vote and the possibility of obtaining a desired result (to the degree where trust in the
original voter is well-deserved).
However, increasing the weight of one’s vote carries privacy implications1. If Bob
copies Alice’s vote and Clint only gets a single vote in the tally, then Alice’s vote is revealed.
This parallels the discussion of privacy in the event of a unanimous election. The privacy
definitions used in the area (e.g. Def.21) overcome this problem by running two bulletin
boards: a real one (which is properly tallied) and a fake one (which is not, and only contains
null ballots). The adversary interacts with the real board, submitting the vote preferences of
honest users or potentially maliciously crafted ballots for corrupt ones. The interactions are
mirrored in the fake board, but honest votes are replaced with zeros. The challenge for the
adversary is to correctly guess which board is visible to him during the experiment. Thus,
to maintain privacy, ballot copying needs to be able to copy the ballots that exist in the real
board irrespective of which board is visible.
8.2 Background
The work presented in this chapter is based on modifying the protocols used by Helios so
that they involve three parties (voter, copier, Helios) instead of just two. As such, we need
to explain the design and operation of Helios before describing the modifications.
An important feature implemented by Helios is universal verifiability [SK95,CGS97b]:
any party, even one uninvolved in the election can opt to verify the integrity of an election
that uses Helios. This is achieved by making the ballots cast by each voter publicly acces-
sible on a bulletin board, albeit encrypted with the ElGamal [Elg85] cryptosystem.
Each ballot also contains a proof of its validity which can be verified without requiring
specific knowledge or access and without revealing the contents of the ballot. The proofs of
1We are thankful to Ben Smyth and David Bernhard for pointing out [SB13] that the original wording about
Alice’s privacy was too strong.
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validity are based on a disjunctive version of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CDS94,CP93]
previously used in [CGS97b]. This ensures that no invalid ballots have been accepted and
that no ballot tampering has taken place. The public list of ballots also guards against the
election officials injecting votes from unregistered voters if the registration list is public. As
the encryption scheme used is additively homomorphic, the product of all encrypted votes
is an encryption of the sum of all votes. Since the encrypted ballots are all public, there is no
way for a corrupt server to tamper with the product in an undetected way. The vote sum is
obtained by the election trustees using threshold decryption. Each trustee is able to provide
a partial decryption factor along with a proof of correctness for his individual calculations.
The partial decryption factors are then combined to arrive at the decrypted result. Again,
once the partial decryption factors have been made public there is no opportunity for foul
play.
In this section we will analyze the parts of Helios that are relevant to this work. We will
start by briefly mentioning the relevant parts of the Helios Implementation before moving to
the cryptographic design. The design of Helios 3.5 is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem
[Elg85], used for encrypting votes and homomorphic tallying. It also uses disjunctive zero-
knowledge proofs of equality to ensure ballot validity.
8.2.1 Helios Implementation
As mentioned in [Hel11] Helios has 4 main components: an election builder, a voting booth,
a ballot casting server and an audit server. From the perspective of ballot copying, we are
mostly concerned with the inner workings of the voting booth since we need to be able to
extract data in order to capture the encryption randomness and also inject it to allow the
copied and blinded ballot to be actually submitted. The ballot casting server concerns us
only with respect to the tests performed against incoming ballots, according to the Helios
specifications [Hel11]. The workings of the other two components are not relevant.
VOTING BOOTH. The Helios voting booth is a fairly complex web application, that reads
the parameters of an election, presents the user with the questions he can vote on, encrypts
his choices and calculates the appropriate proofs to construct a valid ballot and then allows
the user to either audit or submit it.
The voting booth in Helios 3 is implemented in HTML and JavaScript. For perfor-
mance reasons, older versions of the voting booth required Java to perform the modular
arithmetic operations required in the encryption and proof construction, while keeping the
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encryption logic in JavaScript. Another option added later was for the ballot construction to
be performed on the server and the results forwarded to the browser. However, more recent
versions of Helios include a high performance JavaScript library for handling large integers,
removing the need for external plugins, or server-side calculations.
The randomness used in the encryption is only revealed if the user chooses to audit his
ballot in which case he will need to create a new one before voting. This is implemented as
a weak form of coercion resistance, (namely, receipt freeness) but is easily bypassed2 if the
voter executes a JavaScript command during the preparation of the ballot.
VOTING BOOTH TAMPERING. Web browsers allow users to run their own javascript
commands, to be executed in the context of the currect web-page. Thus, a user can sim-
ply cause the browser to output the randomness as well as the vote contained in a ballot,
just before it is cast. Since the commands are executed in the full context of the web-
page one can take advantage of the functions provided by the voting booth, e.g. call-
ing BOOTH.encrypted ballot.get audit trail(); instead of manually read-
ing the ballot parameters. Similarly, if a voter is given a pre-made ballot by a coercer, they
only need to overwrite the existing data structure representing their ballot with the pre-made
one.
Executing JavaScript commands might be difficult for the average user, but in this
instance, the commands in question may be stored as “bookmarklets”. A bookmarklet is a
bookmark that contains a javascript code instead of a location. When it is clicked, the code
is run in the context of the page currently displayed. For Helios, it is simple to construct a
bookmarklet that extracts the vote and randomness used to create a ballot (i.e a receipt) as
well as one that injects a specific ballot to the voting booth page. Thus a user only needs the
technical expertise to install a bookmarklet (i.e drag & drop it to their bookmark bar) and
click it at the appropriate time in order to tamper with the voting booth.
We note that the techniques described in the rest of this Chapter do not represent an
attack on the helios Voting Booth, or new vulnerabilities to be abused: the potential for
receipt extraction and ballot injection is inherent in the current implementation of Helios
and browser environment.
BALLOT CASTING SERVER. After the ballot is constructed and saved as a JSON
(JavaScript Object Notation) [Cro06] object, the voting booth submits it to the ballot cast-
2In fact, early versions of Helios included a “Coerce Me!” button [Adi08] which revealed the encryption
randomness without invalidating the ballot.
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ing server using the HTTP POST method. The ballot casting server then checks the ballot
for validity and compares it against already cast ballots and rejects it, if it is identical to a
previous one.
8.2.2 Vote Representation
In Helios, the homomorphic property of ElGamal (Sect.3.3.5) is used in order to calculate an
encrypted sum of votes from individual encrypted ballots without the need to decrypt them
individualy. However, ElGamal is multiplicatively homomorphic, whereas vote tallies are
sums. In order to bridge this gap, Helios uses a variant of the encoding used in [CGS97b].
where votes of “no” are represented as 1 and votes of “yes” as g. In this way, the product
of n votes vi of which m are “yes” will be ∏ni=1 vi = gm i.e. the log of the product will be
the sum of the votes i.e. the scheme is additively homomorphic. Most elections have more
options than “yes” and “no”, so Helios models them as a series of “yes-no” questions about
each option, with a limit on the number of “yes” answers equal to the number of selections
allowed in the original question. For example, given a question with 3 choices, from which
exactly one may be selected, a vote would be of the form:
V = (α0,β0),(α1,β1),(α2,β2)
= (gr0 ,gm0 ·hr0),(gr1 ,gm1 ·hr1),(gr2 ,gm2 ·hr2)
In the above vote, ri represents the randomness used in the encryption and mi the
answers of the voter to each of the 3 options. We note that a vote of the above form might
be invalid, for example if mi > 1 for some i, or if every mi is 1, even though the election
parameters only allow the voter to choose one option. A particularly insidious voter might
even have m0 = −100, making his vote cancel out 100 honest votes for the first option.
Helios guards against this by requiring the voter to provide a zero-knowledge proof of his
ballot’s validity. Helios supports threshold ElGamal, which involves multiple trustees in
order to ensure that there is no single point of failure with regard to voter privacy, but this
is not relevant to this work.
8.2.3 Validity Checks
As seen in the above example, a voter must provide a proof that the value of his vote falls
into the range permitted by the election parameters. As such, she must prove that the indi-
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vidual vote for each option is either a “yes” or a “no” and furthermore that the total number
of “yes” votes is within the range of the allowed number of selections. In more concrete
terms, the voter is asked to prove that each mi is either 0 or 1 (an individual proof in Helios
terminology), and that the sum ∑n−1i=0 mi is inside the range of allowed selections as specified
in the election’s definition (a total proof ).
The checks of validity used by Helios are non-interactive disjunctive zero knowledge
proofs of equality between discrete logs. In the rest of this section, we will offer a brief
overview of the underlying concepts as well as their use in Helios.
8.2.4 Disjunctive Proofs of Equality between Discrete Logarithms.
To prove that an encrypted individual vote (α,β ) is valid one must prove that the corre-
sponding plaintext is either g0 = 1, in which case loggα = loghβ , or g1 in which case
loggα = loghβ/g. As the prover needs to prove the disjunction of the two statements we
have a disjunctive proof.
Total proofs can be carried out in the same way, the difference being that for individual
proofs the range of exponents is always [0,1] whereas for total votes it ranges from the
minimum number of selections to the maximum. For total proofs the ciphertext used is the
homomorphic product of the individual ciphertexts.
The Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP93] for discrete log equality is essentially a parallel
version of the Schnorr protocol [Sch91]. We note that the Chaum-Pedersen protocol as well
as the underlying Schnorr protocol are Σ-protocols and this only achieve honest verifier zero
knowledge. There is no known simulator for dishonest adversaries [CP93]. In regular usage
this is sidestepped using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
Let g,h be elements of Ggroup of order q. Suppose α = gw,β = hw. A prover with
private input w is trying to prove that loggα = loghβ . The protocol is as follows:
Protocol 1. Equality of Discrete Logs [CP93]
Prover: Let a := gr and b := hr for r← Zp. Send a,b to the Verifier.
Verifier: Choose c← Zp. Send c to the Prover.
Prover: Let s := cw+ r. Send s to the Verifier.
Verifier: Accept if gs = aαc and hs = bβ c.
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Cramer et al. provide a construction for disjunctive proofs [CDS94, FS90] where the
prover can prove one statement from a set and simulate proofs for the other ones, without
the verifier knowing which of the subproofs are simulated. In the context of Helios, this
allows the voter to indicate that the plaintext of his ballot is one out of a number of allowed
values without revealing which one.
In order to apply the construction of Cramer et al. [CDS94] to the Chaum-Pedersen
protocol [CP93], we use the simulator to produce the proofs corresponding to the false
statements:
Protocol 2. Chaum-Pedersen Protocol Simulation
Simulated Proof: Choose random challenge c and response s. Let the commitments be
a = gs/αc and b = hs/(β/gv)c.
Verification: Check that gs = a ·αc and that hs = b · (β/gv)c.
In order to force the voter to provide at least one honest proof, he is not given complete
choice of the challenges. The Verifier is allowed to specify the sum of the challenges used
in the subproofs. This allows the voter to simulate all but one of the Chaum-Pedersen proofs
and let the challenge of the real subproof be as a balancing factor in the sum. Suppose the
voter needs to prove that the value v encoded by (α,β ) = (gr,hrgv) is in [min,max]. He
will simulate the proofs for i ∈ [min,max]\{v} and produce a real proof for i = v.
Protocol 3. Disjunctive Chaum-Pedersen Protocol.
Prover: For i ∈ [min,max] \ {v}: Choose challenge ci ← Zp and response si ← Zp. Let
the commitments be ai := gsi/αci and bi := hsi/(β/gi)ci . Let (av,bv) = (gw,hw) for
w← Zp. Send (ai,bi), for i ∈ [min,max].
Verifier: Send x← Zp.
Prover: Let cv := x−∑i 6=v ci and sv := rcv+w. Send (ci,si), for i ∈ [min,max].
Verifier: Check if gsi = a · αci and that hsi = b · (β/gi)ci for i ∈ [min,max]. Check if
x = ∑maxi=min ci. Accept only if all checks passed.
8.2.5 Non-Interactive Proofs.
For practical reasons, Helios implements the above protocol offline rather than online. This
requires less communication with the Helios server and does not require the Helios server
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to hold the state of proof protocols in progress. This is done by way of the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic (Sect. 3.4.6) which replaces the random challenge issued by the verifier with a
hash of the commitments.
This facilitates universal verifiability since the generation of the challenge is beyond
the control of the (potentially dishonest) Helios server. Additionally, the entirety of the
ballot generation can be performed by the voter with the result being submitted to Helios for
verification. This eliminates the need for the server to hold state between multiple sessions,
which can have performance as well as security implications.
For example, suppose we have an election with 3 options of which exactly one may
be selected (as in the vote example). We follow the notation of protocol 3 in that ai,bi
represent the commitments of a proof, si the solution and ci the challenge. The individual
proofs would then be of the form:
pii = ((ai,0,bi,0,ai,1,bi,1),(ci,0,si,0, ,ci,1,si,1)), for i ∈ {0,1,2} (8.1)
And the total proof would be of the form:
piΣ = ((aΣ,1,bΣ,1),(cΣ,1,sΣ,1))
To check if one of the above proofs is valid, Helios would set T := H(amin,bmin,
· · · ,amax,bmax) and run the last step of protocol 3.
In the interest of readability, for the rest of this text we will limit ourselves to ballots
consisting of a single encrypted “yes”-“no” vote and it’s corresponding proof of validity.
Blind signatures [Cha83, CP93], involve signing a document through an intermediary
(in our case, the copier) without the original signer (the voter) being able to trace the end
product. Blind signatures have been suggested by Chaum [Cha83] for use with anonymous
electronic cash, where banks sign “coins” proving their authenticity but are unable to trace
their use, and voting where authorities can supply signed blank ballots to authenticated
voters but are then unable to track them once filled.
Divertible proofs [OO90, DGB88] are a similar notion to blind signatures, but in an
online setting. An intermediate party is introduced between the prover and verifier, playing
the role of the verifier against the prover and that of the prover against the verifier. The
intermediate is called a warden in some cases (for example, if he is introduced to enforce to
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ensure honest behaviour) or a man in the middle in others. In this chapter we will refer to
the warden as the copier.
8.3 A Ballot-Blinding Protocol
We will describe ballot-blinding in two parts. We will first describe vote-blinding, i.e. how a
copier can unilaterally rerandomise the vote contained in a ballot (making it indistinguish-
able to a random one assuming the DDH problem is hard) while performing appropriate
modifications to keep the attached proofs valid. We note that this is contingent on Helios
using the weak [BPW12] version of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (i.e. the challenge is
produced as a hash of the prover’s first message and does not depend on the statement).
Since this rerandomization does not change the prover’s first message or the challenges
used inside the proofs, it is trivial to detect.
On the other hand, the non-malleability [FKMV12] of the Fiat-Shamir transformation
does not give us much hope of unilaterally randomizing the proofs. A trivial solution would
be for the voter to publish the randomness used in her ballot. This would enable blinded
copying but would would also completely sacrifice her privacy! For that reason, we need
an online proof-blinding protocol between a willing voter (who has already cast a ballot)
and a copier. The protocol allows the copier to produce a “new” proof of knowledge for the
encrypted vote.
The copier can combine the two parts: first he obtains a new (indistinguishable) proof
of validity of the voter’s encrypted vote and then he re-encrypts the encrypted vote making
it indistinguishable as well. The result is a ballot that is equivalent to the original in that it
contains the same vote but indistinguishable from it. Moreover, it does not leak the original
vote. In the event that Helios moves to use the strong Fiat-Shamir transformation, the copier
would need to perform both blinding operations concurrently. As this is not currently the
case, we opt to present the two operations separately for simplicity.
8.4 Vote Blinding
We describe a transformation that a copier can perform to an already cast ballot that is based
on re-encrypting the vote contained in the ballot. Because of the re-encryption, the proof
contained in the ballot must also be modified to stay valid.
Given a vote (α,β ) = (gr,hrgv),v ∈ 0,1, a copier is able to re-encrypt it as (α ′,β ′) =
(gr+z,hr+zgv),v ∈ 0,1. To do that, he does not need knowledge of r as he can simply
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calculate (α ′,β ′) = (gzα,hzβ ).
Lemma 11. If z is chosen to be uniformly random in Zp then (α ′,β ′) is indistinguishable
from a random vote by adversaries who cannot solve the DDH problem, regardless of them
knowing r or v.
Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A who can, given (g,h) and (α,β ),(α ′,β ′) de-
termine if (α ′,β ′) is a re-encryption of (α,β ) or not. Equivalently, A can determine if
(α ′/α,β ′/β ) is an encryption of 0, i.e of the form gσ ,hσ . As h = gx, (h,α ′/α,β ′/β ) is a
DH tuple. This enables us to build a DDH solver as follows:
Given a DDH instance (gk,h,u,v) where gk = (G,q,g), pick random ρ,ψ ← Zq, set
(α,β ) := (gρ ,hρ ·gψ), and let (α ′,β ′) := (u ·α,v ·β ). Give g,h and (α,β ),(α ′,β ′) to the
vote distinguisher A, accept the tuple if A accepts and reject it if it rejects.
Furthermore, if the copier has access to a valid proof for (α,β ) he can transform it to
a valid proof for (α ′,β ′).
Lemma 12. If (V,P) is a valid ballot, with V = (α,β ) as in (8.1) and P =
((a0,b0,a1,b1),(c0,s0,c1,s1)) as in Protocol 3, then ((gzα,hzβ ),(a0,b0,a1,b1),(c0,s0 +
c0z,c1,s1+ c1z)) is also a valid ballot and vice versa.
Proof. If ai = gsi/αci holds then ai = gsi+ciz/(gzα)ci also holds. Similarly, if bi =
hsi/(β/gi)ci holds then bi = hsi+ciz/(hzβ/gi)ci also holds. For the opposite direction we
note that re-applying the transformation for −z produces the original ballot.
The above transformation can be used as a variant of the attack described in [CS11]
since it provides another way of replaying ballots without copying them verbatim. Nonethe-
less, the attack variant can be stopped in a similar way to the one suggested by Cortier and
Smyth, i.e by checking the commitments ai,bi and challenges ci of the proof, which remain
unchanged. Thus, a future version of Helios could defend against the attack by modifying
the ballot casting server to reject votes which reuse past commitment values.
8.5 Proof Blinding
It is clear from the above discussion that blinding the entire ballot is necessary. However,
proof blinding protocol requires two assumptions: First, that original voter cooperates with
the the copier and second, that the voter has access to the randomness used in encrypting
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his ballot (i.e a receipt). Fortunately, the second assumption can be fulfilled in the current
Helios implementation. At the same time, since the active consent of the original voter is
required, our work is of no use to an attacker. If the attacker is able to force the original voter
to reveal their randomness, he is directly violating their privacy. Similarly, if an attacker is
able to force somebody to submit a “sealed” ballot, sight-unseen, there is not need for a
copying protocol to effectively steal their vote.
We start by presenting the protocol of [DC12] for reference before moving on to our
version.
8.5.1 The proof blinding protocol of [DC12]
Suppose the voter has cast an encrypted vote (α,β ) = (gr,hrgv),v∈ 0,1 with an appropriate
proof, and the copier is requesting a different proof in order to copy it. Note that (α,β ) is
public but (r,v) is private to the voter. Since the hash function H() is public, Helios does not
take part in the protocol. The notation used for the commitments is the same as in Protocol
3, but the roles of the parties are different. The voter still takes the role of the prover, but the
copier takes the role of an intermediate verifier who ultimately submits the resulting ballot
to Helios.
Protocol 4. Proof Blinding Protocol
Voter Choose w← Zp and let av := gw,bv := hw. Let φ := 1− v and choose cφ ,sφ ← Zp
and let aφ := gsφ /αcφ and bφ := hsφ /(β/gφ )cφ .
Send (a0,b0,a1,b1) to the copier.
Copier Choose ∆0,∆1,k0,k1← Zp. Let Ai := aigki/α∆i , Bi := bihki/(β/gi)∆i for i = 0,1. Let
c :=H(A0,B0,A1,B1) be the challenge that Helios would issue. Let C := c−∆0−∆1.
Send C to the voter.
Voter Let cv :=C− cφ and let sv := w+ rcv.
Send (c0,s0,c1,s1) to copier as a reply.
Copier Check that C = c0+ c1, ai = gsi/αci and bi = hsi/(β/gi)ci for i = 0,1. If yes, accept
and let Ci := ci+∆i and Si := si+ki. Let V :=((α,β ),(A0,B0,A1,B1),(C0,S0,C1,S1))
and submit V to Helios. Otherwise, reject.
While the protocol is complete and sound, it only achieves honest verifier zero knowl-
edge; [DC12] also features a full zero knowledge alternative, but at the cost of breaking
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compatibility with Helios. This is problematic in itself, but also does little to help us with
constructing a security reduction that enables us to simulate copying one ballot while actu-
ally copying another.
8.5.2 New Proof Blinding Protocol
We suggest a simple addition to protocol 4 that not only gives full (computational) zero
knowledge, but also requires no additional rounds of interaction or changes to Helios. Fur-
thermore, our fix is fairly general and could be used in other applications where a HVZK
proof is to be diverted. The main idea is to allow the prover to change the statement but
only after proving it is equivalent to the original. In normal use, this is inconsequential, and
the additional proof means that the change does not impact soundness. At the same time,
if the simulator has a trapdoor for the equivalence proof (in our case this means program-
ming the random oracle) it is simple to obtain zero knowledge by making the new statement
independent of the original.
This not only enables us to prove full zero knowledge but also gives us an important
tool for ballot privacy: the adversary can ask to copy ballot B and the reduction can use
statement switching to provide him with B′.
Suppose the voter has cast an encrypted vote (α,β ) = (gr,hrgv),v ∈ 0,1 with an ap-
propriate proof, and the copier is requesting a different proof in order to copy it. Note that
(α,β ) is public but (r,v) is private to the voter.
Protocol 5. Proof Blinding Protocol
Voter Choose r˜ ← Zp, let pi be a non-interactive Chaum-Pedersen proof that (α˜, β˜ ) =
(gr˜,hr˜) have the same discrete log w.r.t (g,h). Let α ′ = αα˜ , β ′ = ββ˜ and r′ = r+ r˜.
Choose w← Zp and let av := gw,bv := hw. Let φ := 1− v and cφ ,sφ ← Zp and let
aφ := gsφ /α ′cφ and bφ := hsφ /(β ′/gφ )cφ . Send (α˜, β˜ ,pi),(a0,b0,a1,b1) to the copier.
Copier Reject if pi does not verify. Let α ′ = αα˜ , beta′ = ββ˜ . Choose ∆0,∆1,k0,k1← Zp. Let
Ai := aigki/α ′∆i , Bi := bihki/(β ′/gi)∆i for i = 0,1. Let c := H(A0,B0,A1,B1) be the
challenge that Helios would issue. Let C := c−∆0−∆1, send C to the voter.
Voter Let cv :=C− cφ and let sv := w+ r′cv, send (c0,s0,c1,s1) to the copier.
Copier Check that C = c0+c1, ai = gsi/α ′ci and bi = hsi/(β ′/gi)ci for i = 0,1. If yes, accept
and let Ci := ci+∆i and Si := si+ki. Let V :=((α ′,β ′),(A0,B0,A1,B1),(C0,S0,C1,S1))
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and send V to Helios. Otherwise, reject.
We will now examine Protocol 5 with regard to correctness, soundness, indistinguisha-
bility and zero knowledge.
Lemma 13. The new proof blinding protocol is complete and furthermore if an honest
copier accepts then the resulting ballot V will be accepted by Helios.
Proof. Completeness holds trivially. Indeed, we have:
• C = c0+ c1 since the voter calculates cv :=C− cφ in Step 3.
• For i = φ , we have aφ = gsφ /α ′cφ and bφ = hsφ /(β ′/gφ )cφ from Step 1.
• For i = v, we must check if av = gsv/α ′cv=gw+rcv/α ′cv which holds since av = gw
(from Step 1) and αcv = grcv . Similarly: bv = hsv/(β ′/gv)cv = hw+rcv/(β ′/gv)cv holds
since bv = hw and β ′/gv = hr.
For the second property, we need to show that C0 +C1 = H(A0,B0,A1,B1) and that
given that ai = gsi/α ′ci and bi = hsi/(β ′/gi)ci hold (since the copier has access to a valid
vote) it also holds that: Ai = gSi/α ′Ci and Bi = hSi/(β ′/gi)Ci . This is straightforward by
substituting the blinded variables Ai, Bi, Ci, Si with their definitions.
Lemma 14. Protocol 5 is 2-special sound.
Proof. Suppose a voter can (given the same first message (α˜, β˜ ,pi),(a0,b0,a1,b1), and
given that pi verifies) provide answers to two different challenges C,C′. This means that
for the two answers (c0,s0,c1,s1) and (c′0,s
′
0,c
′
1,s
′
1), we must have ci 6= c′i for at least one
i ∈ {0,1}. We will now show that such a voter can calculate a witness for the vote’s validity
(i.e. the encryption randomness used in encrypting the vote).:
ai = gsi/α ′ci and ai = g
s′i/α ′c
′
i we have:
gsi/α ′ci = gs
′
i/α ′c
′
i
gsi−s
′
i = α ′ci−c
′
i thus:
loggα
′ =
ci− c′i
si− s′i
.
This gives us r′ the logarithm of a′. To obtain the logarithm of α , one needs to subtract
r˜, the logarithm of α˜ . This can be obtained in the same fashion from the proof on knowledge
pi .
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Lemma 15. Given the view of the original voter, the blinded proof of knowledge
((A0,B0,A1,B1),(C0,S0,C1,S1)) is unconditionally indistinguishable from a valid proof
produced independently.
Proof. We observe that Ci = ci+∆i and Si = si+ ki with ∆i and ki being uniformly random
in Zp. Thus, the challenges and responses are independent of the ones used in the original
proof. For the commitments, we note that given (C0,S0,C1,S1), the values of (A0,B0,A1,B1)
are uniquely determined (because for any valid proof: Ai = gSi/α ′Ci and Bi = hSi/(β ′/gi)Ci),
so if a voter is able to distinguish (A0,B0,A1,B1),(C0,S0,C1,S1) from an independent proof
he would also be able to distinguish (C0,S0,C1,S1) which we showed to be distributed
identically.
Our goal is to ensure that the blinded protocol does not leak the value of the voter’s
vote to one of the other parties.
Lemma 16. Protocol 5 achieves computational zero-knowledge in the random oracle
model, under the DDH assumption.
Proof. We will describe a simulator. Intuitively, the simulator will program the random
oracle to fake pi so that it can switch to a fresh α ′,β ′ that is independent of α,β . It will then
follow the same strategy as an honest prover.
The simulator first samples r′← Zp, v← {0,1}. It then sets (α ′,β ′) = (gr′ ,hr′), and
α˜ = α ′/α , β˜ = β ′/β . It then produces a proof pis that α˜, β˜ share discrete logs as fol-
lows: it selects a challenge epi and answer spi and programs the random oracle so that
H(gspi/α˜ ′epi ,hspi/β˜ epi ) = epi . Then, pi = ((gspi/α˜epi ,hspi/β˜ epi ),spi).
From this point on, the simulator follows the same protocol as the prover: w← Zp
and let av := gw,bv := hw. Let φ := 1− v and cφ ,sφ ← Zp and let aφ := gsφ /α ′cφ and
bφ := hsφ /(β ′/gφ )cφ . Then, it sends (α˜, β˜ ,pi),(a0,b0,a1,b1) to its copier oracle to receive
a challenge, and replies as the standard prover would.
We now compare the distributions of real and simulated transcripts. First we point out
that if the simulator correctly guesses v to have the same value as the plaintext of α,β , the
transcript is distributed identically to a real one. Thus, an efficient distinguisher between
real and simulated transcripts would also distinguish between simulated transcripts with
“correct” and “incorrect” guesses. This directly breaks the IND-CPA security of ElGamal.
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We can also use the above simulator to prove that the protocol is also zero-knowledge
with respect to the final prover, Helios. Since the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87] is used
to replace the verifier’s challenge with a hash of the the prover’s commitments, Helios is
unable to deviate from honest behaviour.
We also point out that the simulator may also be run with the value of v given as an
input, without impacting zero knowledge. This is key to reconciling copying and privacy
as it enables us to provide a copying oracle to the adversary: if the adversary is seeing the
“real” board we allow him to copy as normal but if he is seeing the “fake” one, we use the
simulator with the vote from the “real” board.
8.5.3 A Combined Protocol for Blinded Copying
The vote blinding transformation of Sect. 8.4 and the proof blinding protocol (Protocol 4)
can each partially blind a ballot (the vote and the proof respectively). They can be easily
combined to completely blind a ballot as follows: The copier executes the proof blinding
protocol with the cooperation of the voter but does not submit the resulting ballot V . Instead,
he proceeds to apply the vote blinding transformation to V , producing V ′ which he then
submits to Helios. If Helios switches to the strong Fiat-Shamir transformation, the two
protocols need to be combined
Theorem 16. The combined ballot copying protocol is complete, sound and zero-knowledge
in the random oracle model. Furthermore, assuming the DDH assumption holds, the ballots
produced are accepted by Helios and indistinguishable from random valid ballots, even for
the voter.
Proof. Completeness, soundness and honest-verifier zero-knowledge under the random or-
acle model are satisfied by the proof copying protocol and are not impacted by the transfor-
mation (Lemma 12). Indistinguishability holds because of Lemmata 11 and 15.
8.6 Further Work
We have described a protocol which enables voters to allow people who trust them to copy
their vote without revealing it in the process. This can be used as an alternative to public
endorsements. In settings where one person’s expertise or judgement is well regarded our
protocol offers the ability for others to trust his judgement without forcing him to reveal
his opinion –this can be especially important in small, local elections where revealing one’s
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vote can lead to rivalries (of course in a small or close election the tally [DK05] or even the
result might reveal information).
Blinded vote copying would also reduce the power of traditional voting blocs. A voting
bloc is a club or special interest group that coordinates its voting. They achieve stronger
[Pen46] representation compared to individual voters by not diffusing their votes. The trust
requirements for blinded vote copying are more relaxed than in a typical voting bloc since
the “leader” does not need to make his vote public. By making the creation of voting
blocs easier we thus create a more even voting field without needing to change the electoral
system.
It would also be interesting to replace the original voter with a coalition of voters, es-
sentially providing a framework (thus avoiding the complexity of secure multi-party com-
putation) for holding a primary election amongst the members of the coalition. This can
lower the barrier for creating a voting bloc further since there is no need for a single person
to be singled out as the decision maker.
Finally, a voting system built with copying in mind may be able to provide users with a
stronger mix of functionality and security. The high risk of coercion present in Helios might
be too high a price to pay for vote copying. Building support for copying into the protocol
may allow us to obtain similar functionality without relying on receipts.
Chapter 9
BeleniosRF
Returning to the issue of receipt freeness, we now offer a more orthodox approach. We
propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and verifiability.
It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how
they voted. Furthermore, we achieve receipt freeness without burdening the user with any
additional effort (as in the case of revoting as an anti-coercion strategy).
We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-
interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge,
sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the
merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF
inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We
implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop
computers and smartphones.
The research presented in this chapter is joint work with Ve´ronique Cortier, Georg Fuchs-
bauer and David Galindo, and was published in [CCFG16]. The author contributed to the
investigation mainly in designing the voting protocol and SRC scheme in collaboration with
Georg Fuchsbauer. The author also contributed the implementation and the majority of the
benchmarking.
9.1 Introduction
Electronic voting protocols should achieve two antagonistic security goals: privacy and ver-
ifiability. Additionally, they must be practical, from a usability, operational, and efficiency
point of view. Privacy can be expressed via several, increasingly demanding security prop-
erties.
• Basic ballot privacy guarantees that no one can learn how a voter voted.
• Receipt-freeness ensures that a voter cannot prove to anyone how she voted. While
privacy protects honest voters, receipt-freeness aims at protecting vote privacy even
when voters willingly (or unwillingly) interact with an attacker.
• Coercion-resistance should allow an honest voter to cast her vote even if she is, dur-
ing some time, fully under the control of an attacker. Coercion-resistance typically
requires revoting.
Conversely, verifiability ensures that voters’ ballots are included in the ballot box (indi-
vidual verifiability), that the result corresponds to the content of the ballot box (universal
verifiability) and that ballots come only from voters entitled to vote (eligibility verifiability).
Helios [Adi08, AdMPQ09] is a scheme that “only” achieves privacy and verifiability
and is based on a voting system by Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers [CGS97b] with
modifications proposed by Benaloh [Ben07]. As emphasised by its authors, Helios should
only be used in low-coercion environments. Indeed, a voter may easily reveal how she voted
by exhibiting the randomness used by her device to compute her ballot (Sect. 8.2.1); one
can then re-encrypt the claimed vote and check if the encryption is contained in the public
bulletin board. Helios is thus not receipt-free if we assume voters have a reasonable amount
of control of their devices.
To our knowledge, Civitas [JCJ05, CCM08] is the only scheme that achieves both
verifiability and coercion-resistance, without requiring a great deal of interaction between
the ballot box or the election authorities and the voter (such as [BT94,CLW08]). While the
scheme is a foundational work, it seems difficult to use it in large-scale elections mainly for
two reasons. First, its coercion resistance design requires that voters must be allowed to cast
multiple ballots, with checks against duplicates taking place during tallying. This involves
each cast ballot being checked against each other, requiring O(n2) operations –where n is
the number of received ballots, which opens the way to denial-of-service attacks. Second,
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to achieve coercion-resistance, a voter should be able to adopt an anti-coercion strategy (in
Civitas, a voter has to lie about her true credential) and then later revote for her true choice
once she is freed from the attacker. We believe that this scenario is unrealistic in many
cases, as it requires cryptographic skills and a heavy infrastructure to realise an untappable
channel (e.g. in-person registration).
It is also worth noticing that in most countries revoting is not allowed, as for example
in Australia, France, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The only exceptions we
are aware of are Estonia and the Internet voting pilots for the parliamentary elections in
2011 and 2013 in Norway. Indeed, casting a vote is usually seen as an official act that a
citizen should perform with care and revoting is perceived as “changing one’s mind”. Most
election authorities are strongly opposed to this practice. While this way of thinking might
be a cultural aspect inherited from traditional paper ballot systems, it is foreseeable that it
will take time before countries change their electoral rules in order to adopt a revote policy.
9.1.1 Our Contributions
Building upon a recent variant of Helios, called Belenios [CGGI14, GCG15], and a cryp-
tographic primitive called signatures on randomizable ciphertexts [BFPV11a], we propose
a receipt-free version of Helios, which we call BeleniosRF. In our scheme a voter cannot
prove how she voted, even if she is provided with all the ballot material by the coercer. In-
terestingly, our scheme does not demand any strategy of the voter; in particular, it does not
require the active participation of a voter to deceive a coercer that is asking for a receipt. For
example, a voter does not need to lie or produce fake credentials as in Civitas, she simply
has no way to prove how she voted. This represents a huge improvement in usability from
the voter’s point of view: all that is required of the voter is to vote.
We show that our scheme BeleniosRF is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that
even a dishonest voter using a voting client that has been tampered with cannot prove
how she voted. We formalise this property, called strong receipt-freeness (sRF), via a
game-based definition building on the privacy definition recently proposed by Bernhard
et al. [BCG+15]. We view this formal definition of receipt-freeness, which applies to non-
interactive ballot casting protocols, as the first contribution of this work. We call it strong
receipt-freeness to emphasise that in non-interactive protocols an attacker has less room to
build a receipt. Indeed, in the absence of interaction the adversary does not obtain informa-
tion from the voting server apart from what is displayed on the bulletin board; hence any
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receipt must be built by the adversary locally and before submitting the ballot.
We claim sRF is the first game-based receipt-freeness definition in the literature ac-
counting for a voter that is corrupted during the voting phase. Additionally, sRF has the
merit of being simple and concise, potentially allowing for simpler proofs. In doing so we
give a new formulation for the receipt-freeness definition by Benaloh and Tuinstra [BT94]
and highlight that receipt-freeness can be achieved without asking the voters to vote sev-
eral times and cancel previously submitted ballots, and without requiring an untappable
channel. All we need to assume is that the attacker is not permanently eavesdropping the
communication between the voting server and the voter, an assumption made by all previous
constructions of receipt-free or coercion-resistant voting schemes.
A key ingredient of BeleniosRF is a randomization service, a role that we assume is
played by the voting server (also called ballot box), but which could be played by a different
server. The randomization service is in charge of re-randomizing the ballot cast by a voter.
BeleniosRF’s receipt-freeness then relies on the fact that the randomness contained in the
ballot displayed in the bulletin board is not under the control of the voter. Both the voter and
the randomization service contribute to the randomness that is implicit in the voter’s ballot
as displayed on the bulletin board. In fact, in light of the impossibility result of [CFP+10],
the existence of a randomization agent is assumed in most constructions that claim to be
receipt-free. Here however, we do not rely on letting voters vote multiple times or on the
existence of a trusted token for each voter (such as e.g. [Oka97, HS00, CLW08, Hir10]).
The foremost challenge in achieving receipt-freeness non-interactively and via a ran-
domization service is to prevent the latter from changing the voter’s intent when re-
randomizing. The only existing non-interactive proposal [BFPV11a] claiming receipt-
freeness uses a powerful cryptographic primitive called signatures on randomizable ci-
phertexts. It consists of a signature scheme and a public-key encryption scheme that is
randomizable (that is, given a ciphertext, anyone can create a fresh ciphertext of the same
plaintext—without knowing it). The primitive provides an additional functionality: given a
signature on a ciphertext, anyone can randomise the ciphertext and adapt the signature to
the new ciphertext, that is, produce a signature that is valid on the new ciphertext—and all
that knowing neither the decryption key nor the signing key nor the plaintext. On the other
hand, unforgeability guarantees that it is infeasible to compute a signature on a ciphertext
that encrypts a message of which no encryption has been signed.
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Alas, Blazy et al. [BFPV11a] did not provide a receipt-freeness definition nor a proof.
By exhibiting a ballot-copying attack adapted from [CS13], we demonstrate that their
scheme is not receipt-free, worse, it is not even ballot-private. Our scheme fixes the Blazy
et al. construction by binding the ciphertexts to voters, while still inheriting the randomiz-
ability from Groth-Sahai non-interactive proofs [GS08], upon which the previous proposal
heavily relies, this provides the required non-malleability needed to thwart the attack.
We start with giving a new instantiation of signatures on randomizable ciphertexts,
which we show yields an RCCA-secure public-key encryption scheme [CKN03], from
which we build a non-interactive1 receipt-free e-voting scheme as follows:
• As in Belenios, each voter has a personal signature key pair, in addition to authenti-
cation means to the ballot box (typically a login and password).
• Each voter encrypts and signs their ballot and includes a proof of knowledge to pre-
vent ballot malleability.
• Upon receiving a ballot, the server re-randomises the ballot (including the signature
and proof) and adapts the corresponding signature and proof before publishing it.
• While only the re-randomised version is posted on the bulleting board, we can still
check the signature and proof as are part of the re-randomisation.
Receipt-freeness comes from the fact that a voter no longer has control over, nor knowledge
of, the randomness used to form the final ballot stored in the ballot box. On the other hand,
even after the voting server re-randomises the ballot cast by the voter’s voting device, the
voter can still verify that her legitimate ballot is present, as the re-randomised ciphertext
comes with a signature that is valid under the voter’s verification key. By unforgeability of
the signature primitive, the vote cannot have been altered by the ballot box, which we show
implies verifiability.
Our final contribution consists of assessing the feasibility of BeleniosRF; for this pur-
pose we implemented and measured the efficiency of a Javascript voting client (see Section
9.7).
9.2 Comparison to Related Work
Our definition requires that an adversary cannot distinguish whether a voter votes for either
a or b, even if the attacker provides the voter in advance with all the cryptographic material
1After successful authentication between the voter and the ballot box, ballot casting is non-interactive.
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(such as randomness to be used to cast the ballot). Interestingly, this definition does not
require the voter to follow a “strategy” to fool the coercer.
BeleniosRF has one disadvantage compared to Helios and Belenios: it requires that
voters generate keys by themselves and have them endorsed by a registrar. Helios does not
use signatures on ballots, whereas Belenios opts to have the keys be generated centrally and
distributed to voters.
What makes BeleniosRF different, is the rerandomization of ballots, which is used to
guarantee receipt-freeness. If the registrar knows a users private signing key, and it colludes
with the voting server collude, they could undetectably change a voter’s choice. This is
because (rerandomized) signatures on different ciphertexts encrypting the same message
cannot be linked. Thus, the registrar could sign a malicious ballot using a voter’s key, and
the voting server would pretend that the malicious ballot is a rerandomization of the one
cast. Helios and Belenios are immune to this, since they do not use rerandomization (or
even ballot signing, in the case of Helios).
This solution differs from the Belenios approach, where voters receive their signing
keys from the registrar for the sake of usability. This is just another manifestation of the
usual tension between usability, privacy and verifiability in e-voting systems (and computer
security systems in general), in the sense that increasing one of them entails a decrease of
at least one of the others. One may opt to instead use an issuing registrar (as opposed to an
endorsing one) may still be used, but requires that either the voting server or the registrar
remain honest (cf. Section 9.6.3).
9.3 Receipt-Freeness
We now formally define receipt-freeness and start by providing the syntax of a voting sys-
tem, inspired by [CGGI14, BCG+15].
9.3.1 Syntax of a Voting System
Election systems typically involve several entities. For the sake of simplicity we consider
each entity to consist of only one individual but note that all of them could be thresholdised.
1. Election administrator: denoted by E , is responsible for setting up the election; it pub-
lishes the identities id of eligible voters, the list of candidates and the result function ρ
of the election (typically counting the number of votes received by every candidate).
2. Registrar: denoted byR, is responsible for registering the public credentials of users
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after verifying the users control the corresponding secret ones .
3. Trustee: denoted by T , is in charge of tallying and publishing a final result.
4. Voters: the eligible voters are denoted by id1, . . . , idτ .
5. Ballot-box (voting server) manager: denoted by B, is responsible for processing and
storing valid ballots in the ballot box BB, and for publishing PBB, the public view of
BB, also called (public) bulletin board.
The following syntax considers single-pass schemes, that is, systems where voters only
have to post a single message to the board, i.e. ballot casting is non-interactive. A vot-
ing protocol V = (Setup,Register,Vote,Valid,Append,Publish,VerifyVote,Tally,Verify)
is relative to a family of result functions {ρτ}τ≥1 for τ ∈ N, with ρτ : Vτ → R, where V
is the set of admissible votes and R is the result space.
Setup(1λ ), on input a security parameter 1λ , outputs an election public/secret key pair
(pk,sk), where pk could contain a list of credentials L. We let pk be an implicit
input of the remaining algorithms.
Register(id), is an interactive protocol between the registrar and a user with identifier
id. The user creates uskid and its public credential upkid, and forwards upkid to the
registrar along with a proof of knowledge of the corresponding secret key, piid. The
registrar, after checking, piid adds it to the list L = {upkid}.
Vote(id,upk,usk,v) is run by voter id with credentials upk, usk to cast her vote v ∈ V. It
outputs a ballot b, which is sent to the voting server (possibly through an authenticated
channel).
Valid(BB,b) takes as input the ballot box BB and a ballot b and checks the validity of the
latter. It returns > for valid ballots and ⊥ for invalid ones (e.g. ill-formed, containing
duplicated ciphertext from the ballot box. . . ).
Append(BB,b) updates BB with the ballot b. Typically, this consists in adding b as a new
entry to BB, but more involved actions might be possible (as in our scheme).
Publish(BB) outputs the public view PBB of BB. Often one simply has Publish(BB) =
BB.
VerifyVote(PBB, id,upk,usk,b) is run by voters for checking that their ballots will be
included in the tally. On inputs the public board PBB, a ballot b, and the voter’s
identity and credentials id,usk,upk, it returns > or ⊥.
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Tally(BB,sk) on inputs the ballot box BB and the secret key sk, outputs the tally r and a
proof of correct tabulation Π. If the election is declared invalid then r :=⊥.
Verify(PBB,r,Π), on inputs the public bulletin board PBB and (r,Π), checks whether Π
is a valid proof of correct tallying for r. If so, it returns >, and ⊥ otherwise.
The exact implementation of these algorithms depends on the concrete voting proto-
col. In particular, the notion of public and private credentials of a voter varies a lot. For
example upkid might be simply the identity of the voter or may correspond to her signature-
verification key.
9.3.2 Strong Receipt-Freeness
Intuitively, privacy ensures that an adversary cannot learn the vote of an honest voter.
Receipt-freeness furthermore guarantees that a voter cannot prove how she voted, even if
she willingly provides information to, or follows instructions by, the adversary. This cap-
tures the seminal intuition from Benaloh and Tuinstra [BT94]. The latter insisted that a
reasonably private electronic voting protocol should emulate traditional voting in a voting
booth: it should allow voters to conceal their individual votes and, at the same time, prevent
them from revealing their vote. Voters should not be able to give away the privacy of their
vote granted by the voting protocol, even if they are willing to.
Building upon a definition of privacy recently introduced [BCG+15], we argue that
this requirement can be formalised for single-pass schemes by simply providing the adver-
sary with an additional oracle OreceiptLR, which allows him to submit his own ballots on
behalf of a dishonest voter. Apart from immediately implying ballot privacy, this simple
formalization captures several important scenarios:
• A voter who wants to convince a vote buyer of how she voted may prepare her ballot
in an arbitrary way that allows him to construct a convincing receipt (e.g., consider
a voter that uses biased random coins to build her ballot and to prove how she voted
[GGR09]).
• A voter that might have been corrupted before the ballot casting phase may just follow
the instructions given to her by the adversary (as in [JCJ05]).
• A voter can record, but also forge, its interaction with the ballot box (as in [BT94]).
As in previous formal or intuitive definitions of receipt-freeness, we assume the adver-
sary is not monitoring the interaction between the voter and the voting server. However, the
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voter can record this interaction, and later on present this information (or any transformation
thereof) to the adversary.
Formally, we consider two games, Game 0 and Game 1, defined by the oracles in
Figure 9.1. In both games BB0 and BB1 are ballot boxes that start out empty. Box BB0
corresponds to the real election (that will be tallied) and BB1 is a fake ballot box which the
adversary’s task is to distinguish from BB0. In Game β the adversary has indirect access to
BBβ , that is, she can see the public part of that box at any time. The game Exp
srf,β
A,V provides
an adversary A access to the oracles defined in Figure 9.1, which intuitively proceed as
follows:
Oinit generates secret and public keys for the election; the public key is returned to the
adversary. If β = 1, it also returns auxiliary information aux to be used by a simulator
SimProof introduced below.
Oreg, on input an identifier id, initialises id’s credentials (upk,usk) by running
Register(id). It gives upk to the adversary.
Ocorrupt is used by the attacker to obtain the credentials (upk,usk) of a registered voter.
OvoteLR, a left-or-right oracle, takes two potential votes (v0,v1) for an honest user id,
produces ballots b0 and b1 for these votes and places them in the ballot boxes (one in
BB0 and one in BB1), provided that v0,v1 ∈ V.
Ocast allows the adversary to cast a ballot b on behalf of any party. If the ballot is valid
with respect to BBβ , it is placed in both ballot boxes.
OreceiptLR allows an adversarial voter id to cast a ballot b1 in BB1 and a ballot b0 in BB0.
If each ballot b0,b1 is valid with respect to its respective ballot box, then the ballots
are appended by running Append(BB0,b0) and Append(BB1,b1). This allows the
adversary to encode special instructions in the ballots that could later serve as the
basis for a vote receipt (e.g. as in [GGR09]).
Oboard models the adversary’s ability to see the publishable part of the board. It returns
Publish(BBβ ).
Otally allows the adversary to see the result of the election. In both games the result is
obtained by tallying a valid BB0; the proof of correct tabulation is however simulated
in the second world, i.e., for β = 1.
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Oinit
for β = 0
(pk,sk)← Setup(1k)
return pk
for β = 1
(pk,sk,aux)← SimSetup(1k)
return pk
Oreg(id)
If id was not previously
queried, then run Register(id)
and set
U := U ∪{(id,upkid,uskid)}
return upkid.
OcorruptU(id)
On a registered voter id, output
(upkid,uskid) and setCU := CU ∪{(id,upkid)}.
Ocast(id,b)
If Valid(BBβ ,b) =⊥ then
return ⊥. Else
Append(BB0,b)
Append(BB1,b).
OvoteLR(id,v0,v1)
If v0 /∈ V or v1 /∈ V then
return ⊥. Otherwise:
b0 := Vote(id,upkid,uskid,v0)
b1 := Vote(id,upkid,uskid,v1)
Append(BB0,b0);
Append(BB1,b1)
OreceiptLR(id,b0,b1)
If id /∈ CU return ⊥.
If Valid(BB0,b0) = ⊥ or
Valid(BB1,b1) =⊥
return ⊥. Else
Append(BB0,b0)
Append(BB1,b1)
Oboard()
Return Publish(BBβ )
Otally() for β = 0
(r,Π)← Tally(BB0,sk)
return (r,Π)
Otally() for β = 1
(r,Π)← Tally(BB0,sk)
Π′← SimProofaux(BB1,r)
return (r,Π′)
Figure 9.1: Oracles defining experiments Expsrf,βA,V (λ ) for β = 0,1. The games differ in
the way the tallying oracle creates auxiliary data, in the board displayed to the adversary in
response to Oboard queries, and the board against which ballots are validated.
We demand that the adversary first calls Oinit, then oracles Oreg,OcorruptU,OvoteLR,
Ocast,OreceiptLR,Oboard in any order, and any number of times. Finally, A can call
Otally; after it receives its reply, A must return a guess of the bit β . The guess bit is the
result returned by the game.
Inherited from ballot privacy [BCG+15], Definition 30 uses simulators SimSetup
and SimProof to model the fact that the proof should not reveal anything, as it is “zero-
knowledge”.
Definition 30 (sRF). Let V = (Setup,Register,Vote,Valid,Append,VerifyVote,Publish,
Tally,Verify) be a voting protocol for a set ID of voter identities and a result function ρ .
We say that V has strong receipt-freeness if there exist algorithms SimSetup and SimProof
such that no efficient adversary can distinguish between games Expsrf,0B,V (λ ) and Exp
srf,1
B,V (λ )
defined by the oracles in Figure 9.1; that is, for any efficient algorithm A the following is
negligible in λ : ∣∣ Pr[Expsrf,0A,V (λ ) = 1]−Pr[Expsrf,1A,V (λ ) = 1]∣∣ .
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In protocols with non-interactive ballot casting an adversary does not receive any out-
put from its interaction with the ballot box (apart from the public view of the protocol run),
the sRF adversary must therefore build a receipt using local data only, and before casting the
ballot. An adversary might encode arbitrary instructions in bβ , for instance making those
instructions dependent on the vote vβ ; e.g. he could set the least significant bit of bβ equal
to vβ ∈ {0,1}. Intuitively, strong receipt-freeness implies that a ballot b0 could be replaced
by a ballot b1, both submitted via the oracle OreceiptLR, without the adversary noticing.
Thus a receipt, i.e. a proof for a certain vote having been cast, cannot exist as OreceiptLR
captures all what a RF adversary can do.
This definition does not assume that the voter is capable of successfully applying some
anti-coercion strategy (in contrast to [MN06]). We believe this to be important in practice
for two reasons. First, this is of course much easier to use: with our definition, the system is
receipt-free by construction and there is no need to instruct voters how they should proceed
to lie about their vote. Second, we need not assume that revoting is allowed (our definition
accommodates any revoting policy though, including no revote). This is important since
most countries forbid revoting.
As expected, strong receipt-freeness trivially implies BPRIV privacy [BCG+15], since
BPRIV equals sRF except that there is no oracle OreceiptLR.
Helios. Under the RF definition provided in [KZZ15] the Helios protocol would be receipt-
free. In contrast, under our definition Helios is not receipt-free. Indeed, if the adversary
is allowed to cast different ballots b0,b1 to the ballot boxes BB0,BB1, respectively, then
distinguishing Game 0 from Game 1 is trivial. This is due to the fact that in Helios PBB
contains the encryption of the votes, so it suffices for an adversary to produce different
encryptions c,d and check which one is showing up when calling oracle Oboard.
Interestingly, we believe that a Helios instantiation in which voting devices are built
upon trusted hardware tokens that conceal the randomness used for encryption (as proposed
by Magkos et al. [MBC01]) satisfies sRF, when interpreting trusted tokens as preventing
A from accessing the OreceiptLR oracle—in which case sRF collapses to ballot privacy.
This shows the flexibility of our definition. Moreover, we are confident that the same result
applies to [KZZ15].
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9.4 Building Blocks
Before describing our voting scheme, we first present the necessary cryptographic building
blocks.
9.4.1 Assumptions and Primitives
We will work in asymmetric bilinear groups and assume the existence of a bilinear-group
generator GrpGen, which on input 1λ outputs (p,G1,G2,g1,g2,GT ,e), where p is a prime
of length λ , G1,G2 and GT are cyclic groups of order p, g1 is a generator of G1, g2 is a
generator ofG2, and e is a bilinear map e : G1×G2→GT such that e(g1,g2) generatesGT .
The following was discussed in [BLS04, p. 304] and defined in [BFPV11a].
Definition 31 (CDH+). The CDH+ assumption holds for GrpGen if for G = (p,G1,G2,
g1,g2,GT ,e)←GrpGen(1λ ), and for a,b←Zp, for every p.p.t. adversary given (G,ga1,ga2,gb1),
the probability that it outputs gab1 is negligible in λ .
The next assumption implies the security of ElGamal encryption in both groupsG1 andG2:
Definition 32 (SXDH). The Symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption (SXDH) holds
for GrpGen if for G = (p,G1,G2,g1,g2,GT ,e)←GrpGen(1λ ), a,b,c←Zp and for both i ∈
{1,2}, p.p.t. adversaries only distinguish (G,gai ,gbi ,gabi ) from (G,gai ,gbi ,gci ) with advantage
negligible in λ .
Variant ElGamal Encryption. In this chapter we will use a variation of the ElGamal
encryption scheme from Section 3.3.5. This is to improve efficiency in the proofs that
follow. The difference is that the message now lies in the component containing the public
key instead of the one containing the generator.
We will define encryption for messages in G1 from an asymmetric bilinear group G =
(p,G1,G2,g1,g2,GT ,e) and show that it is randomizable.
KeyGen(G, i): Choose d←Zp and define P := gd1 . Return (pk = P,dk = d).
Encrypt(P,M;r): Using randomness r ∈ Zp, output c = (c1 := gr1,c2 := M ·Pr).
Decrypt(d,c = (c1,c2)): Output M := c2 · c−d1 .
Random(P,c = (c1,c2);r′): Using randomness r′ ∈ Zp, output c′ := (c1 ·gr′1 ,c2 ·Pr
′
).
9.4. Building Blocks 195
This scheme is IND-CPA secure assuming hardness of DDH in G1, which fol-
lows from SXDH. It is perfectly randomizable as Random(pk,Encrypt(pk,M;r);r′) =
Encrypt(pk,M;r+ r′).
Groth-Sahai Proofs. Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [GS08] allow us to prove satisfiability of
equations involving group elements from G1 or G2 and scalars. We will use them to prove
consistency and knowledge of encryptions. On input a bilinear group G, SetupGS outputs
a common reference string (CRS) crs ∈ G41×G42. The CRS is used to commit to group
elements X ∈ G1, which we denote by C1(X), and elements Y ∈ G2, denoted by C2(Y ).
Moreover, C′i(x) denotes a commitment to a scalar, which can be made inG1 (i= 1) andG2
(i = 2). The GS system lets us prove that committed values satisfy certain equations.
Under a CRS computed via SetupGS, commitments are perfectly binding and the
proofs are perfectly sound. That is, the values uniquely determined by the commitments
satisfy the proved equation. Moreover, the committed values can be extracted using an
extraction trapdoor ξ that can be computed together with the CRS. We denote this by
(crs,ξ )←Setup(x)GS (G).
There is an alternative CRS-generation algorithm Setup(h)GS , which outputs (crs′, td).
Commitments made under crs′ contain no information about the committed value and the
trapdoor td allows simulation of proofs. As CRSs output by SetupGS and Setup
(h)
GS are indis-
tinguishable under SXDH, GS proofs are computationally zero-knowledge. Moreover, GS
proofs are randomizable [FP09], that is, given commitments and proofs, one can (without
knowing the witness) create a fresh set of commitments and proofs.
9.4.2 Signatures on Randomizable Ciphertexts
The primitive introduced by Blazy et al. [BFPV11a] consists of the following algorithms:
Setup, on input the security parameter 1λ , outputs the parameters (such as the bilinear
group); SKeyGen outputs a pair of signing key and verification key (sk,vk), EKeyGen out-
puts a pair of encryption and decryption key (pk,dk). SKeyGen together with Sign and
Verify constitutes a signature scheme and EKeyGen with Encrypt and Decrypt a public-key
encryption scheme.
As the signature and the encryption scheme are used together, these algorithms have
extensions Sign+ and Verify+, which additionally take the encryption key pk as input; and
Encrypt+, Decrypt+, which also take the verification key vk.
Randomizability. The main feature of signatures on randomizable ciphertexts (SRC) is an
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algorithm Random+, which takes pk, vk, a ciphertext c under pk and a signature σ on c
valid under vk, and outputs a re-randomization c′ of c together with a signature σ ′, valid
on c′.
An output of Random+ is distributed like a fresh encryption of the plaintext of c and
a fresh signature on it; formally, for all messages m, (pk,dk) ∈ [EKeyGen(G)], (vk,sk) ∈
[SKeyGen(G)], c ∈ [Encrypt+(pk,vk,m)], σ ∈ [Sign+(sk,pk,c)], the following two random
variables are equally distributed:
 c′←Encrypt+(pk,vk,m);
σ ′←Sign+(sk,pk,c′);
: (c′,σ ′)
≈ [(c′,σ ′)←Random+(pk,vk,c,σ) : (c′,σ ′)] .
Unforgeability. Unforgeability of signatures on randomizable ciphertext is defined via the
following experiment: The challenger computes a signature key pair and an encryption key
pair (sk,vk), (dk,pk) and runs the adversary on (vk,pk,dk). It is also given access to an
oracle Sign+(sk,pk, ·), which it can query adaptively on ciphertexts c1, . . . ,cq of its choice.
Finally, the adversary outputs a pair (c∗,σ∗) and wins if Verify+(vk,pk,c∗,σ∗) = 1 and
m = Decrypt+(dk,vk,c∗) is different from all mi := Decrypt+(dk,vk,ci).
9.5 Our SRC Construction
At a high level, we need a construction that enforces our restricted message space and is
malleable enough to be re-randomised but no more. The first requirement ensures that
voters can only submit valid ballots, while the second gives us privacy via randomization
while preventing copying or tampering attacks. Specifically, we use GS proofs to ensure
validity and prevent copying or producing ballots related to those of another user. We use
signatures to ensure integrity, meaning a randomiser cannot change the ballot contents.
9.5.1 Asymmetric Waters signature scheme.
Blazy et al. [BFPV11a] define a variant of Waters’ signature scheme [Wat05] for asym-
metric groups that is perfectly randomizable and which they prove secure under the CDH+
assumption.
Setup(1λ ,1k): To sign messages m = (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ {0,1}k, generate (p,G1,G2,g1
,g2,GT ,e)←GrpGen(1λ ), choose z←G1, u = (u0, . . . ,uk)← Gk+11 , define F(m) :=
u0∏ki=1 u
mi
i . Output pp = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,z,u).
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SKeyGen(pp): Choose x←Zp, define X1 := gx1, X2 := gx2, Y := zx; output the public key
vk = (pp,X1,X2) and the secret key sk = (pp,Y ).
Sign(sk = (pp,Y ),m;s): For randomness s ∈ Zp, return the signature σ defined as
(
σ1 := Y ·F(m)s, σ2 := gs1, σ3 := gs2
)
.
Verif(vk = (pp,X1,X2),m,σ): Output 1 if both of the following hold and 0 otherwise:
e(σ1,g2) = e(z,X2) · e(F(m),σ3) e(σ2,g2) = e(g1,σ3)
Random((pp,X1,X2),F,σ ;s′): For randomness s′ ∈ Zp, output σ ′ := (σ1 ·Fs′ , σ2 ·gs′1 , σ3 ·
gs
′
2 ).
Note that for Random it suffices to know the hash F = F(m) of the signed message. The
scheme is perfectly randomizable, as for any ((pp,X1,X2),(pp,Y )) ∈ [SKeyGen(pp)] and
m,s,s′ we have Random((X1,X2),F(m),Sign(Y,m;s),s′) = Sign(Y,m;s+ s′).
Remark 4. Blazy et al. [BFPV11a] show that their signature scheme also satisfies a
(stronger) EUF-CMA notion, where the adversary’s signing queries are of the form
(m,R,T ) and if e(T,g2) = e(R,X2) then the oracle returns an additional signature element
σ4 = Rs.
9.5.2 Our SRC scheme.
We will combine ElGamal encryption, Groth-Sahai proofs and Waters signatures to create
an SRC scheme. Our construction extends that of [BFPV11a], so that it immediately yields
an RCCA-secure encryption scheme (defined below) and ultimately a strongly receipt-free
e-voting scheme.
Our scheme is defined for a polynomial-size message spaceM = {0,1}k, that is, we
assume k to be logarithmic in the security parameter. Messages m are encrypted as ElGamal
ciphertexts of F(m). Decryption works by decrypting a ciphertext to F and then looking for
m with F = F(m). We define a function H and add a third ciphertext element c3 = H(vk)r,
which will tie the ciphertext to the verification key for which it is produced.
We moreover add Cm, Groth-Sahai commitments to the message bits, and a commit-
ment CT to X r1 , which is needed for the security reduction (it corresponds to T from Re-
mark 4). Finally, we add GS proofs which show consistency of these commitments, and
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consistency of the additional ciphertext element c3. In more detail, in order to show a com-
ponent Cmi of Cm contains a bit, we require commitments in both groups (C1,m,i,C2,m,i) and
proofs pi ′i . A commitment Cr to the randomness r is used to prove consistency of the values
c1 with Cr, c2 with Cr and {Cm,i}ki=1, c3 with Cr, as well as CT with X1 and Cr.
Now, given ciphertext elements c1 = gr1 and c2 = F(m) ·Pr, the crucial observation is
that, due to the interoperability of ElGamal encryption and Waters signatures, a signer can
produce an encryption of a signature on the plaintext, without knowing the latter: setting
σ1” = cs1 = g
rs
1 and σ2 := Y · cs2 = Y · F(m)s ·Prs yields an encryption under P of the first
Waters signature element Y ·F(m)s. This is completed to a full signature by (gs1,gs2). Finally,
in order to enable full randomization of ciphertext/signature pairs, we also include Ps in the
signature.
Let Setup (for Waters signatures), SetupGS (for Groth-Sahai proofs) and KeyGen (for
ElGamal encryption) be defined as above, and H : {0,1}?→G1 be defined as
H(x) := h1 ·hH
′(vk)
2 (9.1)
for h= (h1,h2) ∈G21 and a collision-resistant hash function H ′ : {0,1}?→ Zp. Our scheme
is given in Figure 9.2. It is based on the scheme from [BFPV11a], to which we add the cru-
cial ciphertext elements c3 and piV . Unforgeability still holds, as the reduction can program
the random oracle so it knows the logarithm of H(vk), and thus simulate c3.
We omit the specific structure of the proofs in pi as they will not be relevant to the rest
of this work. Informally, pim ensures the message is valid, and piT and piV tie the ciphertext
to vk. Under a binding CRS, the bitwise commitments enable us to extract the message
even in the absence of the decryption key.
Theorem 17. The SRC scheme (Setup,EKeyGen,SKeyGen,Encrypt+, Decrypt+, Sign+,
Verify+, Random+) defined in Figure 9.2 is unforgeable under the CDH+ assumption.
Remark 5. We will prove a stronger statement, namely that our SRC scheme is unforgeable
even when the adversary only needs to output a “partial” forgery (c1,c2,{C1,m,i,C2,m,i},
Cr,pir,pim),(σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4), i.e., it need not contain c3,CT ,piT ,piV and σ5.
Moreover, note that one can also decrypt ciphertexts using the extraction trapdoor ξ
for GS proofs to recover m from Cm, sidestepping the inefficient hash inversion. We let
EKeyGen(x) denote key generation that returns ξ instead of dk.
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EKeyGen(1λ ,1k):
pp := (G,z,u)←Setup(1λ ,1k)
crs←SetupGS(G); h←G21
(P,dk)←KeyGen(G,1)
return pk := (pp,crs,h,P), dk.
Encrypt+((pp,crs,h,P),vk = (pp,X1,X2),m;r):
Compute, with H defined by h as in (9.1):
c1 := gr1 c2 := F(m) ·Pr
c3 := H(vk)r
Make commitments C: For i = 1, . . . ,k:
C1,m,i := C′1(mi) C2,m,i := C′2(mi)
CT := C1(X r1) Cr := C′2(r)
Compute GS proofs pi for the following
(with r being the value committed in Cr;
mi in C2,m,i; and w in CT ):
• pir proves gr1 = c1.
• pim consists of:
pi ′i proving mi is a bit for all i;
pi ′m proving c2 = u0∏ki=1 u
mi
i ·Pr.
• piT proves X r1 = w.
• piV proves H(vk)r = c3.
Return c := (c1,c2,c3,C,pi ).
Sign+(sk = (pp,Y ),(pp,crs,h,P),c;s):
If pi is not valid for C,vk,P, return ⊥.
Else return
σ1 := cs1 σ2 := Y · cs2 (9.2)
σ3 := gs1 σ4 := g
s
2 σ5 := P
s
Random+(vk,(pp,crs,h,P),c,σ ;(r′,s′)):
Let c = (c1,c2,c3,C,pi ); set:
c1′ := c1 ·gr′1 c2′ := c2 ·Pr
′
c3′ := c3 ·H(vk)r′
σ1′ := σ1 · cs′1 ·σ r
′
3 ·gr
′·s′
1
σ2′ := σ2 · cs′2 ·σ r
′
5 ·Pr
′·s′
σ3′ := σ3 ·gs′1 σ4′ := σ4 ·gs
′
2
σ5′ := σ5 ·Ps′
Set C′r =Cr · C2(r′), adapt pir,piT ,piV ac-
cordingly.
Randomise all commitments and proofs
to C′ and pi ′.
Return (c′1,c
′
2,c
′
3,C
′,pi ′) and σ ′.
Verify+((pp,X1,X2),(pp,crs,h,P),
(c1,c2,c3,C,pi ),σ):
Return 1 iff pi verifies and the following
hold:
e(σ1,g2) = e(c1,σ4) (9.3a)
e(σ2,g2) = e(z,X2)e(c2,σ4) (9.3b)
e(σ3,g2) = e(g1,σ4) e(σ5,g2) = e(P,σ4)
(9.3c)
Decrypt+(dk,(pp,crs,h,P),vk,c):
Let c = (c1,c2,c3,C,pi ).
If pi is not valid, return ⊥
Else let F := Decrypt(dk,c = (c1,c2));
browse M and return the first m with
F(m) = F .
Figure 9.2: Our SRC scheme
Proof. The proof is by reduction from unforgeability of Waters signatures. The reduction
obtains a verification key vk including parameters pp. It simulates EKeyGen by running
(crs,ξ )←Setup(x)GS (G), (P,d)←KeyGen(G,1) and choosing h←G21, and runs the adversary
on vk,pk := (pp,crs,h,P) and dk := d. If the adversary queries a signature on a valid tuple
c = (c1,c2,c3,C,pi ), the reduction uses ξ to extract m and T = X r1 from C (note that by
soundness of pi , we have m = Decrypt+(dk,vk,c)). The reduction makes a special query,
as defined in Remark 4, (m,c1,T ) to its signing oracle (note that c1,T satisfy e(T,g2) =
e(c1,X2)); it obtains a signature (τ1 = YF(m)s,τ2 = gs1,τ3 = gs2,τ4 = cs1); it defines (letting
r be the unknown randomness in (c1,c2,c3)) σ1 := τ4 = grs1 , σ2 := τ1 · τd4 = YF(m)sPrs,
σ3 := τ2 = gs1, σ4 := τ3 = g
s
2, σ5 := τ
d
2 = P
s, which is distributed as an SCR signature on c.
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Let {m1, . . . ,mq} be the extracted (equivalently: decrypted) messages of the signing
queries. Assume the adversary outputs a (partial) valid forgery, namely one which only
contains (c1,c2,σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4), commitments Cm,Cr and proofs pir,pim. The reduction ex-
tracts m from Cm. Then soundness of pir and pim ensures that for some r we have c1 = gr1
and c2 = F(m)Pr (and thus m = Decrypt+(dk,vk,c)).
Moreover, let s be such that σ4 = gs2. Since the forgery is valid, from Verify
+ we
have: σ1 = grs1 (from (9.3a)), σ2 = YF(m)sPrs (from (9.3b)) and σ3 = gs1 (from (9.3c)).
The reduction sets σ∗1 := σ2 ·σ−d1 =YF(m)s, σ∗2 := σ3 = gs1 and σ∗3 := σ4 = gs2 and returns
(m,σ∗). This is a valid Waters forgery, as σ∗ is valid for m and m /∈ {m1, . . . ,mq} (otherwise
the adversary would not have won the SRC unforgeability game).
9.5.3 RCCA-Secure Encryption from SRC
As a next step towards our voting protocol, we show that our SRC scheme, contrary to
the one from [BFPV11a], yields an RCCA-secure [CKN03] encryption scheme, as defined
next.
CCA-security (Sect. 3.3.6) is the standard notion for public-key encryption and im-
plies that ciphertexts are non-malleable. It states that for an efficient adversary which after
choosing m0,m1 receives c∗ it should be impossible to decide whether c∗ encrypts m0 or m1,
even when given an oracle that decrypts any ciphertext c 6= c∗. For randomizable schemes
this notion is unachievable, as the adversary could submit a randomization of the chal-
lenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle. The strongest achievable notion for randomizable
schemes is RCCA, where whenever the oracle receives an encryption of m0 or m1, it returns
a special symbol >.
Based on our SRC scheme (Sect. 9.5.2) we define the following candidate RCCA en-
cryption scheme for a polynomial-size message space {0,1}k, and show it to be secure. The
construction is a shim designed to adapt SRC to RCCA which is necessary as SRC and
RCCA have different functionalities.
KeyGen is defined as EKeyGen.
Encrypt(pk,m): Run (vk,sk)←SKeyGen(pp); c←Encrypt+(pk,vk,m);σ←Sign+(sk,pk,c);
return c = (c,σ ,vk).
Decrypt(dk,(c,σ ,vk)): If Verify+(vk,pk,c,σ)=1, return m := Decrypt+(dk,vk,c); else
return ⊥.
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Random is defined as Random+.
The adversary is free to create fresh vk,sk and run Encrypt itself or use it as an oracle
(representing an attack against users with unknown secret keys).
Theorem 18. The above encryption scheme for polynomial-size message spaces is RCCA-
secure under the SXDH and the CDH+ assumption.
Proof. Intuitively, ciphertexts hide the message, since under SXDH we could replace the
commitments and proofs in the challenge ciphertext by simulated ones and under DDH, we
could replace c2 = F(m)Pr by a random element, so the ciphertext would contain no more
information about the message. The difficulty is that we need to simulate the decryption
oracle. For this we program the hash function H: let vk∗ be the key contained in the
challenge ciphertext; we choose a,b←Zp and set h1 = P−a·H ′(vk∗) · gb1 and h2 = Pa, which
is distributed correctly and set H(vk) = Pa(H
′(vk)−H ′(vk∗)) ·gb1. For a well-formed ciphertext
containing vki 6= vk∗, we then have c2 · (c3 ·c−b1 )−1/(a(H
′(vk)−H ′(vk∗))) = c2 ·P−r = c2 ·c−d1 =
Decrypt(d,(c1,c2)), meaning we can use c3 to decrypt without knowing d; for the challenge
ciphertext under vk∗ we have c3 = gbr1 , so we can embed a DDH challenge.
The reduction can thus answer decryption queries containing some vk 6= vk∗, but not
if it contains vk∗. However, if an adversary submits a valid ciphertext with vk∗ which does
not encrypt the challenge message, then it would break SRC unforgeability, so security of
our SRC scheme implies that the adversary cannot make this type of query.
9.6 BeleniosRF
In this section we define Belenios Receipt-Free (BeleniosRF), a strongly receipt-free voting
protocol that builds on [BFPV11a, CGGI14].
9.6.1 Overview
The election public/secret key pair (pk,sk) is an encryption/extraction key pair generated
via EKeyGen(x) (i.e the extractable variant of the key genarator – cf. Remark 5), and user
key pairs (upk,usk) are signature keys generated by SKeyGen. A user casts a vote by
encrypting it via Encrypt+ under pk w.r.t. his upk, and uses usk to then sign the ciphertext
via Sign+ (together, this corresponds to a ciphertext of our RCCA encryption scheme from
Section 9.5.3).
When the ballot box receives a valid ballot, it randomises it via Random+ and imme-
diatelly publishes the resulting ciphertext/signature pair on the public bulletin board PBB.
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Users can verify that their vote is present, since they can verify the adaptation of their sig-
nature on their now-randomised ciphertexts.
Tallying follows standard techniques of e-voting: our construction allows for homo-
morphic tallying as well as shuffling. In the first case, we take advantage of the special
structure of GS commitments, which allow us to calculate a partial tally for each option
by adding the corresponding commitment across voters, and then decrypting the resulting
commitment (with proof of correctness).
Using shuffling, the encrypted votes are re-randomised and shuffled (and a proof of
correct execution of this is generated) via an algorithm Shuﬄe. Then the ballots are de-
crypted (again accompanied with a proof that this was done correctly) and the result is
published. These proofs make the tallying process publicly verifiable.
We now describe the homomorphic tallying version, where V= {0,1}k, and the result
function is simple vector addition.
The scheme VBeleniosRF is based on the SCR scheme from Section 9.5 and consists of
the following algorithms:
Setup(1λ ,1k): Compute (pk,sk)←EKeyGen(x)(1λ ,1k), produce a Fiat-Shamir random or-
acle proof Πσ that crs, contained in pk, is binding. Return (pk∗ = (pk,Πσ ),sk).
Register(id): On (implicit) input pk=(pp,crs,h,P), the user runs (upkid,uskid)←SKeyGen(pp)
and produces piid, a Fiat-Shamir random oracle proof proof that user id knows uskid corre-
sponding to upkid. The registrar checks piid and if it is valid and upkid /∈ L it adds upkid to
L.
Vote(id,upk,usk,v) is used by a voter to create a ballot b for vote v ∈ V. It computes
c← Encrypt+(pk,upk,v) and σ ← Sign+(usk,pk,c); and returns b := (id,upk,c,σ).
Valid(BB,b) first checks that the ballot b is valid, i.e., that it is well-formed and the signature
is correct. Formally, it parses b as (id,upk,c,σ) and checks if
– id corresponds to an eligible voter from ID and upk corresponds to the registration of
user id;
– Verify+(upk,pk,c,σ) = 1.
If any step fails, it returns ⊥; otherwise, it returns >.
Append(BB,b= (id,upk,c,σ)) randomises (c,σ) as (c′,σ ′) ← Random+(upk,pk,c,σ)
and appends to BB a randomised version b′ = (id,upk,c′,σ ′) of b.
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Publish(BB) takes every entry b=(id,upk,c,σ) in BB and removes elements id,c3,CT ,piT ,piV
and σ5, constructing bˆ :=
(
upk,(c1,c2,Cm,Cr,pir,pim),(σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4)
)
. It then adds bˆ to
PBB,2 and returns PBB.
VerifyVote(PBB, id,upk,usk,b) browses PBB for an entry bˆ containing upk. If none exists,
it returns ⊥. For entry bˆ := (upk=(pp,X1,X2),(c1,c2,Cm,Cr,pir,pim),(σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4)) if pir
and pim are valid and
e(σ1,g2) = e(c1,σ4) e(σ2,g2) = e(z,X2) · e(c2,σ4) e(σ3,g2) = e(g1,σ4)
then return >, else return ⊥.
Tally(BB,sk) consists of the following steps. Let N be the number of ballots.
– Parse each ballot b ∈ BB as b = (id(b),upk(b),c(b),σ (b)).
– If there is any ballot b that does not pass Valid(BB,b), output (r =⊥,PBB,Πd = /0).
– Let {C(b)1,m,i}ki=1 be the commitments in C(b)m contained in c(b). Compute Ti :=
∑b∈BBC
(b)
1,m,i. The tally ti for candidate i is produced by decrypting Ti with the GS
extraction key ξ = sk.
– Produce the result r = (t1, . . . , tk) and Πd , a Fiat-Shamir proof of correct extraction.
– Output (r,PBB,Πd).
Verify(PBB,r,Πσ ,Πd) simply verifies Πσ w.r.t. crs and Πd w.r.t. PBB and the result r.
9.6.2 Receipt-Freeness
We now show that BeleniosRF satisfies strong receipt-freeness, as defined in Definition 30.
Note that this in particular implies vote privacy of BeleniosRF.
Theorem 19. VBeleniosRF is strongly receipt-free under the SXDH assumption in the
random-oracle model.
Proof. The proof uses the ideas of that of Theorem 18. The main one is again to use hash-
function programmability and to decrypt a ciphertext (c1,c2,c3) using components c2 and
c3 instead of the GS commitments. This will allow us to switch to a hiding CRS, for which
the commitments would not be extractable. By randomizability of our SCR scheme and of
2As noted in Remark 5, these are precisely the elements that guarantee unforgeability, which assures a voter
that the plaintext of his encrypted vote was not altered.
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Groth-Sahai proofs, instead of re-randomizing the ballots in PBB, we can simply recompute
them. Finally, having switched to a hiding CRS and a simulated ROM proof thereof, we are
able to replace the adversary’s view with uniformly distributed values, irrespective of β .
We proceed by a sequence of hybrid games, which we show are indistinguishable:
Hybrid (β ,0) is the sRF game Expsrf,βA,V (Definition 30 and Figure 9.1).
Hybrid (β ,1) is the same game as Hybrid (β ,0) for β = 1; for β = 0 the difference is that
the Fiat-Shamir proofs for the CRS and the tally are simulated.
Hybrid (β ,0) → Hybrid (β ,1): Since ROM proofs can be perfectly simulated by using
random-oracle programmability, the two hybrid games are distributed equivalently.
Hybrid (β ,2) is defined as Hybrid (β ,1), except for how h is chosen. For a,b←Zp we
define h1 := gb1 and h2 := P
a (as in Theorem 18 but setting H ′(vk∗) := 0).
Hybrid (β ,1)→ Hybrid (β ,2): It is immediate that both games are distributed equivalently.
Hybrid (β ,3) is defined as Hybrid (β ,2), but the result is computed differently: each ballot
bi = (idi,upki,ci,σi) is decrypted as Fi := ci,2 · (ci,3 · c−bi,1 )−1/(a·upki) and vote vi is defined as
the smallest vi ∈ {0,1}k satisfying F(vi) = Fi. The result is r = (t1, . . . , tk) with t j = ∑i vi, j.
Hybrid (β ,2) → Hybrid (β ,3): Perfect soundness of the GS proofs contained in ci guar-
antees that this alternative way of decryption leads to the same result as extracting the bits
of vi from the commitments (we ignore collisions in F which only occur with negligible
probability).
Hybrid (β ,4) is defined as Hybrid (β ,3), except that PBB is computed differently: for ballot
bi, after extracting vi, instead of re-randomizing bi, we freshly compute bˆi for user i with
uski = (pp,Yi) as follows: we pick ri,si←Zp to set
ci,1 := g
ri
1 ci,2 := F(vi) ·Pri σi,1 := csi1 σi,2 := Yi · csi2 σi,3 := gsi1 σi,4 := gsi2
and using witnesses ri and vi, we compute Ci,m,Ci,r and pii,r,pii,m. We set bˆi =
(
upki,(ci,1,ci,2,
Ci,m,Ci,r,pii,r,pii,m),(σi,1,σi,2,σi,3,σi,4)
)
.
Hybrid (β ,3) → Hybrid (β ,4): By re-randomizability of our SCR scheme and GS proofs,
re-randomised ciphertexts, signatures and proofs are distributed exactly as freshly computed
ones. The two hybrids are thus equally distributed.
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Hybrid (β ,5) is defined as Hybrid (β ,4), except that the CRS contained in pk is set up in
hiding mode, i.e., computed via Setup(h)GS .
Hybrid (β ,4)→ Hybrid (β ,5): By the properties of GS proofs, the two hybrids are indistin-
guishable under the SXDH assumption.
Hybrid (β ,6) is defined as Hybrid (β ,5), except that the commitments and proofs published
in PBB are simulated.
Hybrid (β ,5)→Hybrid (β ,6): By the properties of GS proofs, under a hiding CRS regularly
computed proofs and simulated proofs are distributed equivalently; the two hybrids are thus
equally distributed.
Hybrid (β ,7) is defined as Hybrid (β ,6), except that for every i, when computing PBB
entry bˆi, ci,2 is computed as ci,2 := F(vi) ·gwi1 for wi←Zp.
Hybrid (β ,6) → Hybrid (β ,7): The two hybrids are indistinguishable under the DDH as-
sumption in G1, which is proved as follows: we first note that in Hybrid (β ,6), d (the
decryption key with P = gd1) is not used anywhere, and ri is only used to compute ci,1 and
ci,2 (since the GS commitments and proofs are simulated).
We give a reduction from DDH to distinguishing Hybrids 6 and 7. Let (P = gd1 ,R =
gr1,W ) be a DDH instance, where either W is random or W = g
d·r
1 . By random self-
reducibility of DDH [BBM00] we can create arbitrarily many instances (P,Ri,Wi), where
Ri = g
ri
1 for some uniformly random ri, and Wi is independently random if W was, or
Wi = g
d·ri
1 if W = g
d·r
1 .
The simulator now sets pk := (pp,crs,P), with P from the instance, and ci,1 := Ri and
ci,2 := F(vi) ·Wi. If Wi = Pri then this is distributed as in Hybrid (β ,6), whereas if Wi is
random, this is distributed as in Hybrid (β ,7).
Observe that Hybrid (0,7) and Hybrid (1,7) are equally distributed, since in both games
every ciphertext (ci,1,ci,2) is a uniformly random pair. We have thus constructed a sequence
of hybrid games Hybrid (0,0), . . . , Hybrid (0,7), Hybrid (1,7), . . . , Hybrid (1,0) which are
indistinguishable under SXDH and of which the first one corresponds to the sRF game
with β = 0 and the last is the sRF game with β = 1. This concludes the proof of strong
receipt-freeness of BeleniosRF.
Remark 6. We note that our scheme can be easily modified and proven secure in the stan-
dard model if we assume a trusted CRS: drop Πσ in Setup and use GS proofs for Πd .
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9.6.3 Verifiability
We consider strong verifiability from [CGGI14], which intuitively ensures that the result of
the election reflects the votes of:
• All voters who properly checked that their ballot appears in the bulletin board at the
end of the election. In BeleniosRF, a voter should check that one ballot in PBB is
signed with her credential.
• A subset of the voters who did not perform that final check. A voters may stop after
casting her vote, thus there is no guarantee that her ballot made it into the ballot box.
However, if the ballot is present, it should not be possible to modify the corresponding
vote.
• At most all corrupted voters. In particular, an adversary should not be able to add
more votes than the number of voters he controls.
We refer the reader to [CGGI14] for the formal definition and point out that strong veri-
fiability assumes that voting devices are honest. We first note that BeleniosRF cannot be
strongly verifiable if revoting is allowed. Indeed, if a voter first casts a ballot b1 for a can-
didate v1, but later changes her mind and votes for v2, casting a new ballot b2, a malicious
voting server may force the voter to keep the initial vote v1 by re-randomizing b1 instead of
b2, and the voter would not be able to detect it. Therefore, in what follows, we assume that
a no-revote policy is applied. We believe that no-revoting is not a real restriction since, as
discussed in the introduction, this actually corresponds to the most common setting used in
practice. By slightly generalizing the strong-verifiability transformation in [CGGI14, Sec-
tion 4], we are able to show:
Theorem 20. BeleniosRF is strongly verifiable, if the underlying signature on randomiz-
able ciphertexts scheme is unforgeable and either: (a) the ballot box is honest or (b) the
registration protocol is zero-knowledge.
Let us summarise the main ideas behind our argument. The transformation to strong
verifiability in [CGGI14] consists in the voter signing with her private signing key usk a
ballot b obtained via an existing voting protocol that is weakly verifiable (roughly speaking,
weak verifiability assumes that the voting server is honest, e.g., it does not modify nor erase
ballots). Next, the voter sends the triple (upk,b,σ) to the voting server. The latter, after
validating the ballot b and verifying its signature σ , adds the triple (upk,b,σ) to the ballot
9.7. Efficiency of BeleniosRF 207
box. At the end of the election, the voter checks that her ballot (upk,b,σ) appears in PBB
by a simple search. (i.e. she checks that (upk,b,σ) ∈ PBB).
We generalise this transformation by allowing the voting server to add a transformed
triple (upk,b′,σ ′) to the ballot box on input the voter’s ballot (upk,b,σ), such that poten-
tially b 6= b′ and σ 6= σ ′ (in the original construction, one simply sets b′ = b and σ ′ = σ ). In
our generalised transformation, the voter on input her cast ballot (upk,b,σ) checks whether
there exists an entry (upk,b′,σ ′) in PBB such that (b′,σ ′) verifies under her key upk. Due
to unforgeability of randomizable signatures on ciphertexts (cf. Section 9.5) and because of
the no-revoting policy, this check guarantees that the new ballot b′ displayed in the bulletin
board contains the same vote as the original ballot b cast by the voter.
If we opt to use an issuing (as opposed to an endorsing) registar, strong verifiability
assumes that either the ballot box (i.e. the re-randomization server) or the registrar is honest.
As pointed out in Section 9.2, the security of the generalised transformation described in
the previous paragraph is jeopardised if this trust assumption is violated, as the existence
of an entry (upk,b′,σ ′) in PBB would no longer guarantee that b′ contains the choice cast
by the voter. In fact, an attacker controlling both an issuing registar and the voting server
can insert entries (upk,b′,σ ′) in PBB that pass all tests but modified the voter’s choice.
This is due to the fact that the registrar knows each voter’s private signing key. An obvious
countermeasure is to let each voter generate their own signing key pair and simply ask the
registrar to include the corresponding verification key in the list of eligible keys for the
election.
Alternatively, one can thresholdise the role of the registrar (who simply sends a private
signing key to each voter) so it becomes less likely for the attacker to obtain a voter’s private
key.
9.7 Efficiency of BeleniosRF
The ballot encryption scheme we introduced is somewhat involved, especially since we
use bit-by-bit Groth-Sahai proofs. For this reason, we benchmarked ballot creation on a
number of potential client devices. We built a JavaScript implementation [bel16] of the
voting process (encrypt, sign, prove) using the CertiVox IoT Crypto Library [Cer15]. We
used a BN curve on a 254-bit prime field. We considered the values k = 1,5,10 and 25. For
homomorphic tallying, as used in Section 9.6, k represents the number of candidates in an
election. If we switch to shuffle-based tallying, k is the length of the message, which means
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we can support up to 2k candidates.
As seen in Table 9.1, recent devices can complete the required cryptographic opera-
tions in reasonable time for small values of k. We see that while the linear cost associated
with the message size is the dominant factor, the constant factor is not negligible for low-end
devices. While slower than the current Helios or Belenios implementation (which do not
use elliptic curves), performance is acceptable, especially for modern devices. Moreover,
we note that our implementation is single-threaded with only rudimentary optimizations
(e.g taking advantage of the fact that the message bits must be 0 or 1). By constructing
proofs incrementally as the ballot is filled, we could amortise the linear part of the cost.
Alternatively, we may increase performance by coding a native client, e.g. a smartphone
app.
We expect that server performance for BeleniosRF will be less of a bottleneck. Com-
pared to Helios, the main additional cost is verifying our Groth-Sahai proofs, which is dom-
inated by ca. 64(k+ 1) pairings, reducible to 4(k+ 35) using techniques from [BFI+10]
and [GHR15]. Given the timings provided by Beuchat et al. [BGDM+10], we expect a
throughput of roughly 5 ballots/second/core for k = 10. Additionally, checks can be amor-
tised throughout the voting period, as ballots come in.
9.8 The Blazy et al. Voting Protocol is not Ballot-Private
Blazy et al. [BFPV11a], who introduced the notion of signatures on randomizable cipher-
texts, proposed to use this primitive for a receipt-free e-voting protocol. Their ballot-
creation and -casting protocol workflow is as follows:
• The voter sends ballot
b =
(
vk, c = {v}rpk, σvk,sc ,pi t,v∈{0,1}pk
)
,
Device k = 1 k = 5 k = 10 k = 25
2013 Laptop –i7-4650U 1.00s 2.43s 4.02s 9.24s
2010 Desktop –i3-530 1.49s 3.46s 5.92s 13.62s
2014 Tablet –Exynos 5420 6.97s 12.91s 21.92s 47.26s
2016 Phone –SD 810 2.75s 6.26s 10.39s 22.19s
2014 Phone –SD 801 5.55s 13.12s 22.70s 48.06s
2012 Phone –A6 9.04s 18.65s 29.96s 63.77s
Table 9.1: Time to encrypt, sign and perform GS proofs for ballots with a k-bit payload.
This allows for up to k candidates with homomorphic tallying, or 2k using shuffles.
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where r,s, t ∈Zp denote the randomness used for encrypting the vote v, signing the resulting
ciphertext c and creating the NIZK proof pi , respectively.
• The server re-randomises the ballot b to b′ as follows:(
vk, c = {v}r′pk, σvk,s
′
c , pi
t ′,v∈{0,1}
pk
)
, where r′,s′, t ′←Zp.
Similarly to BeleniosRF, the server can only re-randomise legitimate signatures, mean-
ing that any new ballot b′ that contains a valid signature w.r.t. vk must originate from a ballot
b that has been previously created by the voter, and thus b and b′ contain the same vote.
An attack on ballot privacy. However, the above ballot casting workflow is not ballot
private, let alone receipt-free. The following is a ballot replay attack, which is known to
break ballot privacy [CS11]:
• Honest voter sends b = (vk, c = {v}rpk, σvk,sc ,pi t,v∈{0,1}pk ).
• Server re-randomises the ballot b as
b′ =
(
vk, c = {v}r′pk, σvk,s
′
c , pi
t ′,v∈{0,1}
pk
)
and displays it on the public bulletin board.
• Dishonest voter with credentials (v¯k, s¯k) and knowledge of target ballot b′
– Copies c = {v}r′pk, pi t
′,v ∈{0,1}
pk and re-randomises it to c¯ = {v}r¯pk, pi t¯,v ∈{0,1}pk ;
– Signs c¯ with s¯k yielding σ v¯k,s¯c¯ ;
– Sends ballot b¯ =
(
vk, c¯ = {v}r¯pk, σ v¯k,s¯c¯ , p¯i t¯,v ∈{0,1}pk
)
.
These instructions allow any voter with knowledge of a ballot b to produce an
independent-looking ballot b¯, that will be accepted by the voting server and effectively
contains a copy of the vote in b. Thus, the voting protocol [BFPV11a] is not ballot-private.
(Note that due to re-randomizing being allowed, the ballot box cannot discard copied votes,
as they look like legitimate ones.)
9.9 Conclusions
We introduced the notion of strong receipt-freeness, where a malicious voter (i.e. vote-
selling or coerced) cannot produce a receipt proving how she voted, whether the voter de-
cided to act maliciously before, during or after casting the ballot. Even if the voter reveals
to the coercer/vote-buyer the randomness used to seal the vote, the adversary cannot be
convinced that the revealed coins correspond to the actual randomness used by the voter.
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Our adversarial model is close to the spirit of the seminal work on receipt-freeness
by Benaloh and Tuinstra [BT94]. Moreover, our definition builds on the recent work
[BCG+15], inheriting a simple, concise, and game-based definition. Such definitions are
well-known for easing the job of conceiving and writing security proofs; a point we confirm
by giving a new e-voting protocol that satisfies our definition in bilinear groups under the
SXDH assumption in pairing groups, in the random oracle model. The protocol is built
using ideas from a previous work [BFPV11a] that claimed to have solved this problem. We
show however that the previous voting scheme was not ballot-private, which is weaker than
receipt-freeness.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that is both receipt-free (in a
strong sense) and has universal verifiability (in the sense of strong verifiability [CGGI14]),
without requiring the existence of an untappable channel, or the use of secure hardware
tokens. We only require that the receipt-freeness adversary is not eavesdropping the com-
munication between the voter and the voting server, and the existence of a re-randomization
service. As a result, we overcome the impossibility result [CFP+10], stating no scheme can
be receipt-free and universally verifiable without an untappable channel (this is for instance
the case of JCJ/Civitas [JCJ05]). We achieve this by relying on a ballot box server that is
charged with re-randomising ballots, and at the same time precluded from changing their
contents, in a publicly verifiable way [BFPV11a]. Finally, we showed the feasibility of our
approach by implementing a voting client in Javascript and measuring its performance in a
number of platforms.
Chapter 10
Conclusions
Throughout this work we examined protocols that aim to enforce correct behaviour between
(perhaps untrusting) participants. In some examples this is direct, e.g. in the case of pre-
venting a malicious voter from posting a stuffed ballot. In the case of multi-user signatures
this enforcement is more indirect, and lies with the potential for anonymity to be revoked
(of course, in the context of revoking anonymity, direct enforcement is again necessary).
None the less, most of the “targets” of the presented research have a history of move-
ment. Efficiency is always a priority in practical applications, and can often enable new
applications by itself (e.g highly efficient verification enables the outsourcing of compu-
tations [PHGR13]). The notion of security is also evolving, not only because attacks can
become more sophisticated, but also because we discover gaps in our modelling or our
assumptions. With that in mind, some future directions seem promising in particular:
The Protocol of Chapter 5 is highly efficient, and achieves impressively small proof
sizes given its setting. At the same time, the verification time against pairing-based systems
such as [PHGR13] is much higher. It would be interesting to see if the iterative reduction
technique used can be exported to other applications in the same setting.
The DFN-based construction of Chapter 4 removes the reliance on complexity leverag-
ing and demonstrates that culpable soundness can be justifiably used in some applications.
However, it relies on the somewhat inefficient Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98] cryptosystem,
where Paillier [Pai99] or a variant such as [DJN10] might prove more efficient. Addition-
ally, it only covers a somewhat restricted range of protocols. As such, generalizing it to
be more expressive is a natural direction. In the same chapter, the delayed message board
breaks convention with most current approaches, so it would also be worthwhile to exam-
ine whether this requirement can be removed, or alternatively harnessed independently as a
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potential avenue for improvements: it might be possible to omit revealing contents message
board at all by forcing the board to complete a proof certifying they are correct.
A link between multi-user signatures and voting exists by means of list signa-
tures [CSST06], which are akin to group signatures where each user is limited in the number
of times they can sign. It would be interesting to see if the efficient accountable ring sig-
nature scheme of chapter 6 can be used to produce a list signature apart from a group one
(Chap. 7). At the same time, the ring-based construction would also be amenable to self-
organizing communities in a similar fashion to self-tallying voting systems [KY02].
BeleniosRF, presented in Chapter 9 obtains good security properties at a low concep-
tual cost for the voter. While its prover efficiency is acceptable, optimizations might help
make it practical for mobile devices sooner rather than later. Being mobile-friendly is more
than a matter of convenience for BeleniosRF: as revoting is not currently supported, voting
early increases security since users who have voted cannot be coerced. Alternatively, if full
coercion resistance is implemented, mobile usage might be made more difficult as coercion-
resistant protocols are typically heavier. Additionally, as BeleniosRF gives good solution
to the issue of receipts in Helios-like systems (on which the copying system of Chapter 8
relies), it would be interesting to re-examine copying as a potential planned feature of a vot-
ing system (rather than unplanned, but technically feasible). As such it could be compared
to alternative voting and tallying systems such as STV [BO91].
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